


BioCarbon Fund Initiative for Sustainable Forest Landscapes

First Program Evaluation
Final Report



April 2019



Shaping a more livable world.

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Abbreviations and Acronyms

AFOLU	agriculture, forestry, and other land use
BioCF	BioCarbon Fund
CAR	Regional Environmental Corporation (Colombia)
CFU	Conservation Farming Unit
COMACO	Community Markets for Conservation
CONAFOR	National Forestry Commission (Mexico)
CSO	civil society organization
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DfID	Department for International Development
ER	emission reductions
EOC	Evaluation Oversight Committee
ERPA	Emission Reductions Purchase Agreement
ERPD	Emission Reductions Program Document
ET	Evaluation Team
FARC	<i>Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia</i> (Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces)
FCPF	Forest Carbon Partnership Facility
FGD	focus group discussion
FIP	Forest Investment Program
FMT	Fund Management Team
FPE	First Program Evaluation
FREL	Forest Reference Emissions Levels
FY	fiscal year
GEF	Global Environment Facility
GHG	greenhouse gas
GIZ	<i>Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit</i> (German Society for International Development)
GNU	Germany, Norway and the United Kingdom
IBRD	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
IDA	International Development Association
IDEAM	<i>Instituto de Hidrología, Meteorología y Estudios Ambientales</i> (Institute for Hydrology, Meteorology and Environmental Studies)
IDH	<i>Initiatief voor Duurzame Handel</i> (Sustainable Trade Initiative)
IEG	Independent Evaluation Group

IFC	International Finance Corporation
ISFL	Initiative for Sustainable Forest Landscapes
ISR	Implementation Status Report
IU	Implementation Unit
KII	key informant interview
MADR	Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (Colombia)
MADS	Ministry of Environment and Sustainable Development (Colombia)
MEL	Monitoring Evaluation and Learning
MRV	Measurement, Reporting and Verification
NDP	National Development Plan
NGO	nongovernmental organization
NICFI	Norway's International Climate and Forest Initiative
NIU	National Implementation Unit
NORAD	Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation
NORECCO	<i>Nodo Regional de Cambio Climático de la Orinoquía</i> (Orinoquía Regional Climate Change Node)
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
ORCU	Oromia REDD+ Coordination Unit
PAD	Project Appraisal Document
PIU	Provincial Implementation Unit
RBP	results-based payments
REDD	Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation in developing countries
REDD+	Reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation and the role of conservation, sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks in developing countries.
REM	REDD Early Movers
SAGARPA	Secretariat of Agriculture and Rural Development Agriculture Secretariat (Mexico)
T3	Tranche 3
TFA 2020	Tropical Forest Alliance 2020
TOC	theory of change
TONINA	<i>Transformando la Orinoquia con la Integración de los beneficios de la Naturaleza en Agendas Sostenibles</i> (Transforming the Orinoquía by integration of the benefits of nature in sustainable agendas)
TOR	terms of reference
TNC	The Nature Conservancy
TTL	Task Team Lead

UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
UN-REDD	United Nations REDD program
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USFS	United States Forest Service
WBG	World Bank Group
WB	World Bank
ZIFLP	Zambia Integrated Forest Land Project

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Evaluation Team: Robert Hofstede, Shannon Vasamsetti, John Costenbader, Jonathan Randall, Ashwin Bhouraskar

Executive Summary

BACKGROUND

Launched in November 2013, the BioCarbon Fund (BioCF) Initiative for Sustainable Forest Landscapes (ISFL) is a 17-year, first-of-its-kind program in the global effort to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from the agriculture, forestry, and other land use (AFOLU) sector and to increase sequestration through improved land management. With the World Bank as its Trustee, the ISFL is working with the governments of Colombia, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Mexico, and Zambia to pilot new landscape planning approaches at a jurisdictional scale. In the process, the ISFL aims to catalyze the development of a low-carbon rural economy in each of its program areas that will simultaneously result in livelihood opportunities for communities and an overall reduction in land-based emissions. The four contributors at the time of the evaluation were the governments of Germany, Norway, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The Initiative has a total funding pool of \$380 million split across two distinct funding mechanisms: BioCF*plus* and BioCF Tranche 3 (T3). BioCF*plus* provides approximately \$100 million in grant funding to improve the enabling environment for sustainable land-use and low-emissions development activities. BioCF T3 provides approximately \$280 million to purchase verified emission reductions to sustain interventions in sustainable land use that lower GHG emissions.

Through fiscal year (FY) 2018, the ISFL has made progress in many areas, such as:

- Project Appraisal Documents prepared and approved in Colombia, Ethiopia, Mexico, and Zambia.
- Grants signed in Colombia, Ethiopia, Mexico, and Zambia with \$56 million committed across five countries and \$3.26 million disbursed.
- More than 350,000 stakeholders consulted on ISFL programs.
- \$4.55 million leveraged in for-profit private sector finance and \$86.95 million in not-for-profit finance.
- Twenty technical studies completed.
- Two partnerships with private sector organizations and two partnerships with non-for-profit organizations established.
- Six coordination platforms supported.
- Full list of 2018 results reported in *Annual Report 2018*.

FIRST PROGRAM EVALUATION

The Final Evaluation Report provides the results of the ISFL's First Program Evaluation (FPE) conducted between June 2018 and March 2019. The purpose of the evaluation was to:

- Assess the formative years of the ISFL (2013–2018).
- Validate or adjust the ISFL theory of change (TOC) and ensure that the program is on course to achieve its objectives.
- Evaluate the ISFL approach and structure, including its governance, against the World Bank Independent Evaluation Group and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development/Development Assistance Committee criteria of relevance, effectiveness, and efficiency, and provide recommendations.
- Review progress to date against defined milestones.

The evaluation was guided by agreed-upon terms of reference with the World Bank and Contributors and included key primary and secondary evaluation questions. DAI Global LLC, with support from the World Bank's Fund Management Team (FMT) and the ISFL Evaluation Oversight Committee, led the evaluation. The Evaluation Team (ET) reviewed more than 130 documents, conducted 113 stakeholder interviews and a survey, and visited two country missions. Data collection and analysis concluded in December 2018. Based on the analysis of the information, the ET determined whether the ISFL global program is positioned to achieve its objective given its structure, approach, and progress to date against defined milestones, and developed action-oriented recommendations for how the ISFL may improve program performance.

KEY FINDINGS

The Final Report includes 30 overall findings from the ET's research and investigation. Key findings include:

- Overall, the ISFL program, and implementing countries, have made strong efforts to partner with national and subnational government entities, nongovernmental and civil society organizations (NGOs/CSOs), and private sector counterparts that are at the intersection of sustainable landscapes and emission reductions programming. The findings suggest that the program has been stronger in building government partnerships than partnerships with the NGO/CSO and private sector communities. The total number of ISFL partnerships, and their effectiveness, varies across countries. In some jurisdictions, the partnerships have been hindered by the long design phase of the program.
- The structure of the ISFL provides access to several different funding mechanisms from the World Bank Group, which has increased the number and type of activities that occur within each country program. However, the diverse funding sources add to the complexity of the institutional arrangements, which increases transaction costs and slows progress. Challenges include the need to coordinate with, and obtain approvals from, multiple implementing government institutions; lack of congruency between geographic landscapes targeted for different programs; differing implementation timelines; multiple reporting lines; and the additional burden of multiple social and environmental safeguard systems, in some cases.
- Private sector engagement is a core pillar of the ISFL. The ISFL uses a broad definition of private sector engagement that includes private sector consultation, public-private sector collaboration for activity implementation, and leveraging of private sector funds. To date, the program has capitalized on a well-recognized partnership with Nespresso in Ethiopia. More broadly, although there has been a focus on private sector engagement, concrete investments on the ground have been minimal across ISFL jurisdictions.
- No emission reductions purchase agreements (ERPAs) or resulting benefit-sharing agreements had been completed at the time of the evaluation. Stakeholders held divergent views as to what types of beneficiaries and activities the agreements should target. For example, the purchase agreements could be focused on drivers of deforestation ranging from smallholder fuel wood harvesting to large, commercial agricultural operations leading to land conversion. Reaching decisions about the details of the ERPAs will have consequences in terms of the incentive structures that are put into place and the specific types of programming that are needed to achieve the emission reduction targets.
- The implementation of the ISFL program has been slower than planned due to multiple factors, including: 1) ISFL combines jurisdictional and landscape approaches in very diverse target countries, which leads to conceptual complexities that require additional effort to understand and operationalize; 2) the ISFL is managed by a relatively small fund management team with an extensive mandate; 3) the program structure includes several reporting and coordination lines

within the World Bank, country programs, and contributing countries; and 4) strategies such as private sector engagement, ERPA design, and benefit sharing were underdeveloped or misaligned during the first phase (years 1–5) of the program.

- The ISFL faces several unique challenges given its design. These include: 1) high transaction costs due to the multisectoral approach that works across ministries and thematic areas; 2) the time required to negotiate agreements between highly centralized and bureaucratic government structures, with many countries changing administrations over the course of the first phase of the ISFL; 3) diverse institutional landscapes with varying levels of capacity across country programs; 4) few World Bank and government staff who can dedicate enough time to day-to-day implementation requirements of ISFL programs in each country, which has resulted in less effective decision making and fewer resources available for an ambitious program such as the ISFL; and 5) a complex, decentralized global management structure of international, multilateral, and bilateral agencies with numerous reporting and communication lines, contributing to a lack of alignment among different initiatives.
- The ISFL has set forth ambitious targets in terms of emission reductions that are challenging to achieve and measure given the level of program complexity and required in-country capacity. GHG accounting at a jurisdictional scale requires a high degree of capacity and data collection to measure, report, and verify emissions reference levels and reductions, which may take a longer time in some target jurisdictions. The evolution of land-based emission reduction programs from individual REDD+ projects to broader landscape- and jurisdiction-scale approaches is a new paradigm requiring different ways of thinking, and it is not fully understood by all ISFL stakeholders.
- The implementation to date of the ISFL has provided insight into challenges and opportunities of jurisdictional programming, but these lessons have yet to be captured and communicated at the global level and the program has only partially incorporated lessons learned from the evolution of similar jurisdictional and landscape programs. Some critical challenges include the political economy of tradeoffs and competing interests among multiple land-use sectors, unequal distribution of emission sources across jurisdictions, and complexity of implementation in very large jurisdictions, especially when multiple administrative units are involved. The ISFL has not combined results-based payments with commodity supply chain sustainability commitments in jurisdictions, which could provide necessary leverage to overcome these challenges.
- Although there is strong coordination with other government-led forestry programs, such as the United Nations REDD Program, the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility, and the Forest Investment Program, the evaluation found relatively poor coordination among other NGO and bilaterally-funded programs—including some programs funded by the same Contributors that support ISFL. Particularly in large jurisdictions, it is unrealistic to assume that the ISFL can achieve coordination among every single participant; however, the evaluation found that there are opportunities to increase coordination among programs, donor countries, and activities that will improve overall ISFL effectiveness and other areas of the program (e.g., sharing lessons, building capacity, cost-effectiveness).
- The large and complex structures of the World Bank and Contributors have hindered communications at all levels, which has repercussions on effective delivery of the programs. The communication challenges affect how countries make decisions at the governance level and can result in delays, lack of “trust,” and missed opportunities. Coordination and communication are also problematic between the ISFL Contributors and differing agencies in the countries—e.g., the U.S. State Department (donor) and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) or the U.K. Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA), U.K. Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (donor), and the U.K. Department for International Development (DFID).

CONCLUSIONS

The evaluation concludes that the ISFL program is highly relevant and has been adopted by national and jurisdictional agencies in program countries. The program seeks to operationalize a complex concept across subnational landscapes in five highly diverse countries and has set ambitious targets and timelines to achieve the emission reduction targets. The conceptual and managerial complexity of the initiative has led to technical and administrative challenges in its foundational years that have resulted in delayed implementation. These challenges have collectively led to a decreased likelihood that the program is on track to meet its objectives in the planned timeframe.

The program has also faced challenges that are common for large, multilateral environment and sustainable development programs, such as governmental changes, limited intersectoral coordination, and complex intra- and interagency coordination and communication lines. Because only two of the five program countries are effectively under implementation, there is sufficient time and space for improving coordination and communication lines to improve program performance.

Results-based payments (RBP) have been tested for the past decade as a tool for incentivizing behavior change to reduce emissions, with highly variable results related to details such as timing of costs payments.¹ However, it is unclear whether the projected RBP funds are enough to incentivize significant land-use change activities. Generally, government agencies all agreed that T3 funding will be used to defray implementation costs. The ET found little evidence in the country programs of the use of future RBP funding for incentivizing change and, therefore, cannot judge if the TOC of the program holds. This correlates closely with the conclusion that significant uncertainty exists regarding how benefit-sharing will be designed and implemented, resulting in highly divergent expectations of it. Moreover, the ISFL's lack of combining RBP funds with sustainable supply chain commitments undercuts the rationale of a jurisdictional approach.

The private sector is starting to engage more in ISFL program countries and the ISFL is adjusting mechanisms to explore entry-points that will deliver cost-effective and efficient results. However, many companies and private sector initiatives do not know what the ISFL program can offer their operations, what technical assistance ISFL provides to improve their businesses, or how to engage with the Initiative.

The ISFL program has mainstreamed gender dimensions and social inclusion in its programming and management practices through the application of social safeguards at the country level. The ISFL also includes gender-related indicators in its monitoring, evaluation, and learning framework. While the evaluation found that gender was well-incorporated in the design of the program, including a gender-specific strategy or gender specialist to oversee the program could aid in robust gender outcomes in implementation.

THEORY OF CHANGE

At the inception phase of the evaluation, the ET found that the TOC provides a high-level, general presentation of logical pathway from inputs to impact, but lacks elements that are included in most TOCs, such as clear impact pathways (how desired change will come about), result chains (how the intervention will trigger this change), and assumptions and risks that should be monitored for each logical step. To clarify the TOC and guide the evaluation questions, the ET considered the underlying causal logic and identified its implicit assumptions and the preconditions required to meet these assumptions at the outset. The evaluation found that a key shortcoming of the program was the lack of a well-developed, clear TOC—for the program as a whole and for individual country programs. The ET recommends that the ISFL develop a robust TOC that makes explicit each of the logical causal steps included in results chains

¹ See, e.g., Wong, G., et al. (2016). Results-based payments for REDD+: Lessons on finance, performance, and non-carbon benefits. URL: [10.17528/cifor/006108](https://doi.org/10.17528/cifor/006108).

and/or impact pathways, as well as assumptions and monitoring tools, for both the global initiative and country programs. The new TOC should be clear and precise enough in its internal logic to identify inherent assumptions to be used for evaluation and monitoring, to assess program performance, and to guide adaptive management.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the primary challenges that the ISFL has faced and lessons that are applicable to future funding, the ET developed a series of recommendations to improve the ISFL's approach and structure. Key recommendations include:

- While the program has had successful engagement with relevant government agencies, the ET suggests that the program improve information flows to better engage broader stakeholder groups and increase collaboration with a wider group of potential partners. This could be accomplished through a targeted country engagement and communications strategy at the jurisdiction, national, and international levels, with clearly defined pathways for engagement by relevant stakeholder groups.
- The program should improve alignment and coordination among the different agencies involved in program implementation through more clearly defined expectations and roles for each agency.
- To increase private sector engagement, the ET suggests that the FMT expedite the implementation of an actionable private sector engagement strategy identifying all potential partner options and approaches.
- ISFL Contributors can more actively promote options for engagement with companies from Contributor countries, and the ISFL country programs can adapt private sector engagement strategies to the national and local contexts in collaboration with private sector stakeholders.
- The program should improve continuous information flows between Contributor agency representatives at the global and national levels, Task Team Leads (TTLs), and host-country implementing units so that all levels are up to date on progress, opportunities, or challenges to improve program alignment and coordination. Key project staff should consider facilitating (or attending where they exist) regular, in-country Contributor meetings aimed at sharing information and lessons learned and to coordinate activities.
- The ISFL private sector specialist in the World Bank headquarters should identify a key counterpart in each country, such as a member of the Implementation Unit (IU) or a contractor, with the time and capacity to cultivate necessary relationships and build partnerships with the private sector.
- The private sector specialist, with the IU, should develop strategies to upscale ISFL private sector engagement by increasing the number of beneficiaries through private sector partnerships and by targeting producer-group associations, cooperatives, and other aggregators that offer credit and favorable terms based on volume. Similarly, the ISFL should align its RBP funding with private sector sustainable supply chain commitments in the targeted jurisdictions in order to overcome political economy challenges and better incentivize change.
- Within each program country, the FMT should ensure that one TTL, stationed in the country, has sufficiently allocated time to oversee the different complementary funds to allow for more focus on moving ISFL activities forward. Increased staffing commitments, from both the FMT and country programs, are also necessary to enable the ISFL to keep up with the high level of data requirements and to contribute to evolving policy and practice related to the jurisdictional approach, REDD+, and related initiatives globally.

- At the program and country levels, the ISFL should develop explicit and robust TOCs. Each TOC should include a situation model and a series of results chains and/or impact pathways that show how specific interventions lead to intermediate results that ultimately contribute to ISFL objectives. An Initiative-level situation model and results chains could serve as a model for in-country logical models that can help guide country-specific programs and strategies. These causal models can be used to test assumptions and adaptively manage the program.
- The IU in each country should include gender expertise—either with a single expert or by engaging a supporting organization charged with mainstreaming and reporting on the gender-positive approach.
- Because the ISFL can still be considered to be in its early stages, the ET recommends that the ISFL begin taking steps to prepare for managing the wealth of data, information, experiences, and publications that will be generated by different projects from agencies at different levels so that the knowledge can be shared for the benefit of emission reductions programs around the globe.

The findings of this evaluation provide an overall image of a highly relevant project, welcomed and adopted by participating national and jurisdictional agencies. The ISFL's innovative approach provides additional value to participating countries' existing strategies for reducing land-based emissions and promoting green growth. The ISFL is an ambitious program because it operationalizes relatively complex concepts—such as the landscape and jurisdictional approaches for reduced carbon emissions—across subnational regions in five countries. Given the complexity of its approach, the ISFL has faced technical and administrative challenges in its foundational years. The detailed findings, conclusions, and recommendations of this First Program Evaluation are intended to help improve the performance of ISFL and help set the program on a trajectory to success in its remaining years.

Introduction

BACKGROUND

1. Launched in 2013, the BioCarbon Fund (BioCF) Initiative for Sustainable Forest Landscapes (ISFL) is a first-of-its-kind program in the global effort to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from the agriculture, forestry, and other land-use (AFOLU) sectors and increase carbon sequestration through improved land management. Spanning five countries, the ISFL works with the governments of Colombia, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Mexico, and Zambia to pilot new landscape planning approaches at jurisdictional scale. In the process, the ISFL aims to catalyze the development of low-carbon rural economies in each of the participating countries, which will result in livelihood opportunities for communities and an overall reduction in emissions from land use. The ISFL aims to achieve its objective of GHG emission reductions, while also addressing poverty and unsustainable land use, through four key design elements:
 - **Working at scale:** *Focusing on a jurisdiction within a country and engaging with multiple sectors to increase impact over large areas.* The ISFL uses a landscape approach in each jurisdiction, requiring stakeholders to consider tradeoffs and synergies between land use sectors such as forestry, agriculture, energy, mining, and infrastructure. In doing so, solutions can be identified that serve multiple objectives and influence a variety of sectors.
 - **Leveraging partnerships:** *Creating partnerships with other public-sector initiatives and private sector actors.* To maximize impact, the ISFL is designed to work with the public sector to improve capacity and create non-financial incentives to improve landscape management. Private sector engagement can include collaborating on sustainable approaches, blending finance, or convening stakeholders.
 - **Incentivizing results:** *Providing results-based climate finance over a long-term period by purchasing verified emission reductions.* To reduce GHG emissions from land use across an entire jurisdiction while simultaneously creating livelihood opportunities, the ISFL will provide a financial incentive for countries to reduce emissions in a 10- to 15-year period.
 - **Building on experience:** *Drawing on lessons learned from BioCF Tranches 1 and 2 and Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in developing countries (REDD+) work.* The ISFL will build on previous experience in national REDD+ readiness work of the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF), the United Nations REDD Program (UN-REDD), and other global land-use initiatives. However, the ISFL will aim to work at a larger scale, incorporating experiences, approaches, and technical tools from previous programs.
2. The ISFL consists of two primary components, each supported by distinct funding mechanisms, for grant funding and results-based payments (RBP). In the first phase of implementation, grant funding is used under the BioCF*plus* instrument to improve the enabling environment and may include technical assistance, capacity building, and investments. The ISFL provides RBP through the BioCF Tranche 3 (T3) funding instrument to purchase verified emission reductions and thus support interventions for sustainable land use.

TABLE 1: BIOCFPLUS AND BIOCF T3 MECHANISMS

BioCFplus	BioCF T3
Provides funding in the form of a grant for technical assistance, capacity building, and investments.	Provides results-based finance through the purchase of verified emission reductions.
Supports countries to make improvements to its enabling environment for sustainable land use.	Payments can be used to sustain successful interventions to sustainable land use in each jurisdiction.

3. The World Bank is the Trustee for the ISFL, which is housed in the organization’s Climate Change Fund Management unit. The trustee is otherwise known as the ISFL Fund Management Team (FMT) and is responsible for the day-to-day operations of the Initiative. The FMT assumes a coordinating role for all operations, communications, external engagements, and representation of the ISFL. Donors to the BioCFplus and BioCF T3 are known as the ISFL Contributors, and provide advice, guidance, and feedback on the ISFL and its programs as appropriate. The ISFL Contributors make decisions, including for budget approval, program selection, and funding allocations to ISFL programs. During the evaluation, the four ISFL Contributors included the Governments of Germany, Norway, the United Kingdom, and the United States, with Switzerland joining in December 2018.² The ISFL is a 17-year program that became operational in November 2013. As of November 2018 (when the data gathering for this evaluation concluded), the Initiative had a total funding pool of \$380 million—\$100 million for BioCFplus and \$280 million for BioCF T3.
4. The BioCarbon Fund designed the ISFL to build on its previous carbon finance programs and to pilot it in a small group of countries selected in 2013 from a list of 28 potential countries. The BioCF engaged an outside consulting firm to apply the following criteria to identify the ISFL target countries:
 - *REDD+ Readiness*: Countries that were more advanced in REDD+ planning and had greater potential forest sector emission reductions were selected;
 - *Enabling environment and governance*: Countries with stronger enabling environments, governance and co-benefit arrangements, and private-sector engagement were prioritized. The extent of their engagement with green growth initiatives was also a factor in their selection;
 - *Agriculture as primary driver of deforestation*: Countries where agricultural commodities have historically been or are projected to be key drivers of deforestation and forest degradation were chosen;
5. An initial geographic screening study conducted by the ISFL produced a preliminary shortlist of 17 countries, and these were further evaluated to develop an initial portfolio of four jurisdictional programs in April 2014: Ethiopia, Zambia, Colombia and Indonesia.³ Mexico was added later as a fifth country.⁴

² Six agencies and ministries represent the Contributors. These are: the German Federal Minister for the Environment, Nature Conservation, and Nuclear Safety (BMU); the Norwegian International Climate and Forest Initiative (NICFI); the UK Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS), and the UK Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA); the United States Department of State (DoS); and the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC).

³ Draft Operating Framework (v.4.1), BioCarbon Fund, at 6.

⁴ Mexico was proposed for pipeline entry at the 2017 Annual Contributors Meeting. In January 2018, the Project Appraisal Document for the country’s IBRD project, “Strengthening entrepreneurship in productive forest landscapes”, was approved, and it included an ISFL contribution.

FIRST PROGRAM EVALUATION

6. As specified in its Monitoring, Evaluation, and Learning (MEL) Framework, the ISFL is undertaking three evaluations over the course of its implementation, in 2018, 2023, and 2028. This first program evaluation (FPE) assesses the formative years (2013-2018) of the ISFL, and aims to:
 - Validate or adjust the ISFL theory of change (TOC) and ensure that the program is on course to achieve its objectives;
 - Evaluate the ISFL approach and structure, including its governance, against the World Bank Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development /Development Assistance Committee (OECD/DAC) criteria of, relevance, effectiveness, and efficiency, and provide recommendations; and
 - Review progress to date against defined milestones.
7. With support from the World Bank's FMT and the ISFL Evaluation Oversight Committee (EOC), DAI led the evaluation in accordance with the Terms of Reference (TOR) developed by the ISFL including its Contributors in October 2017. The DAI Evaluation Team (ET) conducted the evaluation in accordance with the IEG OECD-DAC *Sourcebook for Evaluating Global and Regional Partnership Programs: Indicative Principles and Standards* (hereafter "IECD OECD-DAC Standards").⁵ Additionally, the ET emphasized a transparent, independent, and participatory evaluation processes to ensure that the data and analysis meet a high standard of quality and generate wide acceptance and buy-in of the findings.
8. The FPE inception phase, data-gathering, analysis, report-writing and draft submission for comments were conducted between June 2018 and March 2019. This Final Evaluation Report, which addresses stakeholder comments on the draft report in consideration of the evidence gathered, includes the ET's refined findings as well as conclusions and recommendation. The evaluation findings are based on information synthesized from a series of document reviews, stakeholder interviews, a survey, and country missions. This information gathering took place between September and December 2018. Therefore, December 1 is the final date of the information consolidation.

SCOPE AND DISCLAIMERS

9. The FPE examined whether the ISFL global program is positioned to achieve its objectives given its structure and approach. To assess the structure, the ET evaluated the ISFL's governance arrangements, communications, and reporting according to the seven principles of good governance as described in the *Sourcebook for Evaluating Global and Regional Partnership Programs*; i.e. legitimacy, accountability, responsibility, fairness, transparency, efficiency, and probity. While a comprehensive assessment of the ISFL's governance arrangements is outside the scope of this evaluation, the ET examined the arrangements' facilitation of efficient and effective decision-making, adequacy to achieve the program's stated objectives, and efficacy for communications and knowledge management. With respect to evaluating the ISFL program approach, the ET assessed the ISFL's TOC and identified the underlying assumptions and preconditions that must be met to for there to be progress from outputs to outcomes to impact. The evaluation looked at how the landscape and jurisdiction approaches and key design elements have been interpreted and applied in country programs, and what lessons have been learned regarding the TOC from the design and early implementation of these approaches.

⁵ World Bank IEG and OECD-DAC, 2007. *Sourcebook for Evaluating Global and Regional Partnership Programs: Indicative Principles and Standards*. URL: <http://www.oecd.org/development/evaluation/dcdndep/37981082.pdf>.

10. The FPE is considered a formative evaluation as it analyzes the initial phase of the ISFL global and country programs, including their design (i.e., scoping and preparing) and implementation. Its primary goal is to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the ISFL, and help guide its future operations. Although the evaluation did not seek to provide an in-depth assessment of the country programs, information and data gleaned from them were used to generate insights for improving the ISFL's effectiveness and developing useful recommendations. The ET also reviewed the progress reported on the cross-cutting and Tier 3 indicators in the MEL Framework. These indicators are predominantly on the preparation of the country programs and initiative-level outputs.
11. One of the major limitations of an evaluation of such a large, global program as the ISFL is the number of countries that can be visited and the stakeholders that can be interviewed. In accordance with the TOR and given the available time and resources, the ET selected, in agreement with the FMT, two out of five country programs to visit, Colombia and Zambia. These country visits allowed the ET to gain detailed, on-the-ground understanding of the program, implementation progress and the functioning of the implementation teams. They also allowed the ET to meet and interview national- and jurisdiction-level stakeholders in person. The ET conducted remote interviews with stakeholders in the other three ISFL countries (Ethiopia, Indonesia and Mexico). These yielded less information than the country visits. However, the interviews and document reviews did facilitate understanding of progress and performance in these countries.
12. The in-person and remote interviews depended upon the availability of key stakeholders and were affected by institutional staff changes. While the ET was as adaptive as possible to such changing circumstances, in a few cases, it could not interview key stakeholders.⁶ However, this did not significantly affect the information-gathering because there were other informants in the same stakeholder groups who could be interviewed. To overcome staff changes in partner governments, the ET targeted technical specialists within the ministries who had more direct experience with the program's implementation and were not affected by higher-level changes. The ET also contacted former director-level persons who were involved in country program design and implementation before institutional changes occurred in order to capture their insights on the ISFL's formative stages.
13. The information on which the evaluation is based was determined in part by the degree to which the World Bank FMT made documents available to the ET. Not all documents reviewed were publicly available due to the World Bank Policy on Access to Information, though most written information used for the evaluation was gathered from publicly available ISFL documents.⁷ To strengthen the evidence base, the ET asked the FMT and country program Task Team Leaders (TTLs) for any relevant information, including draft publications, meeting minutes, grant agreements, and third-party reference documents. The FMT and TTLs complied in most cases, even though there were some documents that were not yet ready for disclosure. The ET agreed to review but not cite information from documents that were not yet publicly available.
14. The evaluation followed global best-practice norms and standards for independent evaluations, including confidentiality, transparency, participation, and consultation as outlined by the IEG OECD-DAC Standards. DAI and the ET maintained organizational and behavioral independence from the World Bank, Contributors, and beneficiary stakeholders, and did not participate in political or business activities that could affect the evaluation's independence. While the ET is independent of

⁶ The key stakeholders who could not be interviewed, included a Lead TTL for the Zambia country program and a former co-TTL from the same program (both declined the invitation to participate in an evaluation interview), representatives from the Alquería dairy company in Colombia (for which contact persons data were not provided) and focal points in the Ministry of Finance in Mexico (who left the Ministry during the evaluation period and did not accept an invitation to speak about their interaction with the World Bank).

⁷ World Bank. 2010. *The World Bank policy on access to information (English)*. Washington, DC: World Bank. <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/391361468161959342/The-World-Bank-policy-on-access-to-information>

the ISFL program, the ET relied on the observations of the FMT, TTLs and program participants as an important source of data for assessing program status, helping to arrange meetings with national and local stakeholders, and providing responses to evaluation questions.

TIMELINE OF THE FIRST PROGRAM EVALUATION

15. With support from the FMT, the Inception Phase of the FPE took place between June and July 2018. The ET began Inception Phase work with an initial conference call with the World Bank FMT in early June to reconfirm expectations, establish a timeframe for presenting the Inception Phase plan, and discuss any changes within the program and World Bank since the TOR was finalized. Next, the ET presented an Inception Phase workplan to set objectives and action items to refine the evaluation question framework and reviewed the ISFL TOC and logical frameworks to review assumptions and results chains. Adapting the OECD-DAC Standards, the ET applied the criteria of effectiveness, efficiency, relevancy, and governance and management to the key and subsidiary evaluation questions.
16. The ET conducted initial stakeholder interviews during the inception phase with the FMT, Contributors, country program TTLs, the EOC, and technical consultants to identify the full set of stakeholders to be interviewed as part of the evaluation. Inception Phase interviews also helped the ET to identify significant themes that provided initial context and insight for capturing stakeholder views during the ensuing interviews. The Inception Phase culminated in the drafting of the Inception Report, which identified the evaluation approach and initial insights, evaluation methodology, final list of evaluation questions, work plan, and an indicative list of approximately 70 potential stakeholders to be interviewed. The Draft Inception Report was submitted to the FMT, Contributors and EOC in August 2018 followed by a review teleconference call with the EOC. A revised Inception Report was submitted in September and approved by the FMT with input from the EOC in November 2018.
17. Following the end of the Inception Phase in August, the Implementation Phase took place through mid-November 2018. The ET began the Implementation Phase work by completing the desktop review of technical, progress and financial reports, publications and agreements to provide insight into ISFL activities to date using the OECD/DAC evaluation criteria. The ET identified sustainable land-use initiatives, country climate change strategies, and action plans implemented in each target country. Additionally, the ET reviewed financial flows, governance structures, communications and reporting lines, MEL systems, safeguards, and plans for Emission Reductions Program Documents (ERPDs) and benefit-sharing agreements.
18. Based on inception interviews and desktop review findings, the ET developed the survey tools for interviews with stakeholders of the ISFL and external informants. For the semi-structured interviews, a questionnaire was developed that could be adapted for different target groups. Target populations for the interviews included program staff involved in ISFL oversight and implementation, national- and jurisdictional-level country partners, civil society organizations, indigenous and local farmer organizations, local experts, and private sector representatives. In addition, a survey was developed with closed questions to gather additional quantifiable data as described in the methodology section.
19. In September and October, the ET spent approximately two weeks in each country—Zambia and Colombia. The Team Leader led both visits, with the Evaluation Manager joining the Colombia field visit and the Sustainable Landscapes Specialist joining the Zambia visit. The ET engaged a local consultant in each country to facilitate visits, provide logistical and translation support, and connect the ET to in-country networks. Evaluation methods included key informant interviews (KIIs), focus group discussions (FGDs), surveys and semi-structured interviews based on primary questions. In October and November, after the two country visits, the ET conducted remote interviews and surveys with key stakeholders in Ethiopia, Indonesia, and Mexico.

20. In early November, after collecting most of the field data, the ET met at DAI headquarters to aggregate and analyze data according to key evaluation questions and measure ISFL program performance against OECD/DAC and World Bank Sourcebook criteria. Additionally, the ET identified barriers, entry points, key enabling conditions, and future risks. The ET also conducted meetings with DC-based stakeholders, including the FMT, and other World Bank staff and Contributors at that time.
21. In mid-November, the ET held a check-in conference call with the FMT and EOC to discuss early findings and ensure that the evaluation incorporated World Bank standards and operational guidelines. Following initial comments from this meeting, the ET drafted the Interim Report, which included preliminary findings from the desktop review, in-country surveys, and global surveys as well as a description of final actions to be taken to complete the evaluation. The Draft Interim Report was submitted to the World Bank and EOC in November 2018, which was followed by an EOC review teleconference call in December. After receiving and responding to feedback from the FMT and EOC on the Interim Report, the ET submitted the revised Interim Report in December and received final approval from the FMT with input from the EOC in January 2019.
22. Following completion of the Final Interim Report, the ET conducted the final Synthesis Phase in January and February 2019. Initial findings were presented to a subset of global ISFL and country teams which provided an opportunity to incorporate additional feedback from these critical stakeholder groups. Based on comments received on the Interim Report and follow-up discussions, the Evaluation Team filled remaining data gaps with additional desktop research and analysis. Next, the ET prepared the draft version of the Final Evaluation Report which includes comprehensive analysis of the ISFL program to date, refined findings, conclusions and recommendations. Following a review of the Draft Final Report by program stakeholders, through which comments from the EOC, FMT and Contributors were received via a group call the ET revised and submitted a final version of the report. As the last step, the ET will participate in an exit meeting with the FMT and EOC to acquire any feedback on the evaluation process and results to ensure that expectations are fully met.

Methodology

GENERAL APPROACH

23. The ET used a systematic, theory-based approach for conducting ISFL's FPE. Such approaches, based on a defined theory of change (TOC), are suitable for complex initiatives such as the BioCarbon Fund ISFL that involves multiple assumptions and lines of inquiry along programming and operations. The approach provided a structure to undertake the analysis using the outputs, outcomes, and expected goals resulting from the interventions that the ISFL completed at the time of the evaluation. Given its early stage in the ISFL program timeline, the FPE follows a formative evaluation approach (i.e., provide forward-looking recommendations for future adjustments).
24. The ET used qualitative data and, quantitative data (e.g., number of stakeholders, financial data, number of activities) where possible. The ET systematically analyzed four different types of information (document review, key informant interviews, focus group discussions, and surveys), collected and triangulated information to respond to the key evaluation questions determined by the EOC, and ensured that findings are grounded in evidence.

THEORY OF CHANGE ANALYSIS AND FORMULATION OF FINAL EVALUATION QUESTIONS

25. The evaluation questions form the basis of the lines of inquiry, and subsequent findings and recommendations, that underpin the FPE. During inception, the ET analyzed and refined the foundational questions originally set out in the TOR to focus on areas of special consideration in the FPE. This was done by an analysis of the program's Logical Framework and TOC to select key assumptions and preconditions to test during the evaluation. The ET found that the TOC provides a high-level, general presentation of a logical pathway from inputs to impact, but lacks elements that are included in most TOC's⁸ such as clear impact pathways (how desired change will come about), result chains (how the intervention will trigger this change) and assumptions and risks, that should be monitored for each logical step.
26. To clarify the ISFL TOC, the ET considered the underlying causal logic and identified its implicit assumptions and the preconditions required to meet these assumptions (see Annex 6). Then, considering the evaluation criteria, the ET prioritized elements according to relevance to the evaluation. Next, the ET linked the foundational questions from the TOR with the prioritized assumptions from the TOC and complemented these questions with detailed sub questions to cover all prior assumptions. This ensured that all evaluation questions are directly linked to the TOC. Further refining of the evaluation questions was done based on insights obtained in document review and interviews with key stakeholders during the inception with input from the EOC. The final edited set of evaluation questions were ordered according to the TOC and OECD-DAC criteria and presented in the Inception Report for acceptance by the EOC. The ET then updated the methodology and data sources for each evaluation question to include document reviews, key informant interviews, field visits and verification, focus group discussions, and a survey to gather additional information. The full set of evaluation questions is included as Annex 1. The methodology integrates gender and social inclusion throughout the FPE approach and criteria.

⁸ https://betterevaluation.org/sites/default/files/Theory_of_Change_ENG.pdf

DOCUMENT REVIEW

27. The ET conducted a desk review of documents listed in Annex 2. The ET collected documents from the ISFL website (biocarbonfund-isfl.org), the World Bank project sites for ISFL countries and requested some documents from the FMT and country TTLs. The ET also referred to documents collected from FCPF, UN-REDD and other similar sustainable land use programs. The reviewed documents included technical, progress and financial reports, publications, aide memoires, safeguards, assessments and agreements (e.g., grants, letters of intent) that provided insight into the ISFL. Based on the initial document-gathering and categorization during inception, the ET continued to collect further documentation that came to light as interviews continued. After the initial review in the inception phase, which assisted the ET in understanding the program's design, communications, and progress, subsequent document reviews focused on finding missing material that could help answer the evaluation questions. The FMT helped to fill the document gaps by providing, for example, the Annual Contributor Meeting Minutes and budget details. In total, the ET analyzed 131 documents.
28. The ET focused on three primary types of documents: 1) program design; 2) country program; and 3) AFOLU/climate financing and carbon accounting. While the ET committed to reviewing emission reductions purchase agreement (ERPAs) and benefit sharing plans, none of the five countries had achieved those milestones at the time of the evaluation. The ET also reviewed, to the extent possible, the country programs' alignment with national and/or subnational climate change strategies and policies. The ET sorted documents into four primary categories: General Background, Country, Design, and Technical.
29. To help guide the analysis of program documents, the ET mapped the content of relevant documents to key evaluation questions using a coding scheme. The ET read the pertinent publications, reports and documents with the evaluation question table, as listed in Annex 1, in mind to code relevant parts of the documents to these questions. For example, the document titled '*Annex 3 – ISFL Governance*' directly assisted the ET to answer Evaluation Question Governance 1 (EQG1) *Have the Initiative's governance arrangements facilitated efficient and effective decision-making, and could they be improved?* The ET triangulated information from the documents with the survey and stakeholder interviews to develop the findings.

STAKEHOLDER CONSULTATIONS

30. The inclusion of a broad range of stakeholders, from national government leaders to partner institutions to local farmers, is critical for the ISFL to be successful. The FPE questions, as considered and approved in the TOR, reflected an acknowledgement that stakeholder participation and engagement is widely recognized as essential. Given that the task of the ET is to analyze the design and early stages of the initiative, the evaluation focused primarily on three types of stakeholders: (i) stakeholders that have been directly involved in design and early stages, both at the level of the country programs and the global initiative; (ii) stakeholders that are expected to be involved during implementation as partners (e.g., similar projects, service providers) or beneficiaries (farmers, farmer associations and communities, and (iii) stakeholders that are not directly associated with the ISFL like external experts or nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). The broad array of stakeholders naturally resulted in diverse views on the program. Nonetheless, the ET synthesized information from all interviewees to develop findings.
31. The ET included stakeholders from the FMT, program teams, Contributors, country counterparts, CSO/NGOs, private sector and field-level participants where applicable. In addition to the FMT and Contributors, the ET worked closely with country program TTLs and country program coordinators to identify relevant stakeholders to meet in person during country missions in Zambia and Colombia

and telephone or internet-based communication in Ethiopia, Indonesia, and Mexico. Additional stakeholders were selected based on individuals named in country program documents, mission documents, and suggestions from external stakeholders.

32. To guide the semi-structured KIIs and FGDs, the ET developed a comprehensive questionnaire based on the evaluation questions. The questionnaire was used to facilitate conversations around the important elements of questions to adapt to each KII and FGD (see Annex 4 for questionnaire). The ET conducted interviews in an open-ended, semi-structured format to more easily tailor conversations based on interviewees' expertise and experience and follow up on key points that arose from the responses. At the end of each interview, interviewees were invited to inform the ET of any theme not covered by the questionnaire or any detail they wanted to highlight.
33. At the beginning of each KII and FGD, interviewees were informed of the evaluation goals, the modality of the interview and the voluntary character of their participation. They were also informed that information would be treated anonymously and confidentially. In a few cases, evaluators asked the interviewees permission to share specific, personalized comments that would be of high value for the evaluation. The ET recorded written notes and audio for each interview after interviewees granted permission.
34. The ET conducted 113 interviews (KII and FGD) with 182 persons from Zambia, Colombia, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Mexico, the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, Norway, Spain, and the Netherlands (see Annex 5). Semi-structured interviews covered topics on relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, and governance and management, guided by a questionnaire. Questions covered topics such as the interviewee's role in the ISFL, program design and decision making, and expectations for the ISFL and country programs (see Annex 4). The desktop review of program documentation included a review of over 130 documents (see Annex 2) on the global ISFL and country program structures, activities, communications, and engagement.

TABLE 2: OVERVIEW OF INTERVIEWED PERSONS DURING THE FPE

Country/Institution	Interviewees	Meetings
County-Level Interviewees		
Zambia	60	37
Ethiopia	7	5
Mexico	10	5
Indonesia	6	5
Colombia	72	33
Global-Level Partners Interviewees		
Norway	2	2
UK/DEFRA	2	2
UK/BEIS	2	2
US/DoS	2	2
Germany	1	2
Technical expert	4	4
Private Sector Platforms	2	2
World Bank Group	11	11
Total	182⁹	113

⁹ Interviewees consisted of 117 males and 65 females.

METHODS FOR KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEWS AND FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSIONS

35. Semi-structured, KIIs were conducted one-on-one in most cases. Stakeholder groups included internal ISFL stakeholders (i.e., directly involved in design and day-to-day operations, such as World Bank staff, Contributors, national implementing agencies, companies/consultants in design and implementation), potential partners (e.g., other government agencies, civil society organizations, private sector, similar programs), beneficiaries (local communities or farmer organizations) and external experts or other NGOs. While the interview questions all related to answering the overarching evaluation questions, the format of the semi-structured interview allowed the ET to follow up on interesting details, focus questions that most pertained to the interviewee's role, knowledge, and experience and gave more flexibility for additional insights that arose. Because of the semi-structured format, not all planned interview questions were asked or were relevant to all interviewed persons. In total, all questions received response from at least five respondents per country apart from questions on capacity building, whose activities were in their early stages at the time of the evaluation.
36. FGDs were organized during the site visits where more than three stakeholders were engaged in the meeting. FGDs provided an opportunity for colleagues of the same or similar associations to engage in a conversation regarding the interview questions rather than a direct response to the interviewer. This provided helpful and dynamic insight into the program from the group point of view. In Colombia and Zambia, five FGDs were organized with a total of 30 participants participating in FGDs across both countries. These discussions were facilitated by the ET in an open-ended manner and based on a subset of the interview questionnaire. The ET ensured all participants had an opportunity to speak and provide input based on their role and experience. Facilitators did this by first getting to know the group by asking each person's professional position and their relationship in the program.

COUNTRY VISITS

37. Zambia and Colombia were selected for country visits. The ET contracted a local consultant with strong institutional linkages to prepare the field mission logistics and support data collection in each country.
38. The Sustainable Landscape Specialist and the Team Leader visited Zambia from September 16-26, 2018. They spent six days in Lusaka to meet with the National Implementation Unit (NIU), national level stakeholders, and World Bank staff. They also spent three days in the jurisdiction where the program is implemented (Eastern Province), to meet the Provincial Implementation Unit (PIU) and local-level stakeholders. In total, the ET interviewed 60 persons in Zambia, among project teams, contributing country agencies (US, Germany and UK), ministerial counterparts at national and local level, international agencies, local traditional authorities, national and local NGOs, and private sector companies. Interviews were scheduled around stakeholder availability and lasted 1-2 hours on average. A complete list of interviewees by country is in Annex 5.
39. The Evaluation Manager and the Team Leader traveled to Colombia from October 3-12, 2018. Most of the interviews were conducted in Bogota to meet national level stakeholders, the World Bank team, and external experts (e.g., staff of agencies not collaborating with the initiative). One day was spent in the jurisdiction where the program will be implemented. The reduced time in Orinoquía was due to scheduling changes by stakeholders once the ET was in Colombia. This was not viewed as detrimental as field activities had not yet started and there are relatively few locally based agencies involved. A few stakeholders that were not available during the field mission were contacted afterwards by telephone. In total, the ET interviewed 72 stakeholders from the program teams, contributing country agencies (Germany, the US, and Norway with a follow up call with the UK),

ministerial counterparts, national and international NGOs, consultants who participated in the design, local CSOs, and private sector groups.

REMOTE INTERVIEWS WITH OTHER ISFL COUNTRIES AND GLOBAL STAKEHOLDERS

40. The ET conducted remote interviews with persons in countries not visited—Ethiopia (seven interviews), Indonesia (six) and Mexico (ten). The ET asked TTLs to provide contact information for World Bank program staff, consultants and partners. The ET also relied on interviews with global-level initiatives, such as IDH and TFA 2020, which also have operations related to the private sector in countries not visited. Given the early stages of programming in both Mexico and Indonesia, questions were adjusted to target the program design stage to gain insight into the challenges and future workplans (e.g., what the program will do with the private sector, how does the program intend to measure emissions from other land uses, etc.), particularly in Indonesia.

FMT AND CONTRIBUTOR EVALUATION INTERVIEWS

41. During the inception phase, the ET interviewed the global stakeholders, namely the FMT and Contributors, in addition to the country TTLs. After completing site visits and most of the remote interviews, during November 2018 the ET interviewed the FMT, Contributors and country TTLs to ask more detailed questions related to the evaluation questions. Questions were asked from the general interview questionnaire (based on overarching evaluation questions) but in most cases (and if agreed to by the respondent), the ET used this opportunity to ask questions and provide an initial overview of answers from other stakeholders to confirm or validate information gained over the course of evaluation (through November 2018). The ET conducted nine detailed interviews with the FMT and Contributors, and four interviews with TTLs in addition to four remote interviews with co-TTLs and World Bank Emission Reductions (ER) Specialists. Table 2 provides the organizations and agencies interviewed related to each country program.

TABLE 3: ORGANIZATIONS INTERVIEWED BY THE ET FROM SEPTEMBER-NOVEMBER 2018

	Zambia	Mexico	Colombia	Ethiopia	Indonesia
Program Teams ¹⁰	TTLs, Co-TTLs, Focal Points, ER leads, Zambia Integrated Forest Land Project (ZIFLP) Implementation Units	TTLs, Co-TTLs	TTLs, Co-TTLs, Focal Points, ER leads	TTLs, Co-TTLs, Focal Points, ER leads, OFLP Implementation Unit	TTLs, Co-TTLs, Focal Points, ER leads
Contributors	UK, USAID, USFS, GIZ	USAID, BEIS(UK), GIZ	Germany, GIZ, USAID, Embassy of Norway, US/DoS, USAID	Norway, US/DoS	Norway, DEFRA (UK), US/DoS
FMT and World Bank	Fund Manager, Fund Analyst, International Finance Corporation (IFC) Lead	Fund Manager, Fund Analyst	Fund Manager, Fund Analyst, IFC Lead	Fund Manager, Fund Analyst, IFC Lead	Fund Manager, Fund Analyst, IFC Lead

¹⁰ TTLs (Lead and co-TTLs) or Task Team Leader, are WB staff who coordinate activities of a project team and are ultimately responsible for hiring consultants for a project. Focal Points are World Bank country staff who oversee sectoral projects in that country. Some projects have specific emission reductions/carbon accounting specialist.

	Zambia	Mexico	Colombia	Ethiopia	Indonesia
Governmental agencies	Interim Climate Change Secretariat, Min of Lands and Natural Resources, Min of Ag, Land & Tourism, ZEMA, Depts. of Forestry, National Parks & Wildlife, Energy	National Forestry Commission (CONAFOR)	Min of Agriculture and Rural Development, Min of Environment and Sustainable Development, National Planning Department, IDEAM, Instituto Alexander von Humboldt, FINAGRO, APC, UPRA	Environment, Forest and Climate Change Commission; Oromia Forest and Climate Change Authority	Ministry of Environment and Forestry, Directorate General of Climate Change, Forestry Service
Civil society organizations (CSOs), nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), Similar Programs	SNV, FAO, USAID/Integrated Land & Resource Governance, Conservation Farming Unit,	PRONATURA	WRI (NDC partnership), Conservation International, Fundación Natural, The Nature Conservancy (TNC), WWF-Colombia/ Global Environment Facility (GEF), FAO, GGGI, Vision Amazonia, Fondo Acción, NDC Partnership, Climate Focus, CIAT, Natural Capital project	Farm Africa	FCPF
Private Sector	COMPACI Missoil, &Green Fund	N/A	ASORINOQUÍA, CORMACARENA (incl. Orinoquia Regional Climate Change Node [NORECCO] coordination), COTELCO, CAMACOL, ANDI	IDH,	IDH, &Green Fund
Field-Level Stakeholders*	COMACO, BioCarbon Partners, Chipata District Farmers Association, Chipata District Land Alliance, Action for Positive Change, Caritas-Chipata, Provincial Depts. of Forestry,	N/A	CORMACARENA, Fundación Palmarito,	N/A	University of Jambi

	Zambia	Mexico	Colombia	Ethiopia	Indonesia
	Agriculture, Wildlife, Planning, Permanent Secretary				

SURVEY

42. The ET developed a thirteen-question survey to gather quantitative data on key evaluation questions from interviewees (Annex 4). This provided the ET with an additional source of information to substantiate findings drawn from the desktop review and KII/FGDs in the field and remotely. The survey used a five-level Likert scale and asked respondents to select 1 (fully disagree) to 5 (fully agree) on statements that related to the overall evaluation questions. Surveys were anonymous, and the ET did not ask for names, gender, or positions of respondents. Each respondent identified their organization type which included: International/Multilateral Institution, National Government Agency, NGO/CSO, Private Sector, Subnational/Local Government Agency, Consultant or Institute/Similar program. The ET distributed surveys after KIIs and FGDs both in-person and in-country and by email after remote interviews. The surveys were in English for respondents in Ethiopia, Indonesia, and Zambia and translated into Spanish for respondents in Colombia. The ET collected a total of 94 completed surveys, including 41 in Zambia, 42 in Colombia, five in Indonesia, and six in Ethiopia. The ET received a higher number of responses in Zambia and Colombia because interviewees were asked to immediately fill out a survey following the discussion in person. In Ethiopia and Indonesia, respondents were asked to complete a survey following the telephone/Skype conversation. Due to the incipient stage of development in Mexico, the ET did not send surveys to those interviewees. Survey responses across countries were collated in a master spreadsheet to draw preliminary findings. The ET used STATA software to analyze the responses by evaluation question, triangulate information and support the evaluation findings. A summary table of the survey responses is included in Annex 3.

DATA PROCESSING AND CONSTRUCTION OF FINDINGS AND CONSULTATION

43. The qualitative data from KIIs and FGDs derived from the questionnaire were organized according to the initial coding related to evaluation questions.¹¹ After the ET reviewed the interview notes from the KIIs and FGDs, the ET recorded responses in a matrix mapped from the questionnaire to determine the frequency of responses. The ET processed recurring points of convergence or disagreement to inform the findings. In addition, the ET also extracted illustrative comments in the meeting notes to support the findings, particularly where comments highlighted recurring themes. The matrix of interview questions and comparison of the responses assisted the ET to record the frequency and quality of content of responses around the evaluation questions.
44. The ET identified quantitative data sources that helped answer the evaluation questions. Quantitative information included stakeholder survey data, reported indicators, budget and expenditures, completion times and frequency of meetings. Some quantitative data supported specific evaluation questions such as *EQEc1.1. "How do the ISFL's administrative costs compare to activity costs and are there any opportunities for improving economies of scale?"* Quantitative survey data was used to support numerous evaluation questions as they related to feasibility, relevance, communications, capacity building, and governance.

¹¹ For example, Question 6 of the interview questionnaire: "Are you familiar with the objectives/outcomes/activities of the ISFL program in your country/jurisdiction? Do you consider the project (incl its jurisdictional approach) feasible, considering the available money, time and capacity?" supported the ET's ability to answer Efficiency Question 2 (EQEf2), as follows: "Are ISFL programs on track to meet their outcomes and objectives as outlined in the ISFL Logframe? Are the current objectives of the ISFL realistic in relation to the capacity of ISFL program countries and the World Bank?"

45. Milestones in program development, both at global and country levels, were included in timelines to visibly show the progress in comparison to planning.

DEVELOPMENT AND VALIDATION OF FINDINGS

46. Evaluation findings are evidence-based elements that build up to the response of the evaluation questions. They are constructed based on the analyzed opinions of interviewed stakeholders supported as much as possible by objective information, document citations or data points. They do not represent the ET's professional assessment or opinion, but a synthesis of the evidence. Based on the initial information processing, the ET converted observed trends with enough sustained evidence into a series preliminary finding for each evaluation question. The evidence to support findings was based mostly on opinions of stakeholders as gathered during the interview process. Trends were identified when there was a clear majority in coinciding responses and converted into findings. This was then reinforced as much as possible by quantitative information available at the time of the evaluation. The available information was organized around these findings to test the amount and consistency of available evidence and identify eventual information gaps or dissenting information that needs to be validated or triangulated by additional interviews. The process enabled the ET to identify data gaps in information.
47. The preliminary findings of this evaluation were initially presented to the EOC with feedback provided during a group call on November 16, 2018. Based on EOC feedback, each finding was developed with the addition of context, illustrative evidence, and an overview of available information that was included in the Interim Report of the evaluation. The ET reviewed the Draft Interim Report with the EOC on December 19, 2018. After submitting and discussing the Interim Report, the ET scheduled WebEx calls in January 2019 with country program teams in Colombia, Ethiopia, and Zambia to get feedback on the preliminary findings from this critical stakeholder group. The Final Interim Report was submitted to the World Bank on January 18, 2019. With additional feedback from the EOC and country teams, the ET developed the Draft Final Report that presents detailed findings, conclusions, and recommendations to increase future efficiency and effectiveness. The draft report was discussed with the EOC on February 28, 2019 and written response was received through March 11. These comments and suggestions were included in the final report.
48. Throughout the evaluation process, the ET ensured comprehensive consultation with diverse parties. Country visits were planned as much as possible in coordination with the FMT, TTL, and leading government agencies in the countries. The ET aimed to provide an initial briefing at the start and debrief at the end of each country visit. During the Implementation Phase after the field missions, the ET returned to the same key individuals that were contacted during inception for more in-depth, targeted interviews. The check-in meeting with the FMT and EOC to present preliminary findings was another key step in the consultation. The ET also received written feedback from the FMT and EOC on the Draft Interim Report and incorporated and corrected information where applicable.

Findings of the Evaluation

49. Based on processing all the gathered information, the ET developed the following set of 30 evaluation findings that are organized according to the evaluation questions. First, an overview of the findings is presented followed by a detailed description, context, and evidence for each one of the findings.

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

50. **The ISFL is considered innovative because it is the first program of its kind to apply the landscape and jurisdictional approaches in conjunction with one another.** The integrated concept of the ISFL program is seen by most stakeholders to be necessary to achieve reduced emissions in the program landscapes. Further, the program is well aligned to national global climate change mitigation policies and strategies. Though, The Initiative is welcomed by the participating countries because it is aligned to their agreements under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), and it responds to national priorities of achieving sustainable rural development while simultaneously reducing GHG emissions.
51. **Various national and subnational governmental agencies, generally from different sectors, have been fully involved in the development of the country programs, and they lead the work in the two countries where implementation has started, Ethiopia and Zambia.** Most of these agencies expressed that, at the country level, the program is based on their demand and priorities regarding sustainable development and landscape management. Social, environmental, and economic co-benefits have been generally integrated into the design of the country programs and through social and environmental safeguards, and they are reported upon in the MEL Framework and for donor reporting requirements. The ISFL has been applied flexibly to each country's context and needs, which has resulted in each country program being unique in terms of goals, choice of partners, funding mechanisms, and implementation arrangements. Four out of the five country programs combined different World Bank Group (WBG) funding mechanisms, which increased available funding for the initial phase of the ISFL, filling capacity gaps for an enabling environment for ER and effectively combining social and economic goals with climate goals. During the design of the country programs, the use of the landscape and jurisdictional approaches triggered the involvement of different government sectors and levels in the country program design. While this innovative combination of approaches yielded positive results, the complexity of using different funding mechanisms and engaging with different government sectors/levels slowed the pace of the design process.
52. **While the ISFL has managed to consolidate Project Appraisal Documents (PADs) for jurisdictional programs in four countries and is well advanced in a fifth country, the implementation of the overall initiative and country programs has been slower than originally planned.** At the time of the program evaluation's finalization, there were two programs under implementation (Ethiopia, and Zambia). Colombia finalized the grant agreement at the end of the evaluation while Indonesia is currently finalizing the PAD. The project in Mexico was developed in shorter time than the others due to the longstanding institutional relationship and ongoing initiatives in the forest-carbon area between the World Bank and CONAFOR. On the other hand, progress in Ethiopia, Zambia, and Colombia proceeded at a slower pace than expected. No ERPDs or ERPAs have been finalized; however, Ethiopia's ERPd was under development at the time of the evaluation. While there have been several promising engagements with the private sector, only one concrete agreement was in place at the time of the FPE. The barriers for meeting Initiative-level milestones in the logical framework follow: 1) the overall conceptual complexity of the initiative resulted in the slow development of tools, approaches, and activities; 2) the small size of the FMT, with only three

full-time staff, may not allowed for enough resources to provide continuous efficient support; 3) the complex coordination lines within the World Bank slow down decision-making and contribute to complex oversight systems; and 4) initially underdeveloped or mistargeted strategies related to some program elements such as private sector engagement, benefit-sharing, and communications slowed progress. Together, these reasons contributed to delays in the early development at the global and country program levels.

53. The main barriers for effective delivery of the ISFL country programs follow: 1) the transaction costs of working with different sectors that require time to be familiarized with ISFL objectives and adjust their agendas; 2) changing government administrations, which requires rebuilding ownership with new points of contact; 3) a wide and diverse institutional landscape that does not automatically speak the language of sustainable landscapes and lacks background information on the program; and 4) a lack of World Bank and government resources. While many professional staff and consultants are involved in country program development and implementation, few World Bank and government staff can dedicate enough time to responding to day-to-day implementation requirements.

54. **The ISFL program encountered a set of unique challenges, particularly related to the jurisdictional and landscape approaches.** Both are concepts under development, as such, they lack tools to apply to every situation. The most significant of these challenges include the following overarching issues:

- Leveraging external funding in particular, from private sector sources;
- Addressing political economy and power dynamics related to trade-offs between economic development and environmental conservation; and
- Balancing competing interests between jurisdictions (e.g., policies and practices at the national level or in a neighboring jurisdiction affecting the GHG and land use in the targeted jurisdiction).

Additionally, the following technical issues have resulted in additional delays but are likely to be easier to resolve:

- Difficulty of developing or downscaling national GHG reference levels for the jurisdiction;
- Lack of available data for some drivers of forest degradation (e.g., charcoal harvesting);
- The absence of adequate models for GHG emissions from a suite of land use types in different geographies;
- Understanding the contributions from individual ER projects when many are nested and pooled; and
- Dealing with jurisdictions managed by different governments.

55. **Because many of the ER program framework issues are new to agencies involved in the implementation of the global initiative, there is not yet enough capacity at all levels to respond to all these challenges.** ISFL countries have been incorporating lessons from some global initiatives, such as FCPF and UN-REDD+, but they could do more to apply evolving concepts from the developing global debate on the landscape and jurisdictional approaches to effectively generate impact on low-carbon development from the incentives generated from ER payments.

56. **There has been sufficient initial outreach to relevant local stakeholders in most countries, particularly local governments, civil society organizations, and rural communities, with careful consideration of gender dimensions.** However, in some countries, stakeholders do not know how to engage with the ISFL because they do not fully understand the program's vision and operations. The ET has encountered alignment between the ISFL and other ongoing land-based climate change mitigation initiatives implemented by the same government agencies that manage the ISFL country programs, but found less alignment, coordination, and communication with other initiatives, including some of those supported by the same donors that contribute to the ISFL.

57. **Many stakeholders do not find that the ISFL at the global or country program level is on track to achieve its stated outcomes and objectives in the agreed timeframe.** In addition to the ambitious and complex application of the landscape and jurisdictional approaches, there are questions about the adequacy of funding from BioCF*plus*. This part of ISFL funding is aimed at covering existing capacity gaps for an enabling environment for ER, but these capacity gaps are not defined in detail and not budgeted. There is no single or clear understanding of the use of the funds originating from RBP (BioCF T3 funding). Based on interviews, different stakeholders have different expectations on the destination of T3 funding, ranging from direct payments to communities that support policy-making and implementation at the jurisdictional level to reinvesting funds to maintain the ISFL and/or to attract additional funding. While the program designed T3 funding to be used to purchase verified emission reductions, there is no a clear vision, based on stakeholder interviews, of what the funds will target, who will benefit from them, or where they will be directed. Additionally, the ER Program Requirements and MEL Framework require ER programs to include noncarbon benefits, and the expected generation of ERs and subsequent RBPs indicate achievement of at least some objectives and associated benefits but this is not further detailed.
58. **Because the reward from RBP is not sufficiently known and certain, the ET cannot judge if RBP is an effective tool to incentivize sustainable land use.** However, as performance-based payments do not appear to have not been informed sufficiently thus far by political economy analysis related to financially incentivizing relevant actors, benefit-sharing does not seem to be on track to be an effective mechanism. Key aspects such as fair benefit-sharing or involvement of stakeholders also cannot be assessed, which makes achieving the set outcomes of the overall ISFL and most country programs highly uncertain, particularly within the timeframes current during the evaluation.
59. **The ISFL program design intended private-sector involvement to be a central element in its strategy. To date, there have been many positive engagements with different private-sector representatives, and one clear agreement is in place and another one is close to completion.** While these are positive and innovative processes, they are relatively isolated examples. The overall private-sector involvement strategy was undergoing redesign at the time of this evaluation. The unclear use of T3 funding is affecting the definition of opportunities for the private sector.
60. **The ISFL is managed by international, multilateral, and bilateral agencies with a complex and decentralized structure.** While the World Bank and Contributor agencies generally fulfill their roles in program management, the reporting and communication lines within and between the various agencies is complex and has contributed to lack of alignment between different initiatives. This complex structure is seen as a factor in the slow pace of Initiative development. Some stakeholders believe that ISFL decision-making is not as inclusive or as transparent as it could be. For example, country governments and country implementation teams feel that they are not involved in global decision-making. Although local governments are actively involved and have shown appropriation of the Initiative, they are not steering the Initiative at the level that the jurisdictional approach suggests they should be.
61. **In summary, the ISFL is highly relevant for the progress of global climate action and to the country policies and plans for promoting green growth.** It has contributed to an integrated approach toward land-based emission reduction efforts through the collaboration of different governmental sectors and levels, and through the application of different WBG funding windows. The ISFL has encouraged the inclusion of a variety of private-sector stakeholders, although results have not been measured yet. Its effectiveness and efficiency are challenged because of the complexity of the landscape and jurisdictional approaches that have been not sufficiently understood or effectively integrated by the main stakeholders of the Initiative and the country programs. Furthermore, several key aspects of the ISFL (including country capacity gap assessments and global guidance on the use of RBP funding and private-sector involvement) are yet to be defined, which makes the question of overall feasibility of the Initiative open-ended. Regarding the ISFL TOC, the

ET observed that the main challenges are found in the Initiative's efforts to transition from inputs to outputs and from outputs to outcomes. Though the program assumptions of country interest and ownership hold, other assumptions related to enabling environment, such as effectiveness of technical support, timely grant performance, adequate communication, and the convening of all key stakeholders and the private sector do not. Without these preconditions in place, several ISFL outcomes for the enabling environment are at risk, namely capacity building, land management planning, stakeholder involvement, and partnerships.

FINDINGS FOR RELEVANCE

EVALUATION QUESTION RELEVANCE 1

Has the ISFL been successful in building partnerships, coordinating efforts and leveraging complementary activities and finance by relevant stakeholders, including national and subnational ISFL program country governments, rural communities, vulnerable populations, indigenous peoples, donor countries, civil society, the private sector, and others toward its objectives?

- EQR1.1. How does the ISFL engage these stakeholders and are they aware of opportunities for engagement? How can engagement processes be scaled-up, replicated, or improved, including throughout the various stages of program development (e.g., scoping, design, implementation)?
- EQR1.2. What is the degree to which ISFL programs have worked with other programs and/or initiatives, including in ISFL program countries and with the private sector, that complement the ISFL's objectives in order to avoid duplication of efforts and leverage finance or activities?
- EQR1.3. Do ISFL programs align with national and local, public and private policies and plans? Is the ISFL central to climate change strategies for relevant stakeholders?
- EQR1.4. Is the ISFL on track to add unique value to existing programs and/or initiatives in addressing sustainable land use and emission reductions?

Finding 1: The ISFL has been building partnerships with national and subnational governmental agencies and other relevant stakeholders through informational meetings, institutional mapping, and direct (bilateral) coordination efforts. These partnerships have achieved some level of coordination and complementarity although there is high variation in terms of depth and expanse of partnerships between countries and programs.

62. Leveraging partnerships with other public-sector initiatives and private-sector actors to maximize impact is one of the four design elements of ISFL. Overall, the country programs and the ISFL as a whole have tried to partner with other initiatives at the interface of sustainable landscape management and emission reductions. The country programs have made an earnest effort to work with relevant governmental agencies, development partners, and civil society organizations. Across all country programs, the ISFL is focusing on private-sector engagement to find opportunities for collaboration in each jurisdiction. These partnerships aim to achieve program coordination, align program strategies, and leverage complementary activities and financing. The finding is based on information gathered from project design documents, stakeholder mappings where available, aide memoires of field visits and engagement activities, and interviews with World Bank and partner organizations.
63. **The number of partnerships and the success of partnership-building efforts vary across global, national, and jurisdictional levels** with some stakeholders satisfied with their levels of engagement and others feeling that they have not been adequately consulted nor know how to adequately engage with the program. The survey used during this evaluation showed more involvement of government agencies and variable engagement with key nongovernment agencies. For example, 35 out of 37 government respondents agreed with the statement "ISFL is well coordinated with ongoing activities in forestry/agriculture/land-use/climate change mitigation in the country." However, more than a quarter of nongovernment respondents did not agree. Also, while two-thirds of national and local

government respondents agreed that the ISFL is a well-known initiative, only 30 percent of potential partners (NGO, consultants, private sector) agreed with that statement. Given the World Bank's role to strengthen the capacity of partner government institutions, engagement at the time of the evaluation was more solidified with the government counterparts at the national level in particular rather than local NGOs, institutions or CSOs. This finding suggests that as activities take place and in addition to initial outreach to communities (which in countries such as Colombia took place through NGO partnerships as well as the World Bank), the projects should find avenues to collaborate with NGO/CSO and private-sector actors if the ISFL country and global programs are to achieve their stated goals. Examples of the success of partnership-building efforts from country programs include the following:

- In **Zambia**, all partners' activities are mapped and meeting minutes show that partners are invited to specific events of the country program. Villages are included through traditional leadership roles and PIU staff confirmed that all districts were consulted during the design phase. In addition, the previously existing Chipata roundtable¹² includes a group of private-sector, government, and civil society actors that providing an adequate forum for continuous and diverse consultation for the ISFL country program (ZIFLP). Some interviewees from the Eastern Province, particularly local NGOs, mentioned that they have not been informed nor updated on activities since the project launch in February 2018 (see Finding 20). While government officials confirmed this was due to the time it takes to procure items before starting activities, it does show the need for continuous communication.
- In **Mexico**, the ISFL country program is being developed exclusively with CONAFOR, although the PAD recognized that to work at the landscape level, the Secretariat of Agriculture and Rural Development (SAGARPA) must be included as an implementing agency in the future. Also, key stakeholders in the jurisdictions where the ISFL portion of the program is to be implemented have not been involved or consulted during before PAD approval. According to interviews with World Bank and CONAFOR staff, partnership-building with local stakeholders and other sectors will be developed progressively during the first five years of implementation. One of the interviewees familiar with the project development in Mexico considered this a "*red flag*" because, "*if you want to do ER in agriculture, you obviously should involve the Agriculture Department during design.*"
- Examples from **Colombia** illustrate the trend of differing perceptions of the success of partnership-building from various stakeholders. Design documents in Colombia present a detailed stakeholder analysis that includes recommendations for comprehensive engagement.¹³ However, not all the recommendations have been implemented yet. Representatives of the participating public agencies generally confirmed that there is a strong alignment of national activities and strategies with the ISFL country program. While key organizations such as Fondo Acción, WWF, and TNC have been consistently involved in the design of the ISFL and the Initiative has recognized their engagement, representatives of other (public and private) agencies such as Conservation International, the Instituto Alexander von Humboldt agency, some local NGOs, and non-agriculture private sector entities that were not directly involved with the program design indicated that they have not been well informed and have not been able to identify opportunities to engage. At the time of the evaluation, the program has also tried to engage the private sector with initial engagements in the dairy and meat sectors. Others, such as bilateral organizations (USAID, Norwegian Embassy, and GIZ), felt it was difficult to engage with the ISFL and the

¹² See, e.g., <https://www.cargill.com/sustainability/cotton/cotton-environmental-impact>.

¹³ IDEAM (2017) Mapeo de actores involucrados en el desarrollo rural sostenible de la Orinoquía en los niveles nacional, sub-nacional y territorial. Report commissioned by the ISFL program.

World Bank and they could not confirm whether their programs are aligned (see Findings 4, 17, and 21).

- Still in the design phase, the **Indonesian** team is putting a lot of energy into collaboration, partnership-building, and regular engagement. All interviewees felt that the consultation process has been effective so far, and that the involvement of all stakeholders is critical to project preparation. The program has established a Common Secretariat as a forum to streamline stakeholder engagement from the private sector, NGOs, government, and academia. Interviews with Indonesian staff confirmed that the private sector is a difficult stakeholder to involve in the types of activities the ISFL country program will carry out to achieve emission reductions.

Finding 2: In most countries the ISFL is implemented with one or more other WBG funding mechanism(s) (e.g., International Development Association [IDA], International Bank for Reconstruction and Development [IBRD], GEF, IFC) which greatly increased the availability of complementary funding to support program objectives and leverage further financial resources. This delivery model has also resulted in some operational and institutional challenges.

64. **At the country program level, BioCFplus is being implemented along with other funding mechanisms from the WBG such as IDA and IBRD loans, GEF funds, IFC private sector support, and parallel funding of FCPF.** During the initial stages of the ISFL, the BioCFplus mechanism provides grants to be used for technical assistance, capacity building, and investment activities. Other mechanisms allow for funding complementary activities and investments. There is a different blend of these mechanisms in every country (see Table 4) involving different managers, planning tools, and administrative requirements. An ISFL country program can be made up of a combination of different funding sources from the WBG. The ET reviewed the design documents of the different projects and interviewed managers of the different funding lines and implementing partners to understand the benefits and challenges.

TABLE 4: FINANCING MECHANISMS BY COUNTRY

	Colombia	Ethiopia	Zambia	Mexico	Indonesia ¹⁴
ISFL grant	\$20 million	\$18 million	\$7.75 million	\$10 million	\$13.5 million
IDA loan			\$17 million		
IBRD				\$56 million	
GEF	In process		\$8.05 million		
Private sector		\$3 million			

65. **Additional funding mechanisms have increased the total budget for ISFL-relevant activities by \$84.05 million to date (including from the IDA, IBRD, GEF, and private sector—see Table 4).** This additional funding is important for the future success of the Initiative. Many stakeholders perceive that the available BioCFplus funding might not be enough to fill all the capacity gaps that must be filled to establish an enabling environment (see Finding 18). On the other hand, the inclusion of various funding sources—each with their own procedures, rules, timing, proposal documents, executing agencies, and World Bank managing staff—involves more time and effort for operations and institutional arrangements. For instance:

¹⁴ In Indonesia, ISFL is not implemented directly along with other funds but the program will work in parallel with FCPF implemented in East Kalimantan. This is explained in Figure 1 of the Project Concept Note: while ISFL focuses on Jambi, FCPF focuses on East Kalimantan. FCPF has spent \$8.6 million on REDD+ readiness activities since 2013 and projects \$110 million on results-based funding between 2019 and 2026 in East Kalimantan. It was also noted by WB staff that Indonesia will not take a loan on environmental programs.

- In **Zambia**, local stakeholders stated that the strength of the ISFL country program is that it is implemented in conjunction with an IDA loan. Stakeholders responsible for implementation (government agencies and implementation units [IUs]) perceived that the loan will support investments (e.g., technological, infrastructure) beyond merely “advisory and capacity building,” allowing for direct and tangible incentives for good land use. The complementary funding modalities are considered positive, with loans providing infrastructure investment opportunities and the GEF co-financing providing a greater focus on biodiversity. Each modality is being led by a different World Bank TTL. While the complementary funding mechanisms were seen as positive, Most PIU members as well as three local government representatives said that having three TTLs added to the complexity in management and reporting (see Finding 28).
- In **Colombia**, BioCFplus is being complemented with a GEF project. This project was developed in parallel to the ISFL country program and early versions of the PAD included this proposal. As the GEF took time to consolidate its work program under the sixth replenishment period (GEF6), the Orinoquia project was included 1.5 years after its technical approval. At the time of the evaluation, the GEF project design is being updated to fully complement ISFL goals with biodiversity goals. The institutional arrangement of the GEF project is slightly different from that of the BioCFplus funded project: where the latter is led by the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MADR), the GEF project will be led by the Ministry of Environment and Sustainable Development (MADS) with WWF as the executing agency by delegation. The involved agencies (World Bank, MADS, and WWF) are trying to overlap project teams and institutional arrangements and ensure representation of relevant stakeholders in the related steering committees. Although outside of the control of ISFL, the pace of development of the GEF grant in relation to the ISFL grant has resulted in coordinated but disjointed project development and different implementation timelines.

Finding 3: In most ISFL program countries, there has been considerable initial engagement with relevant local stakeholders including local governments, CSOs, and rural communities. Nonetheless, stakeholders reported that they do not understand how to participate in the ISFL given the lack of a clear country engagement strategy/plan.

66. **ISFL country programs target local stakeholders because they are deemed key actors of landscape-level change and the final beneficiaries of sustainable development programs.** To engage these stakeholders, programs have conducted local consultations and dissemination events based on stakeholder mapping in the jurisdiction. The ET reviewed program design documents and reports on stakeholder dissemination and consultation events to see how this engagement was planned and executed. The team also interviewed a selection of local stakeholders and asked if they felt well-informed and consulted.
67. **The design documents for national programs (PADs and others) reflect the Initiative’s emphasis on widespread stakeholder engagement, including targeted consultations for benefit-sharing plans, safeguard instruments, and Grievance Redress Mechanisms, as well as ongoing community- and regional-level engagement.** Design documents call for engagement via coordination mechanisms such as REDD+ Working Group meetings at a national level and fora for civil society and private sector representatives at jurisdiction-level, such as the Chipata roundtable in Zambia and the NORECCO in Colombia. The number of coordination platforms supported is an output (Tier 2) indicator in the global initiative’s MEL framework.
68. **The TTLs and country program staff affirmed that during implementation, the program indeed focused on stakeholder engagement at the national and provincial levels, but many also stated that after initial high-intensity events for engagement (during program design or launch events), the level of effort had fallen off.** Overall, the program generally responded to local-level priorities and strategies (see Finding 6), which should ensure the engagement of local stakeholders.

However, while the information and engagement events reached many people, this did not ensure that they felt fully informed or understood how to engage. For instance:

- Interviewees in **Zambia** generally agreed that stakeholder consultations had been conducted thoroughly up front, building on the national climate change strategy's widespread consultations of district government, civil society, and private-sector representatives. According to attendance lists, several dozen **Zambian** stakeholders attended local consultation and information meetings in the Eastern Province. Seven out of 10 local (nongovernmental) stakeholders interviewed recognized the existence of the ISFL country program (ZIFLP) but while they confirmed they had been present in at least one information or consultation event, they could not explain what the program is about and how they can collaborate. Some examples of stakeholder observations are the following:
 - “We are wondering what direction this is taking.”
 - “Government actors do not tell anything else than the overall goals.”
 - “The launch was good [...] I made an intervention with a recommendation [...] After that, no communications, never called me for follow-up meeting”

Several stakeholders noted that the project needed more decentralized provincial administration and coordination, as well as greater inclusion of local chiefdoms and traditional authorities necessary for bridging land tenure issues, particularly given their nature in **Zambia**. **Zambian** project members noted that many stakeholders had changed roles after consultations due to the program's slow development, as well as challenges in sharing all aspects of decision-making with every stakeholder at the micro level.

- In **Colombia**, stakeholders noted that there was extensive consultation, especially at the jurisdictional level. According to people directly involved in the development of the country program, there are many logistical challenges to engaging with many stakeholders in a large area like the Orinoquía, which, according to participants in one FGD¹⁵, delayed decision-making. The engagement at the national level in **Colombia** could be improved, however, as several key stakeholders, particularly nongovernmental agencies with ongoing work agendas in the Orinoquía region, have limited knowledge of the ISFL program and could not tell how they could engage or coordinate (see Finding 17). According to interviewed consultants and local authorities, and an examination of attendance lists, the consultation in **Colombia** has been done mostly at the representational level of farmer associations or trade unions (*gremios*) in line with the Ministry of Agriculture's policy. The annual event organized by ISFL to present the broader approach of sustainable development in the Orinoquía (ExpoGestión Orinoquía) was well attended and covered by local media although it was focused at a broader audience (e.g., the general public, interested private sector actors) rather than the stakeholders directly involved in the program.
- **Ethiopian** interviewees all found the stakeholder engagement to have been comprehensive and participatory. Several noted that three regional multi-stakeholder coordination platforms are underway at the jurisdictional level. However, three out of five interviewees noted a need for more engagement due to security issues, changing political situation, and the variety of institutions beyond forestry that must be involved in planning.
- Similarly, four out of five **Indonesian** program interviewees strongly agreed that there was widespread stakeholder engagement, but some noted that the private sector was difficult to involve and that the project would explore how to involve them and other stakeholders better.
- In **Mexico**, little specific consultation on the ISFL country program has been done. The executing agency explained that the ISFL was developed as one project, together with an IBRD loan. The

¹⁵ Focal Group Discussion with FINAGRO, MADR participants.

project is considered a direct follow-up of a previous forest-carbon project (*Proyecto de Bosques y Cambio Climático*). As a result, both the environmental plan¹⁶ and indigenous people's framework¹⁷ of the previous project were updated for the current project. These updated documents were reviewed internally in CONAFOR and shared with the national REDD+ platform (CTC-REDD+) before publication on the CONAFOR and World Bank websites. Further stakeholder engagement is planned at the time of project implementation and ER once the underlying studies are finalized.

Finding 4: Though the ISFL's design is generally well-aligned with earlier global programs in the forest-based emission reduction area, there are opportunities to improve alignment with other (past or ongoing) ER programs.

69. **One of ISFL's key design elements is to build on the experience of earlier global programs in the forest conservation, sustainable forest management, and emission reduction areas, incorporating lessons, approaches, and technical tools.** All five ISFL countries have current and previous programs providing REDD+ Readiness, forest investments, and other support that can contribute to the ISFL ER program (e.g., FCPF, UN-REDD, FIP, REM). The ISFL has its strongest 'design connections' with the World Bank-managed Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF); since 2005 the BioCarbon Fund's first two tranches tested pilot forest and land-use carbon activities serving as the precursor and 'fast start' action mechanism to the FCPF.¹⁸ The ISFL is now building off and complementing FCPF REDD+ Readiness work under BioCF*plus* and T3, with ER programs under preparation for the FCPF Carbon Fund and the ISFL in both Indonesia and Mexico. The BioCF also strives to complement activities of the UN-REDD program: it has stipulated in its initial country selection that ISFL countries be current participants in the FCPF and/or UN-REDD. Apart from Zambia, which only participates in UN-REDD, all current ISFL countries are participants in both. The ISFL also states that it complements the Forest Investment Program (FIP), which provides upfront investment funding in 23 pilot countries, including Mexico and Indonesia (in pilot phase having had their Investment Plans approved) and Zambia (still developing its Investment Plan). The FIP is largely loan-based and lacks a carbon fund mechanism, which orients it more toward private-sector traditional forestry/agroforestry tree crops with less focus on the enabling environment that is found in FCPF, ISFL and UN-REDD. The ET has reviewed program design documents for linkages or references to previous or ongoing such programs and has interviewed key actors of these ongoing programs to understand the level of alignment.
70. **ISFL design documents include lessons from the main complementary forestry and ER programs that have been implemented in ISFL countries.** Elements of FCPF that are included in ISFL include national-level enabling environment and planning, technical capacity and awareness raising. References from UN-REDD country projects include mainly planning, measurement, reporting and verification (MRV), and safeguards. Also, FCPF country program staff actively worked with ISFL country program staff, Contributors, and technical experts to develop the ISFL country programs. In all countries, the agency that led FCPF or UN-REDD is also central to ISFL implementation, which guaranteed alignment with these programs and other initiatives. Examples include:
 - In **Mexico**, the ISFL program is based on a previous WB loan to CONAFOR on Forest Management and Ecosystem Services and clearly refers to the experience obtained by CONAFOR implementing FCPF: Although the FCPF ER Program is only in the initial

¹⁶ Proyecto "Fortalecimiento Empresarial en Paisajes Productivos Forestales"; Marco de Manejo Ambiental; Pg 48.

¹⁷ Proyecto "Fortalecimiento Empresarial en Paisajes Productivos Forestales"; Marco de planificación para los pueblos indígenas; Pg. 38.

¹⁸ BioCarbon Fund ISFL Flyer, at 3. URL: http://awsassets.panda.org/downloads/biocf_isfl_flyer.pdf.

negotiations phase, CONAFOR has undertaken work in developing an enabling environment for FCPF and other ER Programs. This includes work supported under FCPF REDD+ Readiness on institutional strengthening, REDD+ strategy development, safeguards, MRV, benefit sharing, and coordination with other government agencies.

- In **Indonesia**, ISFL and FCPF implementations are done in parallel in two different provinces, but highly coordinated: they are combined in one single Project Concept Note (PCN), are planned to have the same national coordinator and technical elements (MRV, SES and ESMF), and capacity building is partly shared.
- In **Zambia**, the ISFL was built on the previous experience of the UN-REDD program and includes coordination with ongoing voluntary-market ER programs. The same staff who managed the national program of UN-REDD were also leading the design of ISFL country program. ISFL uses REDD+ national consultation platforms, technical information (base lines), and tools (SIS) developed by UN-REDD. Lessons from ongoing ER programs in the Eastern Province i.e., Bio Carbon Partners (BCP) and COMACO, are considered, though stakeholders alerted the ET of potential future challenges related to nesting approaches and carbon prices. According to key Zambian technical stakeholders, the BCP and COMACO projects use voluntary market standards and are receiving 12-13 USD/ton. This is a much higher price than the 5 USD/ton - the average forest carbon offset price in 2015-2016¹⁹ – that might be offered under the ISFL, given that bulk carbon credits typically sell at lower prices than smaller projects.²⁰ According to program planning, ISFL will require the Eastern Province to reduce six million tons of emissions. However, informants with first-hand experience in those projects, mentioned that BCP and COMACO already have covered a significant share of potential ER.²¹ The areas included in existing ER programs likely cover the easiest portion of ER potential (areas with data, capacity, and social acceptance). As a result, ISFL may have to include and negotiate the ER generated by these projects (at double the price) in their nested approach or exclude them and look for additional areas to generate ER, which is likely less easy to achieve.
- The World Bank and the Ministry of Environment have ensured that **Colombia's** ISFL national program includes FCPF and UN-REDD lessons, tools, and data. The coordination and alignment with the ongoing REDD Early Movers (REM) program in the Amazon *Visión Amazonía* creates some challenges though (see Finding 17). According to technical staff of the Ministry of Environment and the Institute for Hydrology, Meteorology and Environmental Studies (IDEAM) involved with both programs, the challenges include dealing with geography overall (South of Meta department, which is the area where largest emissions are generated in the ISFL jurisdiction), dealing with different ER funds (REM vs. BioCF) with different pricing, and different reference levels (only forest and deforestation vs full AFOLU). The fact that the RBP for REM covers a different period than the ISFL may give opportunities to reduce the impact of these challenges.
- The Forest Investment Program (FIP) funds activities only in **Mexico and Indonesia** among the five ISFL countries at the time of writing. ISFL is complementary with the FIP in the sense that the programs do not substantively overlap, and a strengthened traditional forestry/agroforestry private sector (supported by FIP) could support the private sector work of the ISFL. However, because the FIP includes loan-based support of large-scale commercial monoculture plantation

¹⁹ See Forest Trends, 2017. "State of Forest Carbon Finance 2017," at 4. URL: https://www.forest-trends.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/doc_5715.pdf.

²⁰ See Forest Trends, 2018 "Voluntary Carbon Markets Insights: 2018 Outlook and First Quarter Trends," at 8. https://www.forest-trends.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/VCM-Q1-Report_Full-Version-2.pdf.

²¹ According to their websites, COMACO and BioCarbon Partners each claim to cover roughly 1 million hectares. The total size of the Eastern Province is just over 5 million hectares, so a rough estimate tells that at least 20% of all ER is covered.

forests,²² there is the potential for social and environmental risks to FIP recipient countries. As both programs are relatively new, it is uncertain whether the ISFL and FIP are truly complementary or if opportunities for greater alignment exist.

Finding 5: One concrete private sector agreement has been implemented through IFC, which has attracted much attention and has potential for replication. Beyond this, there have been several examples of engagement of the ISFL with the private sector at different levels; these have been mainly exploratory with declarations of interest, but so far without specific action or investment on the ground and do not yet target corporate engagement in jurisdictional-scale change processes.

71. **The ISFL program recognizes that the private sector is a key partner needed to achieve substantial land-use change at a jurisdictional level and to leverage the funding required to do so.** The role of private sector in a jurisdictional approach is to link implementation of corporate commitments to efforts to reduce deforestation at the scale of political jurisdictions by connecting public and private sector actors in joint efforts to decouple commodity production from forest conversion.²³ In the ISFL country programs, private sector actors include smallholder farmers, local producers and businesses, value chain aggregators, national companies and distributors or multinational corporations. ISFL has engaged with these actors to varying degrees in each country program. The ISFL global program defines working with the private sector as collaborating on sustainability approaches, blending financing, and convening stakeholders to work toward complementary goals.²⁴ Stakeholders in-country and remotely were asked how the ISFL engaged the private sector and what opportunities and challenges existed.
72. **Various efforts to engage with private sector have resulted in one concrete private sector agreement and one in an advanced state.²⁵ The ISFL Initiative is not far off track with the set target of three partnerships by 2019.** The first concrete private-sector agreement was achieved through the Nespresso deal in Ethiopia and is considered the primary example of ISFL drawing in a large(r) amount of IFC financing. Though limited to a specific part of the overall landscape level challenges in Oromia, three different stakeholder groups consulted (WBG, Private Sector and Government) all saw the deal as a positive opportunistic activity. Another advanced private-sector partnership is with the Alquería dairy company in Colombia. Interviewed in-country private-sector representatives felt that interaction with the ISFL was mostly exploratory and has not yet led to concrete investment opportunities. The ET found most evidence of contacts with individual companies or producer groups but little collective meetings with different companies to explore joint and collective commitments at the jurisdiction level. Also, public-private partnerships have not been put in place yet to support ISFL goals, as included in TOC. An overview of the process of private-sector engagement in three countries follows:
 - **Colombia** has reported the emerging development of a private-sector partnership with Alquería and two private-sector engagements with the beef sector in the 2018 ISFL Annual Report. The Colombia program laid a strong foundation for private-sector engagements through the support of stakeholder fairs ‘*expogestiones*’ in Orinoquía. This provided a forum for many private-sector

²² For example, the Cote d'Ivoire 2016 FIP plan envisions planting 100,000 hectares of industrial tree plantations, (https://www.climateinvestmentfunds.org/sites/cif_enc/files/meeting-documents/fip_cote_d_ivoire_ip.pdf) and Mozambique's 2016 Plan aims to promote “commercial forest plantations.”; (https://www.climateinvestmentfunds.org/sites/cif_enc/files/meeting-documents/mozambique_fip_investment_plan.pdf.)

²³ Seymour, F. 2017. “Corporate commitments: Necessary but not sufficient to end tropical deforestation” <https://medium.com/trase/corporate-commitments-necessary-but-not-sufficient-to-end-tropical-deforestation-45da39f49a4c>

²⁴ ISFL Private Sector Engagement Approach

²⁵ ISFL Annual Report 2018

representatives to discuss opportunities to collaborate with public agencies and civil society for a sustainable development of the region. Interviewees from that sector and from national level NGO's noted that there is more pressure now for large companies, such as Grupo Éxito,²⁶ to commit to zero deforestation value chains. ISFL Colombia is an active participant in private sector networking initiatives, such as TFA 2020, which are driving interests in a sustainable direction. While the ET considers these actions as positive, they have not yet led to a concrete collaborative effort or commitment that the public sector can complement with different incentives. According to a local NGO stakeholder, Colombia has already developed some climate incentives for smallholder farmers²⁷ and large companies²⁸, but because of their design they are insufficiently applied in Orinoquía. Some interviewees, especially from national and local NGOs, noted that the private sector is moving faster than the project is, to the detriment of the landscape. Since the peace agreement in 2017, there is a rapidly increasing interest and active investment by large companies in agriculture in the region. Developments progress quickly, as indicated at ExpoGestión in 2015, *"only four years ago, technical maize cultivation started in the Orinoquía and is now already contributing to 15 percent of national production."*²⁹ In relation to this, interviewed private-sector representatives in Orinoquía noted that if the ISFL does not provide immediate business opportunities, some powerful agro-industrial sectors will act more quickly on their own, rather than in cooperation with the project partners.³⁰ They may also act in a way that is not consistent with the ISFL's goals. They also mentioned a limited focus of ISFL on agriculture and forestry private-sector actors, while in the rural landscape private businesses in other sectors like tourism, industry or housing provide many opportunities for sustainable landscape development.

- **In Zambia**, ISFL is focused specifically on small-holder agriculture and it is envisioned that subsistence farmer communities will be among the major beneficiaries.³¹ In addition, ISFL is collaborating with cotton companies to explore adopting standards for zero- deforestation sourcing. The ISFL country program is supporting the companies to adopt approaches to achieving their commitment to zero deforestation.³² The ET interviewed local stakeholders who felt that the ISFL country program will scale up the successful model of COMACO, which focuses on small scale farmers producing products for the Zambian and regional markets. Eight interviewees that commented on private-sector engagement in Zambia felt that more needed to be done to involve the private sector beyond explorative activities. People knowledgeable with other private-sector initiatives such as COMACO or BCP mentioned financial incentives, such as investment risk coverage or credits for investments, and market access for sustainable products.
- **In Mexico**, involvement of the private sector is fully included as a part of the country's strategy because of the character of the IBRD loan to which ISFL has added, which focuses on community forest enterprises. The objective of the project is to strengthen sustainable forest management as well as to increase economic opportunities for forest-dependent people and enterprises. According to the Mexico PAD, the major beneficiaries include clusters of communities or smallholders who have formed associations, including community forest

²⁶ South America's largest retail corporation; <https://www.grupoexito.com.co/es/sostenibilidad>.

²⁷ www.banco2.com.

²⁸ <https://www.conservationfinancenetwork.org/2018/11/27/colombia-puts-tax-on-carbon>.

²⁹ <https://www.dinero.com/economia/articulo/sector-agropecuario-region-Orinoquia/213920>.

³⁰ For instance, the external evaluation of a GEF project on biodiversity conservation in oil palm cultivations in Orinoquía found that when the project services to support oil palm companies in the certification process did not proceed fast enough, these companies started to contract external service providers, in a dis-coordinated manner (Hofstede 2016; Evaluación de Medio Término del Proyecto ATN/FM-13216-CConservación de Biodiversidad en las Zonas de Cultivos de Palma).

³¹ PAD Zambia, pg. 14.

³² ISFL Annual Report, 2017.

enterprises and private or mixed-forest enterprises, and the project's key result is to increase their index of forest entrepreneurship by at least one range. According to World Bank staff, CONAFOR and third parties interviewed in Mexico, this support to forest enterprises is one of CONAFOR's key strengths and supports the enabling environment for the landscape approach that the ISFL component adds to the country program. Wider engagement with other private sector stakeholders in the jurisdiction has not yet been started but is foreseen for a second phase of ISFL in Mexico.

73. **The International Finance Corporation (IFC) has served as an important mechanism to engage the private sector in program countries.** The ET spoke with the IFC focal point to understand how their advisory services supported country programs and could drive investments. As one IFC interviewee told the ET "ISFL was ahead of its time" on engagement with the private sector in sustainable landscapes. The ISFL can pull out "the best tools in the toolkit of the World Bank group" to address sustainable landscape challenges. For example, while the IFC struggles to reach small scale subsistence farmers that are not part of the formal economy, the World Bank country program teams can use the BioCF*plus* funding to reach this important private- sector group. Once there is an aggregator, the IFC can reach thousands of farmers at scale.
74. **While the IFC enables the potential for private-sector engagement in program countries, there are several challenges related to its selection criteria.** Many of the screened companies are not eligible for IFC actions because of their institutional due diligence processes.³³ For instance, the IFC has worked extensively on studies in Indonesia to identify potential entry points but both the IFC and national-level interviewees noted that it is challenging with palm oil given the strict IFC (and in this case, World Bank) criteria to work with palm oil. While palm oil is an important product, the ISFL program is reviewing other products that impact the Jambi landscape such as rubber, coffee, and cinnamon to identify areas where the program can engage.
75. At the initiative level, contacts with other potential complementary funding mechanisms including private-sector platforms such as *Initiatief voor Duurzame Handel* (Sustainable Trade Initiative, IDH) and &Green Fund have not gone beyond exploratory conversations. IDH mentioned to ET that it is challenging to engage with the ISFL 'on the ground.' Most conversations are taking place in generalities and at a higher initiative level and therefore have not led to concrete collaboration or collective corporate engagement at a jurisdictional level. An IDH representative informed the ET that there have been many positive meetings and conversations, but no concrete joint action at the point of the evaluation and it is unclear what the way forward will be for the IDH-ISFL partnership. &GreenFund also did not have concrete collaboration with the ISFL but believed that they will be able to find points of convergence once the ISFL identifies private-sector opportunities in each jurisdiction (planned for summer 2019). They noted that companies do not know entry points to engage with the ISFL or what the ISFL can do for a company. Both suggested the ISFL global program should explore the role that public-private partnerships play to enable companies to look beyond their own production systems and transform larger market systems, through preferential pricing, to entire jurisdictions. The ET is aware of other potentially synergistic funds, but did not find evidence of mention of contacts or exploration of partnerships.³⁴

Finding 6: Although ISFL program countries have scarcely been involved in the design of the global initiative, its objectives and scope align with their policies related to climate change and landscape management. The countries,

³³ Also, the IEG evaluation on Carbon Finance observed that "IFC developed new [carbon] financing instruments but was not able to scale up for various reasons (including the regulatory and market uncertainty) and did not operate in low-income countries because of the limited opportunities and small size of projects for emission reduction." (<https://ieg.worldbankgroup.org/sites/default/files/Data/Evaluation/files/CarbonFinance.pdf>).

³⁴ E.g. DFID PROFOREST, Rabobank/UN Environment AGRI3Fund, Commonland, CPICFinance, Iniciativa 20x20.

however, have been involved in the design of their respective programs. Multiple sectors' policies and plans have been generally integrated, even though some alignment challenges remain.

76. **All ISFL countries have policies and plans addressing climate change, sustainable landscapes, and green investment.** Except for Zambia and Ethiopia, all focal jurisdictions have climate change policies in place (see Box 1). These policies should be mirrored by the objectives and scope of the ISFL country programs. The ISFL country programs should be bottom-up, demand-driven and responsive to jurisdictional and national priorities to ensure country appropriation and increased relevance. Both the ISFL global initiative and its country programs draw on international climate change policies, practices and guidance under the UNFCCC and related bodies – such as the phased approach, jurisdictional and landscape approaches, and REDD+ technical elements. As all ISFL countries are FCPF and/or UN-REDD+ participants (see Finding 4), policy coherence is promoted between the ISFL global initiative – which draws on FCPF/UN REDD+ technical elements – and country programs' national REDD+ policies and plans.³⁵ The ET has reviewed the program design documents and available grant agreements to check for reference to international, national and jurisdictional policies. Senior-level government agencies at national and local level were interviewed to understand their perception of policy alignment and country ownership. Also, the alignment with existing policies and plans was included in the survey instrument used during this evaluation.
77. **National government stakeholders consulted in each country agreed that the combination of ER and livelihood options under a broad umbrella of a low-carbon economy aligns with their country development policies and plans.** None of the five countries influenced the overall global design of the ISFL to a significant extent. There has been some country input to the elements of the program, such as the ISFL ER Program Requirements, but there was no consistent and formal participation in the overall decision-making (see Finding 30). Nevertheless, 72 out of 93 respondents agreed with the statement that ISFL strategies aligned with existing policies and plans. The public sector was especially in agreement, with 87 percent of government respondents giving a positive answer and only one respondent disagreeing. Furthermore, respondents mostly agreed with the statement that the ISFL is designed based on local and or national demand (62 out of 91 respondents), especially among respondents of national (average score 4) and local governments (average score 4.8) that rated higher on this question than all respondents (average score: 3.75).
78. **Working at scale across multiple sectors is a key design element of the Initiative. The ET found that country programs were developed in close coordination with relevant governmental**

Box 1: Main National and Jurisdictional Climate and Green Growth Policies of ISFL Countries

- Colombia: 2017 National Climate Change Policy; 2018 Long-Term Green Growth Policy; Regional Climate Change Plan for Orinoquía (PRICCO)
 - Indonesia: 2009 Climate Change Sectoral Roadmap; 2015 National Green Growth Roadmap; Jambi Local Action Plan for Greenhouse Gas Emission Reduction.
 - Mexico: 2012 General Climate Change Law; 2013 National Climate Change Strategy (2) Mexico - Chihuahua and Durango State Climate Change Plans and Climate Change Laws, and Coahuila and Nuevo Leon State Climate Change Plans.
 - Ethiopia: 2014 Climate Resilient Green Economy; 2017 National Adaptation Plan
 - Zambia: 2010 Climate Change Response Strategy; 2016 National Climate Change Policy
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³⁵ REDD+ Strategy in particular sets out high-level policy goals with dates & workplan for how to get there This is guaranteed by oversight committees like the FCPF Participant Committee that conducts a technical review before approving each country's REDD+ Package. This package is produced at the end of the Readiness phase prior to Implementation and consists of 1) a REDD strategy; 2) an Implementation framework; 3) a MRV system; 4) a Reference Level scenario (REL); and 5) Safeguards.

agencies from various sectors, which resulted in distinct programs in each country, reflecting the public priorities and plans at national and jurisdictional levels. For example, Colombia's ISFL program emphasizes economic growth including large scale, commercial agriculture, with the Ministry of Agriculture as the lead agency. Zambia's program focuses on sustainable forest use and small-scale agriculture, with the Ministry of Planning as lead agency. Finally, the Mexican program focus on forest enterprises is in line with CONAFOR's experience, and expects that other sectors will be included later, during implementation of the program. At this early stage of the overall program implementation, it cannot be said if a broader or narrower multi-sectorial approach is more effective for future successful upscaling and long-term results.

79. **While the strong involvement of key government sectors in the design of the country programs has stimulated the alignment with policies and plans, there are examples where policies and plans could be better aligned with the ISFL.** Most country government representative confirmed good alignment with their main policies, but also mentioned several challenges. Obstacles for aligning ISFL country programs with national development plans vary per country.
 - The **Zambian** PAD notes that the ISFL country program's approach has been developed to completely align with national climate change and AFOLU sector-related plans outlined in Zambia's Revised Sixth National Development Plan, National REDD+ Strategy, and Nationally Determined Contribution, as well as with Zambian Government methodological approaches. They emphasize President Lungu's strong statements against deforestation.³⁶ On the other hand, they noted a lack of provincial policies on climate change and AFOLU issues, including fewer regulations at that level.
 - In **Colombia**, the National Development Plan (NDP 2014-2018) sets ambitious goals that contribute toward low-carbon rural development, including reducing the current annual deforestation towards achieving zero net deforestation in the future, bringing 210,000 ha of new area under restoration, and increasing Colombia's agricultural production while reducing the number of hectares used for cattle pasture. By targeting sustainable intensification of agriculture and cattle ranching in Orinoquía while decreasing deforestation, the program aligns with the NDP. In practice, there are examples where alignment was more challenging. For instance, while in Colombia the national planning agency (DNP) and the Ministry of Environment are both partners in the ISFL program design, they are now involved with a USAID-supported planning strategy for the biome (*Visión Orinoquía 2032*). Although Colombia WB staff informed the ET that there have been multiple efforts underway to coordinate the ISFL program with the development of that strategy, its text failed to reference the ISFL and its responsible agencies told ET that the Initiative has not been considered.

Finding 7: Most stakeholders found that the ISFL's landscape and jurisdictional approaches add value to existing ER efforts in their countries. However, the complexities and practical implications of such ambitious approaches come with challenges for country program development and implementation that are often under-estimated

80. **The ISFL program is attempting to scale up land-based ER approaches, previously attempted under BioCarbon Fund tranches 1 and 2 and some small-scale pilots, to large geographic areas spanning multiple land-use sectors and government units.** The Initiative reflects internationally-accepted standards in technical accuracy and its aim to scale up from project to national-level accounting and reporting, with the subnational level as an interim step as set out by the UNFCCC.

³⁶ Lusaka Times, 30 April 2018. "President Lungu calls for mindset change to curb rising levels of deforestation in Zambia." URL: <https://www.lusakatimes.com/2018/04/30/president-lungu-calls-for-mindset-change-to-curb-rising-levels-of-deforestation-in-zambia/>.

While all beneficiary countries have solid experience with project-level REDD+ and national level REDD+-readiness initiatives, few have worked with a results-based payments goal at the integrated landscape level.³⁷ Analysis of projects has shown that the application of landscape and jurisdictional approaches requires a high degree of administrative capacity and coordination at national and jurisdictional levels.³⁸ Other challenges relate to meeting the technical capacity requirements for a multisector landscape approach at an entire jurisdictional level with a rigorous methodological framework evolved from project-level, sectoral ER methodologies (see Finding 13 and 14).

81. **Practically all stakeholders agreed that the program adds value to the existing land-based climate mitigation initiatives.** To cite a global-level informant, his make the ISFL *“the next step in mitigation after Clean Development Mechanisms and REDD+”* National stakeholders differed on which aspect of the project had the highest added value.
 - Most previous initiatives are sector-focused and many informants saw the value of integrating agricultural value chains into emission reductions programs and bringing together multiple stakeholders relevant to forest landscape emissions. As one Zambian Government official noted, merging agriculture, wildlife, and forestry sectors requires attention to multiple interrelated sectoral issues such as fertilizers and water supply, greatly expanding the overall theory of change.
 - Other stakeholders noted the importance of bringing this focus to a jurisdictional level, as it enables the scaling up of ER programs to the point where they have a greater impact. As a Contributor representative in Colombia noted, programs like the ISFL cannot just work within the forest sector on RBP, but need to cover entire value chains at scale to make progress. This view was mirrored by an Indonesian ISFL national team member, who emphasized that only by working at the jurisdictional scale is it possible to make a dent in Indonesia’s ER profile.
 - The application of the landscape approach to a jurisdiction requires careful identification of positive and negative drivers of deforestation and land-use change at the right scale. This work, already completed and published in Zambia and Ethiopia, is commendable because it increases overall understanding of what actions are required to achieve sustainability across entire landscapes.
82. **Contributor and World Bank staff interviewees involved in the global program’s design emphasized that the added value from the jurisdictional and landscape approaches comes with challenges for many country programs that are often underestimated.** Stakeholders in four of the five countries agreed that implementation of landscape and jurisdictional approaches has been complex due to both the numerous actors, different sectors (refer to previous finding on sectors) and rigorous technical methodologies involved. Such complexities often complicated and delayed program implementation, many noting the wide variation in capacity between national and jurisdictional levels (see Finding 12 and 13). Some examples of these challenges are:
 - ISFL landscape approach implies conceiving of the ISFL as a coherent initiative rather than discrete sectoral projects. As one respondent explained, *“Even today, the mindset of projects is more dominant [than of jurisdictions] ... Trying to make that shift from projects to jurisdiction is not easy for anybody. By going to the larger scale, you’re multiplying the complexities. There are multiple players, diverse views, competing interests... Anyone who thought it’s just like a project*

³⁷ The REM project “*Visión Amazonía*” in Colombia can be considered an exception, although they are limiting their efforts to LULUC and not yet including the full suite of AFOLU. Experiences in Zambia (BCP and COMACO) are integrated but at a project-scale. Additionally, in February 2019 the FCPF Carbon Fund selected into its pipeline Indonesia’s ER-PIN, which provides results-based payments at a jurisdiction level in East Kalimantan but only under a REDD+ forest sector approach.

³⁸ See, e.g., “Earth Innovation Institute, Jurisdictional Sustainability: A Primer for Practitioners,” at 3; see also, Fishbein, G., and Lee, D. “Early Lessons from Jurisdictional REDD+ and Low Emissions Development Programs.” Rep. Arlington: n.p., 2015, at 19.

but bigger... it's not." For instance, Ethiopian respondents noted the large size of Oromia and thought that the shift to the jurisdiction level could have happened by 'nesting' or building from existing programs gradually to the entire jurisdiction, analogous to the phased approach for landscape sectoral integration.

- Literature on the jurisdictional approach emphasizes advantages such as a common program area baseline and subnational government involvement, but also challenges such as competing ministries, shifting political priorities and complex methodologies.³⁹ As an example of the latter, a Zambian stakeholder cited technical challenges such as nesting baselines and ER accounting information at project level inside those of the jurisdiction level.
- The analysis of emissions drivers in non-forest sectors such as livestock and agriculture emissions, requires a significant push to acquire more sophisticated data (IPCC Tier 2 or 3 rather than Tier 1 data) and develop a time series before including these sectors (i.e., in Zambia and Ethiopia).⁴⁰ In most cases this data is not available (see Finding 16).

EVALUATION QUESTION RELEVANCE 2

To what extent are non-carbon benefits – including improving local livelihoods to address poverty, building transparent and effective governance structures, promoting improvements on clarifying land tenure, and enhancing or maintaining biodiversity and/or other ecosystem services – considered in the early design of ISFL programs and captured and reported on?

- EQR2.1. Do ISFL design documents, grant agreements and ERPAs align with jurisdiction priorities, and do they support local livelihoods, fair benefit sharing, biodiversity conservation and other ecosystem services?

Finding 8: The overarching ISFL initiative and country programs consider economic, social and environmental benefits and poverty reduction in the program design and the MEL framework. Further consideration of social and environmental aspect is done through applying and reporting on safeguard systems from both national REDD+ practice. Potential trade-offs between co-benefits are scarcely considered.

83. **ISFL's primary objective is to achieve GHG emission reductions, but its broader set of goals includes improved livelihoods, safeguarding ecosystem services, protecting biodiversity, conserving forests, and increased agricultural productivity.** The ET reviewed design documents and grant agreements to assess the degree and appropriateness of inclusion of livelihood, biodiversity and other ecosystem services. The inclusion of the social and environmental co-benefits in the implementation and reporting of ISFL was targeted during stakeholder interviews and survey.
84. **Both at the Initiative and at country levels, many ISFL stakeholders share the view that "...beyond ER, ISFL principally wants to promote a model of climate friendly, sustainable economic development."** In the survey used during this evaluation, 72 out of 88 respondents agreed that ISFL considers social and environmental co-benefits. The officially stated goals and objectives of the ISFL initiative focuses on low-carbon economic development, implying economic and social co-benefits. One of the four key design elements of the initiative is *incentivizing results* which the ISFL MEL Framework defines as results-based climate finance through purchasing verified emission reductions. While results are measured in reduced GHG emissions, creating livelihood opportunities is of equal importance. Along with the amount of GHG emission reductions, the number of people reached with benefits (including the percentage of women) are two of the three impact level indicators (Tier 1). Also, at the outcome level (Tier 2), mandatory indicators with quantitative targets

³⁹ See, e.g., Boyd, W. et al., 2018. "Jurisdictional Approaches to REDD+ and Low Emissions Development: Progress and Prospects," at 2-3.

⁴⁰ See Global Forest Observations Initiative, 2013. "1.1 IPCC greenhouse gas inventory methodologies - Box 1: The IPCC Tier Concept." URL: <https://www.reddcompass.org/mgd-content-v1/dita-webhelp/en/Box1.html#Box1> (explaining Tier 1, 2 and 3 data differences).

were developed during implementation, include the number of communities or other organizations that have received benefits and the number of people involved in income generation activities. Comparing the different design documents of the country programs, the ET found that all countries have at least one main outcome that targets economic development and poverty reduction. In the country program where a loan is involved (Zambia and Mexico), the economic benefit is quantified and reported upon. For example, the Zambia program reports on ten indicators, which include food security and family income. Mexico's loan agreement focuses heavily on local livelihoods, expecting direct support to forest-dependent people and enterprises for socio-economic development and to generate additional income development. These interventions take the form of technical assistance and capacity development activities in forest entrepreneurship and social capital; sustainable management of forest landscapes, and transformation of and access to markets.

85. Biodiversity and other ecosystem services are also considered in ISFL overall design, monitoring and in country programs.

Although there are no direct targets associated to biodiversity or ecosystem services such as water regulation, both the global initiative and country programs have considered biodiversity and ecosystems services. Reducing deforestation is a main goal of the ISFL which in general is positive (though not enough⁴¹) for biodiversity conservation. Ecosystem services (such as provision of food and raw material, water regulation, and soil protection) are included in several specific activities such as restoration and sustainable land use change as well as in site selection criteria. For example:

- The **Colombia** PAD mentions "...[the] project's support to the design and implementation of zero deforestation agreements [...] will serve as a vehicle for rural development, biodiversity conservation, [...]. The inhabitants of the four departments will benefit overall from the project's outcomes in terms of securing ecosystem services and from the Government's improved capacities and policies to better manage the region's natural resources and to clarify land tenure" Also, biodiversity is one of the six selection criteria for municipalities where the program will concentrate its activities.
- The portion supported by the IBRD loan of **Mexico's** PAD (Component 1) centers around strengthening forest management, conservation, and business development. For several activities, eligibility to participate is restricted spatially (e.g., to areas of high hydrological and/or biodiversity importance in the case of the PES program). Payment for ecosystem services (PES) has been an important approach supported under earlier WB collaborative programs with CONAFOR and is strongly included in the IBRD loan portion of the PAD (subcomponent 1.2). The ISFL-funded portion (Component 2) will support CONAFOR in developing new (PES) contract modalities focusing on support to environmentally-friendly forest production and restoration of degraded landscapes.
- In the country programs where a GEF project is associated to an ISFL program, namely those in Zambia and Colombia, biodiversity is clearly mainstreamed and reported upon in this part of the program. Under **Zambia's** PAD Subcomponent 2.2 on community management of wildlife, the program seeks to promote practices which will maximize opportunities for rural communities from adjacent wildlife resources and which will be positive for biodiversity conservation.
- Deforestation is included in the MEL Framework of the global initiative as part of the mandatory outcome indicators (Tier 2; "total natural forest area" or "reduction in deforestation") and in non-mandatory output indicators (e.g. total land area brought under sustainable management plans). While these indicators are expressed in number of hectares, they are not direct biodiversity targets.

⁴¹ <https://www.smithsonianmag.com/science-nature/unfortunately-reducing-deforestation-isnt-enough-protect-amazon-biodiversity-180959610/>.

86. **In addition to the inclusion of social, economic and environmental benefits in project planning and implementation, the application and reporting of safeguards ensure that projects, at a minimum, "do no harm" to social and environmental externalities, and promote positive co-benefits.** ISFL country programs have adopted safeguard systems from existing national REDD+ programs, with the proviso that country programs confirm such safeguards that meet World Bank safeguard policies. In addition, the World Bank screens projects against its own social and environmental safeguards. Application and reporting of both national and World Bank safeguard systems is evidenced by country program project documentation (e.g. Integrated Safeguards Data Sheets PID/ISDS). Under the FCPF, the WB documented that its Safeguard Policies and Procedures meet key UNFCCC safeguards established for REDD+ (e.g. relating to rights of indigenous peoples and local communities, conservation of forests and biological diversity), which ensures that WB policies reinforce national law and safeguard policies such as for REDD+.⁴² The ET observed that each country program's PAD lists social and environmental safeguard policies, such as Environmental Assessment, Natural Habitats, and Involuntary Resettlement, to be applied based on the activities considered in the project. The PADs also mandate additional safeguards instruments, such as a Social and Environmental Safeguards Assessment (SESA) and a Grievances Redress Mechanism. At a national level, existing national safeguards policies for REDD+, national laws, and institutions such as Safeguards Information System (SIS) working groups provide an additional level of safeguards relevant for consideration.
87. **Members from the Mexico ISFL team discussed the challenges of complying with multiple safeguards.** ISFL country programs have adopted safeguard systems from existing national REDD+ programs, with the proviso that country programs check that such safeguards meet WB safeguards policies. In addition, the WB screens projects against its own social and environmental safeguards. For countries that must apply a similar REDD+ safeguard with the loan safeguard, it effectively doubles the burden on the executing agency. As one interviewee said *"typically, the World Bank requires applying the most onerous and complex safeguards instrument, which is not necessarily adequate for all funding mechanisms involved in an ISFL country program."*
88. **Promoting different co-benefits can entail trade-offs; while program design documents outline a wide variety of expected economic, social and environmental benefits beyond carbon, they include little discussion of potential trade-offs and conflict between interests.**⁴³ Interviewees in several country programs noted conflicting interest group views on which benefits are most important and how to balance trade-offs. These included, for example, which private-sector actors to target and which value chains and activities represent positive and negative drivers of forest loss and land use change:
- In **Colombia**, interviewees noted that the Ministry of Agriculture's focus is on developing agro-industry in the Orinoquía region whereas the Ministry of Environment is focused on sustainability and conservation. Large parts of the Orinoquía are still covered with unprotected natural savannah vegetation. While both sides of the development discussion agree that agro-industrial development, and hence the transformation of natural savannah ecosystems in agricultural fields, is inevitable, interviews showed that the expectations on the acceptable change

⁴² FCPF, August 2013. "World Bank Safeguard Policies and the UNFCCC REDD+ Safeguards" URL: https://www.forestcarbonpartnership.org/sites/fcp/files/2013/june2013/FMT%20Note%20CF-2013-3_FCPF%20WB%20Safeguard%20Policies%20and%20UNFCCC%20REDD%2B%20Safeguards_FINAL.pdf.

⁴³ Some literature on potential tradeoffs between GHG mitigation and other benefits: <http://www.ipc-undp.org/pub/IPCOnePager156.pdf>; <https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421511009918>; <https://bioone.org/journals/International-Forestry-Review/volume-10/issue-3/for.10.3.433/The-Politics-of-Avoided-Deforestation--Historical-Context-and-Contemporary/10.1505/for.10.3.433.short>.

and the direction of change differs among interest groups.⁴⁴ This dynamic can lead to potential inter-sectorial conflict in the future.

- **Ethiopian** stakeholders noted a conflict in overlapping mandates between the Oromia Environment, Forest and Climate Change Authority (established by Oromia State Council Proclamation to coordinate and lead environmental, forest and climate protection programs) and the Oromia Forest and Wildlife Enterprise (established by Oromia State Council Regulation, focused more on forest and wildlife management). Many Ethiopian stakeholders thought the project faced challenges due the design of the implementation at a jurisdictional level in a large area at the start—missing out on opportunities to scale up more naturally and thereby avoid conflicts between competing interests and benefit groups.
- Both the national and regional development planning agency informants in **Zambia** confirmed that during the program design, there has been a thorough constructive discussion between different departments and the WB on the overall priority of the program: rural development or climate mitigation, arguing that the choice of which communities or activities to support depend on that choice.

Finding 9: Although there is no specific gender strategy or single gender specialist, the ISFL program has included several efforts to include gender dimensions and social inclusion in its management practice, as part of programming and by application of social safeguards. Country programs show several examples of outcomes related to women empowerment and gender indicators which are included and reported upon in the MEL Framework. There is a fairly similar gender balance in program management and stakeholder engagement.

89. **It is globally accepted that there are many co-benefits to be leveraged by connecting gender equity to climate action to combat the impacts of climate change.**⁴⁵ The WBG holds that no country, community, or economy can achieve its potential or meet the challenges of the 21st century without the full and equal participation of both genders.⁴⁶ Gender equity and social inclusion extends from the level of engagement with women and indigenous communities or marginalized groups in forested landscapes, to women in key government roles, to the gender balance of men and women on the ISFL program implementation staff. The ET looked at three dimensions of gender equity: (i) gender practice (e.g., is the ISFL program implementation gender-balanced and gender and culturally sensitive?); (ii) gender mainstreaming (e.g., the level of representation of gender and cultural diversity in ISFL activities such as training, meetings, and program decision meetings) and how this is being monitored or promoted; and (iii) the empowerment of marginalized groups (e.g., to what degree the project activities generate benefits for women, youth, indigenous people, and rural poor?). Furthermore, the ET incorporated a gender-balanced perspective from program participants and a cross-sample of beneficiaries.
90. **The overall management of the ISFL program is gender-balanced and includes a fair reflection of ethnic diversity.** Of the World Bank global staff directly involved in the program (FMT and TTL), there are more women (8 of 12) and generally women are in key roles at country levels. The WB team has staff from developed countries from both the North and South. Outside ISFL management at the WB, the ET found that overall, there are more men than women involved in the institutions and organizations working with the ISFL. Accepting that those interviewed at country level for this evaluation fairly represent all the country-level individuals engaged in the ISFL, there

⁴⁴ See also: Mateus (2018): Modelo agroindustrial en el Meta: “Borrón y cuenta nueva” a favor del gran capital. Revista Semillas 71/72, p 26-30.

⁴⁵ http://unfccc.int/files/gender_and_climate_change/application/pdf/leveraging_cobenefits.pdf.

⁴⁶ <https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/gender>.

are roughly twice as many men than women involved. While in Colombia there is a strong gender balance (38 of 72 interviewed were male), Zambia was heavily skewed as 45 of 60 interviewees were male. Contributor representatives are well balanced in terms of gender, though all of them are from developed countries in the northern hemisphere.

91. **The global initiative can be considered ‘gender sensitive.’**⁴⁷ The ISFL does not have an established gender strategy or a gender specialist at Initiative or country level. Also, global initiative-level design documents such as the instrument that established the fund, the ISFL Vision and Buffer Requirements and the guidance note on the preparation of the financing plan, do not mention any gender issues. The ISFL ER Program Requirements and ERPD template do include gender and social equity among the criteria for social engagement and for benefit sharing. Nevertheless, the MEL Framework has included gender dimensions: even though there are no specific objectives or outcomes that target strengthening the position of women, the measurement of project performance includes gendered data. This is evidenced by the first of three Tier 3 (impact) indicators, number of people reached with benefits (assets and/or services) from ISFL program (% women), and several Tier 2 (outcome level) mandatory indicators. Wherever possible, indicators are gender-differentiated, meaning that information will be collected on both men and women. The initiative-level MEL Framework encourages country programs to be mindful of the need to report on sex-disaggregated data and differentiated effects and impacts, whenever possible.
92. **The design of the country programs in Zambia, Colombia and Mexico can be considered “gender positive”** (‘Attempt to re-define women and men’s gender roles and relations’).⁴⁸ In accordance with the initiative-level MEL Framework, the Ethiopia program mainstreams gender in its monitoring and reporting, by defining and measuring sex-disaggregated data. Furthermore, gender elements are incorporated into the Nespresso partnership, with Nespresso examining barriers and opportunities for strengthening the role of female coffee farmers. The country programs in Zambia, Colombia, and Mexico go further in their program designs by directly referring to and aligning with gender elements of the WB Gender Strategy⁴⁹ as well as with gender goals of the relevant National Development Plans. There is detailed consideration of how country programs can support gender equity and women’s empowerment in the PADs. The Zambia and Colombia PADs have specific sections presenting the gender approach and actions, including monitoring and reporting. Examples of these include:
 - In the **Colombia PAD**, “Women will be key beneficiaries of project activities (within Components 1 and 2) that will aim to address existent gender inequalities in terms of access to capacity-building activities and land tenure”; and
 - In the **Zambia PAD**, “As such, a key feature of the project’s design is to target marginalized populations as direct beneficiaries of community forestry programs. The aim is to help remove barriers to managing natural resources and provide these vulnerable groups direct access to finance for these activities.”
 - Additionally, the **Mexico** country program foresees inclusion of a gender specialist at the program level.

⁴⁷ ‘Attempt to redress existing gender inequalities’, *sensu* UN Women glossary: <https://trainingcentre.unwomen.org/mod/glossary/view.php>.

⁴⁸ ‘Attempt to re-define women and men’s gender roles and relations’; *sensu* UN Women glossary: <https://trainingcentre.unwomen.org/mod/glossary/view.php>.

⁴⁹ World Bank. 2015. World Bank Group gender strategy (FY16-23): gender equality, poverty reduction and inclusive growth. Report 102114.

Finding 10: Benefit sharing mechanisms are not available yet. Stakeholders have divergent expectations about future benefit-sharing mainly because the future results-based finance (BioCF T3 funds) are not defined in design documents or grant agreements.

93. **According to the ISFL ER Program Requirements document, each country program is required to outline how benefits, both monetary and non-monetary, from ERs will be distributed in the program Area.** The benefits from future ERPAs will be covered by BioCF T3 funding. However, the document only includes general requirements for benefit sharing, including considerations of equity and use of the funding, and states that the “benefit-sharing mechanism should consider ways to sustain successful program interventions in order to further reduce emissions and potentially attract additional finance for related results.”⁵⁰ To date, no ERPAs have been developed and as such, no formal benefit-sharing mechanisms have been defined during the evaluation. However, the ET understands that Ethiopia’s ERPD and benefit-sharing plan was in draft version at the time of conducting this evaluation. Contributors and WB staff acknowledged the vigorous ongoing debate over the best use of BioCF T3 payments. In response to this, in late 2018, after information-gathering for this evaluation was conducted, the FMT developed a Global Note on benefit sharing.⁵¹
94. **Different stakeholder groups gave widely divergent answers regarding the best use of benefit-sharing, incentive structures and what BioCF T3 funding should target:**⁵²
- Several local stakeholders in each country mentioned that they expected the BioCF T3 funds would be directly allocated to communities. To cite one Zambian local government agency: *“This is money for the region that should be spent in the region.”*
 - National stakeholders and jurisdictional decisionmakers, on the other hand, seemed to expect that these funds would support policy making and implementation at the jurisdictional level, including law enforcement.
 - Five representatives of stakeholders at the global initiative level identified the most effective use of BioCF T3 funding to be for reinvestment to maintain the ISFL or to attract additional funding rather than direct payments to communities or individuals. For example, these funds could incentivize private-sector investments. To quote a WB staff member, “the ISFL has the opportunity of smashing the mold of the FCPF [regarding ER payments], but they have the same donors, so they’re scared of doing something differently since the FCPF has been doing it this way... they feel it’s safer, but it doesn’t have to be identical...” A 2017 joint BioCF-FCPF guidance report about ER program financing plans notes that ER program revenue can be used as a finance source for program implementation. The guidance also notes that country program financing plans should clarify arrangements for the flow of funds but does not mandate the final target of ER funds.⁵³
95. **According to the Ethiopia ISFL program June 2018 Implementation Status Report (ISR), the Ethiopia Benefit Sharing Mechanism is under preparation, but significant work is still needed on this document. National stakeholders all agree there was extensive stakeholder consultation on the benefit-sharing plan.** Interviewees related that performance measurement by the Oromia REDD+ Coordination Unit (ORCU) will be based on the MRV protocol and will be conducted at the zonal level. Monetary benefits will be allocated based on performance at that level. Further distribution of benefits will be considered based on the eligible stakeholders and relying on certain

⁵⁰ ISFL Emission Reductions Program Requirements, Version 1 (September 2017), at 8.

⁵¹ This note was made public in January 2019 and could not be considered in time for this evaluation.

⁵² Response to Questions 10, 17 and 27 of the interview template (Annex 4).

⁵³ FCPF, BioCF, “Guidance Note on the Preparation of Financing Plan of REDD+ and Landscape Emission Reduction Programs,” August 2017, at 5.

proxies, such as the number of actors involved in participatory forest management. This model guarantees that most of the monetary benefits will go to the communities involved in sustainable forest management and other activities, with such activities being implemented through a coordinated effort of the bureaus responsible for agriculture, energy and environment at the Woreda level.

FINDINGS FOR EFFECTIVENESS

EVALUATION QUESTION EFFECTIVENESS 1

Is the ISFL on track to meet its outcomes and objectives at the Initiative level, as outlined in the ISFL logical framework?

- EQEF1.1. What are the main risks and barriers to meeting Initiative-level milestones in the current ISFL Log frame?

Finding 11: The implementation of the overall initiative has been slower than planned, impacting the speed of delivery of outcomes and objectives. The slow pace of implementation of ISFL at initiative level is related to the slower than expected development of individual country programs. Additional barriers for meeting Initiative-level milestones in the logical framework are (1) overall conceptual complexity of the initiative; (2) a small fund management team; (3) complex coordination lines within the World Bank; and (4) initially underdeveloped or mistargeted strategies related to some program elements like private sector engagement, benefit-sharing, and communications. These have collectively contributed to delays in the early development at the global level as well as at country program level.

96. **The ISFL is a global program with a global-level strategy, framework and milestones.** It is comprised of the five country programs, which tailor the results framework and milestones to their own, respective contexts. Country-level results frameworks filter up to the overall program one, except with regard to Tier 3 (input level) indicators, which are reported on by the FMT.⁵⁴ The ET analyzed milestones set out in the MEL Framework and reported upon annually through public reports and Annual Contributors' meeting minutes to understand the extent to which the ISFL is on track to meet its targets. The ET consulted global-level stakeholders to better understand the progress, challenges at the Initiative level and reasons for delay.

TABLE 5: COMPLETION TARGETS PER ANNUAL REPORTS VERSUS ACTUAL

Country	Milestone per Annual Report	Annual Report 2015	Annual Report 2016	Annual Report 2017	Actual Completion Date
Ethiopia - opened Sept 2014					
	Project Appraisal Document	End Sep 2015			Mar 2017
	Grant Signed	Winter/Spring55 2015	2016		Mar 2017
	ERPD finalized			2018	- 56
	ERPA signed		2018	2018	-
Zambia – opened Sept 2014					
	Concept Note Review	Oct 2015			-
	Studies commissioned	Fall 2015			-
	Draft PAD	Summer 2016			April 2007
	Studies Completed		2016		2 studies completed-no dates
	Prep grant agreement signed		2016		-
	PAD completed		2016		Apr 2017

⁵⁴ See to ISFL MEL.

⁵⁵ In ISFL's Annual Reports, seasons referred to are Northern Hemisphere seasons

⁵⁶ - signifies no information or yet to be completed milestone.

Country	Milestone per Annual Report	Annual Report 2015	Annual Report 2016	Annual Report 2017	Actual Completion Date
	Grant signed		2017	2017	Sept 2017
	Letter of Intent signed		2017	2017	Nov 2017
	ERPD finalized			2018	-
	ERPA signed		2018	2019	-
Colombia – opened Aug 2015					
	Concept Note Review	Sep 2016			-
	Studies commissioned	Fall 2015			-
	Draft Project Appraisal Document	Spring 2016			-
	Studies completed		2016		4 studies completed in 2018. Not published yet
	PAD complete		2017	2017	Feb 2018
	Letter of Intent signed		2017	2017	-
	Grant signed		2017	2017	Original Mar 2018, under revision (as of Oct 2018)
	ERPD finalized			2018	-
	ERPA signed		2017	2018	-


* Annual report format changed and became more detailed over the 3 years analyzed as the program developed.

97. **There are several areas where the program is behind schedule based on the progress reported in ISFL annual reports on the Tier 3 indicator targets of the MEL Framework.** Table 5 above provides details from the ISFL’s annual reports from 2015-2017 on planned (and adapted) completion targets versus actual completion targets. The information is based on the details provided in the annual reports (less detail is shown for Ethiopia’s program milestones because the annual reports do not provide it). As Finding 12 explains, country programs are proceeding at a slow pace for a variety of reasons. And, because the results for Tier 3 indicators are constructed based on country-level inputs, the achievement of the targets is being adversely affected.
98. **According to interviews with WB staff and examining the Initiative’s management arrangements, the ISFL faces challenges due to the small management team and complex coordination lines across the WB.** The FMT is a lean team, consisting of three full time staff. Given the size of the fund, the complexity of the concepts and the diversity of the implementation countries, it appears that the fund is well-managed but that the late delivery of several key program planning elements (see next paragraph) might be partly related to a heavy workload for the small number of staff. The management team is small compared to those in similar initiatives: for instance, the UN REDD+ program has a dozen staff in the global secretariat and double that amount of managing staff at the three implementing agencies (FAO, UNDP and UNEP). Furthermore, ISFL TTLs for country programs report to their respective WB Global Practices (GP), which have no formal reporting line to the ISFL. They also must ensure that the WB Country Directors, who are responsible for managing the country agreements, are aware of the ISFL’s activities (see Finding 21). To cite one TTL: *“I have to follow orders from three sides: the FMT gives us the money and instructions what to do with it, but my line manager is the GP director that has no formal relationship with ISFL, and finally, all actions in the country has to follow the country agreement*

which is overseen by the country director of WB". TTLs are often responsible for multiple projects as well.

99. **While the pace of the overall initiative is determined by the progress of country programs, the ET has also noted examples where the pace of country programs is determined by slow delivery or initially underdeveloped or mistargeted strategies and plans at the Initiative level.** One former FMT interviewee recalled the challenges early in the design phase of getting the global-level stakeholders on the same page, noting for instance, that the discussion on program requirements began in May of 2015 and took two years to finish the ISFL Emission Reductions Program Requirements. While the WB designed and began engagement with the Zambia, Ethiopia and Colombia programs at the country level, the ISFL was still establishing its governance arrangements at the global level. Additionally, many Initiative-level strategies, such as for benefit-sharing and communications, were not in place when the country programs needed them, thus slowing down the implementation of these programs. Country programs have not developed their own communication strategies to fill this gap, even though, at the time of the evaluation, communication staff was being hired by the IUs in some countries. The global-level MEL Framework was developed after the design of the Ethiopia country program, causing challenges for the latter's country-level planning. The restructuring of the program there took one year (2015) and, together with the social unrest in Oromia, delayed the grant to Ethiopia. While the FMT produced a global private-sector engagement strategy, the Annual Contributors' meeting considered this and requested it be tailored to the country and jurisdictional levels. The ISFL is planning to develop country-focused private sector road maps in early 2019.


FIGURE 1: OVERALL ISFL PROGRESS TIMELINE



Overall progress of program timeline is based on documentation provided on the ISFL website and the World Bank project page.

FIGURE 2: COLOMBIA COUNTRY PROGRAM PROGRESS TIMELINE

The primary reasons for delay in implementation in Colombia were insufficient communication and collaboration between lead ministries, changes in Ministers and senior staff combined with variable levels of interest, poor understanding of procedural issues such as grant signing, and a small World Bank team relative to the complexity of ISFL.



Colombia Timeline of progress based on documentation provided by World Bank on the ISFL website and the World Bank project page.

PID: Program Information Document


IG: indigenous groups

ESMF: Environment and Social Management Framework

PAD: Project Appraisal Document

FIGURE 3: ZAMBIA COUNTRY PROGRAM PROGRESS TIMELINE

Delays in Zambia have been attributed to the complexity of engaging multiple, sectoral agencies across the government. A key ISFL government counterpart, the Development Planning Ministry, is also new with little accumulated experience for donor programming or climate change. Delays were also associated with decisions requiring both World Bank and Zambian Government approvals. Many provincial officers have been too busy to devote adequate time to the project. Communication inefficiencies are due to the relatively high number of TTLs, and the fact that they are all based in Washington. There is also duplication between the national and provincial program implementation units.




Zambia Timeline of progress based on documentation provided by World Bank on the ISFL website and the World Bank project page.

LOI: Letter of Intent
ESM: Environmental and Social Management

FIGURE 4: ETHIOPIA COUNTRY PROGRAM PROGRESS TIMELINE

Ethiopia project delays have largely resulted from poor capacity in managing and reporting on project funds from the over 60 districts (woredas), and the critical political and social situation since November 2015.



Ethiopia Timeline of progress based on documentation provided by World Bank on the ISFL website and the World Bank project page.

ISR: Implementation Status Report

EVALUATION QUESTION EFFECTIVENESS 2

Are ISFL programs on track to meet their outcomes and objectives as outlined in the ISFL logical framework? Are the current objectives of the ISFL realistic in relation to the capacity of ISFL program countries and the World Bank?

- EQEf2.1. What are the unique challenges and opportunities in scoping, preparing, and implementing ISFL programs, taking into consideration each country's context and the World Bank project cycle, and how can these processes be improved?
- EQEf2.2. Is the ISFL jurisdictional and landscape technical approach – as outlined in its ER technical framework and related documents – on track to meet program goals, and balance ambition with feasibility?
- EQEf2.3. Given the scope of the ISFL programs' designs, the innovative nature of the programs, and the baseline capacities of program countries (including technical capacities), are the expected delivery timeframes realistic?
- EQEf2.4. Are the implementing governmental agencies in ISFL program countries also implementing other ER programs similar to the ISFL or complementary programs? Are efforts to manage these programs being streamlined?
- EQEf2.5. Is available support and funding, including from BioCF*plus* grants, sufficient for addressing any identified constraints or gaps in ISFL program country capacity to meet their objectives?

Finding 12: The ISFL country programs face several unique challenges to implementation. The main barriers for effective delivery of the country programs have been: (1) transaction costs of having to work with different sectors; (2) changing government administrations; (3) a wide and diverse institutional landscape; and (4) limited number of fully dedicated WB and government staff.

100. The political, environmental, social and economic context of each of the five countries is different as are the ways the country programs are designed. Each country program combines different funding mechanisms, has a diversity of jurisdictions, and targets different sectors. Therefore, their implementation processes and progress are different. Some of the challenges are unique to the ISFL, such as the innovative concepts of the jurisdiction and landscape approaches, and the understanding of them, which is not yet found at all levels of government. Other challenges are typical for all large, complex and multi-year programs. These are working with different sectors that require time to acquire ownership of shared objectives; changing government administrations, which means having to build ownership with new points of contact; and a diverse institutional landscape that does not necessarily speak the same language on development and conservation or start from the same knowledge base. The ET interviewed an extensive group of national-level stakeholders to understand how the country programs have been developed and how this progressed to the early implementation. The context of each country was assessed through document review and interviews with people with general knowledge on the country setting. The ET compared progress reports to planning (see timelines).

101. As seen in the timeline overviews and Table 5, and based on stakeholder interviews, all countries, apart from Mexico⁵⁷, have a slower pace of implementation than planned. According to the evaluation survey results, less than half of all respondents agreed with the statement that the program is on track to meet its objectives. This result did not vary much by country or at global level. Several reasons for late delivery were identified, including:

⁵⁷ In Mexico, the ISFL-financed component was defined, prepared and negotiated in conjunction with an IBRD loan as one project. The same team at CONAFOR developed the technical components for ISFL and many project requirements for the loan (consultation, safeguards, financial analysis etc.) were applied to the ISFL part as well. The project strongly builds on a previous forest-carbon project and therefore, the environmental plan and indigenous peoples' framework from that project have been updated for the current project. Also, the project was developed by national level stakeholders, consulted internally in CONAFOR and with the national REDD platform. Therefore, the ISFL country program was developed faster than any other country, and is now under implementation after signing its grant agreement effective May 2018. Downscaling to jurisdiction level and further consultation with local stakeholders and government sectors will take place during implementation.

- **The transaction costs of having to work with different sectors caused delays because** ISFL programs are implemented by different governmental sectors (e.g., agriculture, forestry, climate change, and planning) with various implementation arrangements (see Finding 3). Examples include:
 - In **Colombia**, program delays were partly due to miscommunication and misinformation between the lead ministries on resources as noted by numerous interviewees both in the government and outside of it. For example, the Ministry of Agriculture considered the most important aspect of ISFL to be the increase of sustainable agro-industry in Orinoquía while the Ministry of Environment’s priorities focused on forest management aspects. The Planning Department considers the landscape and jurisdiction approach mostly as a matter of spatial planning (see Finding 6). Most interviewees said that the ministries have little experience working together which made the process of coordination challenging.
 - Like their Colombian counterparts, the **Indonesian** Ministry of Agriculture and Ministry of Environment and Forestry each tended to have different priorities. **Indonesian** interviewees noted that it was difficult to make decisions when officials believed the outcomes could be at odds with those of another ministry. Interviewees from Indonesia also noted that it took time to bring the decision-makers of different ministries together and discuss the common goals of the project.
 - **Zambia** has also struggled to engage multiple sectoral agencies across the government, which slowed the development of the program. One of the key ISFL government counterparts, the Development Planning Ministry, is also new and had little experience in donor programming or climate change programs.
 - When the ET presented the preliminary findings from the Interim Report (in January 2019) to the **Ethiopian** program team, it noted that the progress toward finalizing the ERPDP continued to be slow. The team noted that this was due to the lack of a cohesive government vision among the different sectors that would translate into emission reductions, and that the country has ownership but lacks capacity (e.g., data and data systems, see Finding 16).
 - In **Mexico**, the country program is being developed and implemented through CONAFOR. Engagement with SAGARPA is foreseen as the program further develops. The WB informed the ET that in early 2019, the new CONAFOR administration, which came into office after the federal government administration change, has reached out to the current Agriculture Ministry (SADER) to seek financing to pilot and implement underlying investments for Phase 2 of the ISFL ER Program.
- **A complex institutional landscape.** Working with a landscape approach in a jurisdiction implies not only having to deal with different sectors but also different levels of government. Finding out (and agreeing on) what authority, role and capacity must be mobilized takes time and has led to further delay.
 - The **Colombian** Orinoquía has no overarching government responsibility. Instead, it is comprised of four subnational governing units plus municipalities under each. Constituting an additional government layer are the regional environmental authorities (*CAR*, for its Spanish acronym) of which two cover the Orinoquía. These public agencies are autonomous from local or national government. Although all interviewed stakeholders agreed that it was necessary to bring agriculture, environment and planning ministries together with the local governments, collaboration has come with a high transaction cost. According to people involved in the development of the program, all agencies at all levels are valid, but it takes time for each agency to understand the other’s priorities. It is likely that the Mexican program (including four States, each with its own governmental sector agencies) will later face the same challenge during implementation.

- Similarly, the institutional landscape of **Indonesia** is large and complex. The WB engages through the national government but the program is implemented at the jurisdictional level far from the capital. Getting stakeholders at both levels aligned to ISFL goals and their implementation is challenging, complex and takes time, partially because the jurisdiction-level stakeholders do not have the same capacity and understanding of the complicated issues that the ISFL brings. The provincial government implements the program but will not make decisions if it is not supported by regulations by the Ministry of Home Affairs, according to interviewed stakeholders. Amidst these complexities, the Ministry of Finance regulations require that if funds exceed \$500,000 then the grant must be merged with the state budget. Also, because RBP is new, the ministry did not have regulations in place to accommodate this modality. Administrative misunderstandings between ministries caused more delays that took months to resolve before the project could register.
- **Ethiopian** stakeholders reported delays largely resulting from poor capacity in managing and reporting on project funds from over 60 districts.
- **Changing staff, restructuring governmental agencies.** An obvious standard in democratic societies is the change of decision-making level in government agencies (Ministers, Secretaries of State). In several countries where ISFL is implemented, such as Colombia, Zambia, and Mexico, these changes also imply changes at technical level and sectorial policies, affecting continuity. Because the WB implements all its activities in direct coordination with the country government, each change results in a pause in progress while the new authorities assume office and develop new policies.
 - In addition to the general changes in administration, sector ministries can change and do so more frequently. During the last national administration of four years in **Colombia**, line ministries changed two or three times and each new minister's team started with new goals and priorities. Because these changes are not synchronized, there is usually a process of change in one of the participating agencies. In addition, local authorities in the jurisdictions changed halfway through the national administration, which added to the perception of the country program that “there is always someone new around the table.”
 - One WB country staff member told the evaluators that when the government in **Indonesia** changed, it took one and a half years to get the new government to buy in to the program. Furthermore, four years ago, the Ministry of Environment and Forestry was reformed which also impacted the pace at which the ISFL could develop.
- **Not enough fully dedicated staff to ISFL.** According to the WB staff interviewed, the ISFL's multi-sector, multi-funding source program has been a new experience in every country where it has been introduced (see Finding 14). One Contributor representative noted that ISFL global and country programs should be treated as both technical and financial cooperation with staff focused 100 percent of their time on it—especially given the consensus that the program is complicated. This was also confirmed by WB staff in the countries, who felt overloaded with the many aspects of developing and/or implementing the country program but as members of a Global Practice team had to share their time with other priorities as well.
 - In **Colombia**, only two staff at the WB coordinate this large program, and only on a part-time basis, amidst a complex institutional landscape that includes government and non-government entities; See Finding 28).
 - In **Zambia**, interviewees noted that delays were due to communication inefficiencies given the three TTLs (one for each funding stream), where none of them are based in Zambia and are available full-time. Moreover, Implementation Unit staff considered WB procurement on the program to be slow, but this was noted as ‘typical for World Bank procurement’ and should be accounted for in the timeline.

Finding 13: Due to the technical complexities of the ISFL's landscape approach, the program will be challenged to achieve its ambitious objectives within the established timelines.

102. **The Initiative's landscape approach combines rigorous carbon accounting methodologies across a variety of emissions sources and sinks together with upscaling from the project to jurisdictional-level geographic area (see Box 2).** The ISFL approach builds in some flexibility, such as not requiring attribution of emission reductions to specific projects. The program also allows for a phased approach that starts with the forestry sector and adds additional sectors (e.g., agriculture) progressively over time. However, even with this flexibility, the technical requirements for GHG accounting at a jurisdictional scale still requires a high degree of capacity and data collection to measure, report, and verify emissions reference levels and reductions. There is general consensus across technical literature that robust GHG accounting approaches are generally easier to implement at the level of smaller, privately-run ER projects as opposed to programs across entire landscapes managed by public agencies at jurisdiction level.⁵⁸ Nonetheless, the ISFL aims in large part to test the methodological parameters of just this premise to provide lessons for similar future programs. The ET conducted stakeholder interviews and reviewed country documents to assess the feasibility of the ISFL's technical approach in light of the program's ambitious objectives.

⁵⁸ See, e.g., Milne, E. et al. 2013, "Methods for the quantification of GHG emissions at the landscape level for developing countries in smallholder contexts," *Environ. Res. Lett.* 8, (2013) 015019 (9pp), at 2. URL: <https://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1748-9326/8/1/015019/meta> (noting challenges in landscape-scale quantification of smallholder farmers compared to traditional carbon market related projects). See also, Chagas, T. et al. 2013 "REDD+ Reference Levels: Definitions and Function," at 6. URL: https://climatefocus.com/sites/default/files/reference_levels_concepts_functions_and_application_in_redd_and_forest_carbon_standards.pdf (noting increased complexity of national and jurisdictional objectives in establishing reference levels compared to project-based standards).

Box 2: Background on the definition of landscape and jurisdictional approach

The terms “landscape approach” and “jurisdictional approach” are concepts that lack precise definition at a global level and therefore are inherently open to different interpretations. Variations in approach are common and even encouraged by some practitioners who emphasize the need for a diversity of approaches be customized to local circumstances. Generally, both the landscape and jurisdictional approaches refer to the participation and alignment of diverse actors and initiatives towards shared goals across a wide scale addressing overlapping challenges such as conservation, livelihoods, and food security. Although additional factors may be necessary for their success, we may summarize each approach’s most common essential elements as follows:

Landscape Approach

- Refers to sustainable ecosystem management spanning a mosaic of land-use sectors;
- Considers ecosystem services together with economy activity and other cultural or social needs;
- Usually maps land cover and land use to find common ground among diverse interests;
- Aligns incentives to support sustainable activities and reduce unsustainable incentives; and
- Seeks to build trust, participation and communications among stakeholders to achieve multiple objectives while balancing trade-offs.

Jurisdictional Approach

- Refers to scale within a defined administrative boundary and with political management (generally subnational or national, but also potentially an ecological region crossing political boundaries provided a common authority and legal recognition, or written agreement regarding governance);
- Enables jurisdiction-wide metrics such as commodity certification, preferential sourcing, performance targets, baselines/reference level, accounting and MRV via policy-relevant borders;
- Generally, includes disincentives – through policy and law enforcement – and incentives;
- In the ER context, may consist of ‘nested’ project areas within that receive all or a portion of ER credits either directly or indirectly via jurisdiction;
- Additional ER features commonly include protocol for leakage of emissions outside the jurisdiction, ER crediting, and ER reversals; and
- In keeping with UNFCCC guidance, the subnational jurisdiction is interpreted flexibly for REDD+ monitoring and reporting purposes.

Landscape and jurisdictional approaches need not always coexist. Landscape approaches can take place without the framework of a jurisdiction to administer them, such as the case of voluntary market carbon or water offset projects. Conversely, jurisdictional approaches may consist of less sectors than the full AFOLU spectrum within a landscape, such as REDD+ projects that exclude agriculture or other land uses. Additionally, these concepts can be used interchangeably in technical documents and discussions, and can appear in the form of numerous subtle variations in terminology. The essential distinctions between jurisdictional and landscape approaches are that jurisdictional approaches must be grounded in administrative-scale boundaries and hinge largely on the political level where land-use decisions are made and enforced whereas landscape approaches lack this political-administrative element and need only be implemented at spatial and temporal scales relative to their objectives. In the case of the ISFL, the landscape approach and jurisdictional approach are combined: the landscape approach is applied by a specific jurisdiction at the scale of its boundaries and includes political-economy concepts of the jurisdictional approach (see Box 3)

103. **Stakeholders from four out of five countries were nearly unanimous in stating that ISFL’s goals are highly ambitious because of the technical complexity of the landscape approach. At the global and national level, stakeholders acknowledged that MRV was a bigger challenge than they originally expected.** Several national-level stakeholders reported that they had to apply several different MRV systems: those from their various donors, the UNFCCC, and their own domestic accounting processes. Countries reported that applying different MRV systems was inefficient, particularly with changes in reporting requirements and advances in technology.
104. **At the jurisdictional level, the establishment of baselines and reference levels is a technical challenge for all countries and jurisdictions.** For instance, several stakeholders pointed to the difficulty of operationalizing ISFL’s requirement for fixed, 10-year baselines based on average

annual historical GHG emissions ending at least two years prior to submission of the ER Program document for each ERPA phase.⁵⁹ For example:

- **In Colombia**, the requirement for using 10-year emissions levels is especially unfavorable for jurisdictions like Orinoquía which are expecting significant rises in emissions in the near term. In Colombia, the forest reference level is established nationally and regionally for the Amazon which might be too high for the Orinoquía. Colombian carbon specialists underscored the need for greater technical flexibility, such as being able to update baselines more frequently. In addition to citing the Orinoquía region, Colombian carbon specialists said that baselines may need to be updated in areas like Meta following the peace process (see Finding 23).
- **In Zambia**, a GHG emission inventory is just underway in the Eastern Province so providing data for a 10-year baseline is not possible. It is also difficult to assess the level of forest cover in patchy landscapes, such as Zambia's Miombo forest.
- **In Mexico**, program stakeholders were generally optimistic about CONAFOR's technical ability to implement the program within the timeline. According to the respondents involved in the design of the program, agriculture and land use models need to be developed, and there were no efforts underway to develop these models with the relevant implementing agencies during the implementation. This would mean that a full, landscape-level ERPA would only be available towards the end of the 12-year program.
- **In Ethiopia**, stakeholders noted the need for greater capacity and commitment given the highly ambitious technical objectives and large scale. Additionally, some noted ongoing confusion over the common baseline given different measurement methodologies of various projects within the jurisdiction.
- **In Indonesia**, interviewees expressed similar concerns with the ambitious timelines in light of weak capacity in fundamentals such as ER measurement. Some noted the upfront delays were caused by the time required to understand the program's key concepts and results framework, and agree on jurisdiction and carbon counting rules

105. **Even in countries with relatively high technical capacity, such as Colombia, the level of uncertainty in calculating emissions baselines is problematic.** For example, ISFL commissioned the revision of GHG inventories for the development of reference scenarios in the Orinoquía, and found that the uncertainty was between 15 and 100 percent. This margin of error would exceed the planned emission reductions; and thus, make it impossible to assess project benefits or make results-based payments. The reason for this level of uncertainty is that applying the landscape-scale approach for specific land use types in a large and very heterogeneous landscape requires an averaging of values.

Finding 14: Country programs have gathered valuable new insights on the jurisdictional approach but do not appear to have fully incorporated global lessons that could help guide implementation.

106. **Relatively new concepts when the ISFL was initially conceptualized in 2012,⁶⁰ jurisdictional and landscape approaches have been developed and piloted increasingly across Asia, Africa**

⁵⁹ ISFL Emission Reductions Program Requirements. Version 1, September 2017, at Sections 4.2.5 and 4.3.10.

⁶⁰ See, e.g., September 2012, "Funding Avoided Deforestation: Concept Note for Discussion."

and Latin America.⁶¹ The jurisdictional approach refers to a government-led, comprehensive approach to forest and land use across one or more legally defined territories.⁶² It consists of a combination of technical and administrative elements to improve landscape management and reduce emissions from the forest and land-use sector, while promoting alternative livelihoods. Equally importantly though, is that the jurisdictional approach requires careful attention to creating the necessary incentives to motivate disparate actors to collaborate at subnational, national and international levels (see Box 3). The ET reviewed global and country program-level design documents to understand how the jurisdictional and landscape approaches were being used in the ISFL countries, and to what extent the ISFL has provided or leveraged those incentives. In addition, the ET conducted interviews to better understand the challenges and opportunities associated with operationalizing the jurisdictional and landscape approach concepts.

- 107. The experience of ISFL-participating countries in operationalizing jurisdictional approaches has led to the discovery of some challenges and lessons learned that should be addressed by the ISFL and future initiatives applying the same approaches to emission reduction.** These challenges include the following:

Box 3: Background on the application of the jurisdictional approach

The jurisdictional approach refers to a government-led, comprehensive approach to forest and land use across one or more legally defined territories.⁶³ It consists of a combination of technical and administrative elements to improve landscape management and reduce emissions from the forest and land use sector, while promoting alternative livelihoods. The jurisdictional approach to low emissions development grew out of prior efforts to protect forest carbon, reduce tropical deforestation and create incentives for green development that were seen as taking too long and not generating impact at the subnational level.⁶⁴ Jurisdictional approaches were driven by the realization that protecting forest landscapes requires strong foundations in government policies and measures.⁶⁵ By working at larger governance scales, and linking government, civil society and private sector actors, the proponents argue that jurisdictional approaches can better link land use planning with tangible, field-level activities that reduce emissions and promote environmental conservation. Jurisdictional approaches' main advantages are their economies of scale and government involvement, enabling greater financial and legal 'carrots and sticks' for forest protection, and achieving broader buy-in.⁶⁶

Notably, the jurisdictional approach offers promise to an increasing number of multinational companies that have committed to rid themselves of deforestation via voluntary partnerships such as the New York Declaration On Forests and Tropical Forest Alliance 2020.⁶⁷ Recent research has shown that despite good intentions, such 'Zero-Deforestation Commitments' have been slow to bear fruit to date.⁶⁸ By improving the enabling environment for green growth, jurisdictional approaches can provide risk management for private sector investors. For example, private

⁶¹ The two approaches are conceptually distinct (see Finding 13 and Box 2); ISFL implements them jointly since it envisions including all AFOLU sectors in jurisdictional approach.

⁶² Boyd, W. 2010. "Climate Change, Fragmentation, and the Challenges of Global Environmental Law: Elements of a Post-Copenhagen Assemblage." *University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law* 32 (2): 457–550. http://wwf.panda.org/wwf_news/?283050/JAZD

⁶³ Boyd, W. 2010. "Climate Change, Fragmentation, and the Challenges of Global Environmental Law: Elements of a Post-Copenhagen Assemblage." *University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law* 32 (2): 457–550. http://wwf.panda.org/wwf_news/?283050/JAZD

⁶⁴ Nepstead, D., et al. 2013. "More Food, More Forest, Few Emissions, Better Livelihoods: Linking REDD+, Sustainable Supply Chains and Domestic Policy in Brazil, Indonesia and Colombia." *Carbon Management* 4 (6): 639–58.

⁶⁵ Boyd, W. 2010.

⁶⁶ Wolosin, M. 2016. "WWF Discussion Paper: Jurisdictional Approaches to Zero-Deforestation Commodities," at 4. (noting the convergence of landscape approaches using multi-stakeholder processes – known as integrated landscape management – with jurisdictional approaches and voluntary corporate sustainability).

⁶⁷ Wolosin, M. 2016.

⁶⁸ See, e.g., New York Declaration on Forests, 2018, Progress Assessment Report. URL: https://forestdeclaration.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/nydf_report_2018-121818.pdf

sector companies will be able to source commodities from “certified green jurisdictions” which should help lower the cost of monitoring their supply chain. Certifying entire jurisdictions as deforestation-free could reduce companies’ risks of ‘leakage’ of deforestation to suppliers with less scruples, and more easily include smallholders than company-driven supply chain efforts.⁶⁹ Significantly, public-private partnerships in and around supply chains can generate emission reductions while also helping developing countries improve the sustainability of their forestry, agricultural and other land use sectors.⁷⁰ Additionally, governments can facilitate land-use planning in order to prevent land-use conflicts and protect natural forest areas.⁷¹

Jurisdictions and their partners will need to provide clear road maps to buyers and traders on how exactly they can engage, and assurances – such as via sustainability certification or ER verification – that such engagement will help them meet their sustainability commitments.⁷² In order to develop the requisite political will for political leaders to adopt jurisdictional approach practices and relevant actors to buy into them, strong incentives and disincentives for a given jurisdiction need to be packaged and presented clearly. Key elements for such a jurisdiction approach package to incentivize buyers, traders and decision-makers include the following:⁷³

- **Favored market treatment:** binding long-term contracts to source sustainable commodities at preferred prices from jurisdictions that meet key indicators would provide a strong carrot for reforms and security to buyers and traders;
- **Favored finance and investment access:** banks and lenders such as the &green fund commit to increase investment in green projects and make funding contingent on jurisdictions meeting sustainability benchmarks;
- **Funding incentives:** green jurisdictions could receive domestic or international public finance for meeting or exceeding agreed sustainability performance criteria; and
- **Reputational visibility:** rewarding jurisdiction leaders with public praise for their JA sustainable contributions can help engender political will at the least financial cost and support public pressure in other jurisdictions to do the same.

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- **Some selected jurisdictions are not single administrative units and require coordination among different administrative units.** In Colombia and Mexico, the area under consideration is made up of four administrative units.⁷⁴ This complicates activities in both countries, since the country program must coordinate amongst multiple subnational governments rather than have single administrative points of contact at the jurisdiction level.
 - **Several jurisdictions constitute very large geographic areas.** In countries such as Mexico (227,248 mi²), Ethiopia (110,662 mi²), and Colombia (110,208 mi²), the focal jurisdictions cover vast areas adding further challenges to the programs in implementing activities and communications. By comparison, Zambia and Indonesia jurisdictions are 19,875 mi² and 19,328 mi² respectively.
 - **GHG emissions are not equally distributed across a jurisdiction and can be concentrated in a small area.** In Colombia, for example, a relatively small area in the southern part of Meta Department is responsible for a disproportionately high level of emissions caused by illegal

⁶⁹ Seymour, F. 2017.

⁷⁰ Streck, C., and Lee, D. 2016. “Partnering for Results: Public-Private Collaboration on Deforestation-Free Supply Chains.” U.S. Dept. of State. URL: <https://climatefocus.com/sites/default/files/Partnering%20for%20Results.pdf>

⁷¹ Seymour, F. 2017.

⁷² Fishman, A., et al. 2017. “Tackling Deforestation through a Jurisdictional Approach : Lessons from the Field,” at 31. WWF. URL: <https://www.worldwildlife.org/publications/tackling-deforestation-through-a-jurisdictional-approach>.

⁷³ Id.

⁷⁴ The Colombian country program consists of the provinces of Meta, Vichada, Arauca and Casanare. Mexico’s country program covers Chihuahua, Coahuila, Durango and Nuevo León states.

deforestation.⁷⁵ According to the people involved in program development, this poses a dilemma to program implementation because adopting a jurisdictional approach implies that program activities will occur across a much greater area and across multiple sectors; however, the biggest potential gains in emission reduction are located in a single sector (illegal deforestation) in a small area. To be most effective for future ER, the ISFL could focus on this area by “nesting” it as a project area within the overall jurisdictional baseline, and thus concentrating much of its effort on controlling deforestation on this small part of the jurisdiction covered by tropical forest. If the program were to take such a focused approach in Meta, it would move away from its general logic of promoting sustainable agro-industrial development across a much larger geographic area related to protecting tropical savannah. This would pose added challenges since a nesting approach would address historic deforestation emissions in Meta but not future emissions on the agricultural savanna lands. The challenge of the jurisdictional approach in the Colombia program area as it was chosen is that, to be successful, it must be effective in both types of areas, and both problems are very significant and require significant resources.

- **Jurisdictions are not ‘closed systems’: drivers for land-based GHG emissions can have their origins outside of jurisdictions which implies the critical need to coordinate with agencies and stakeholder groups outside of the target jurisdictions.** For instance, the main driver of forest degradation in Zambia’s Eastern Province is charcoal extraction by forest dwellers to meet demand from urban centers. Demand for charcoal comes from the provincial capital, the national capital and, given the nearby border, the neighboring countries of Malawi and Mozambique.⁷⁶ If a serious reduction in deforestation and degradation in Zambia is the goal, then the supply and demand sides for charcoal have to be addressed simultaneously.⁷⁷ Therefore, at least part of the work to reduce land based GHG emissions in the Eastern Province must be tackled by agencies who have influence in the household energy sector in the cities, many of which are outside the jurisdiction.
 - Power dynamics, political economies and trade-offs between competing sector interests outside of the focal jurisdiction have been underestimated in the development of country programs, which could undermine the effectiveness of ISFL activities across jurisdictions in many programs (see also Finding 6). For instance, a WB staff member highlighted the pressure for commodity production in Indonesia (e.g., palm oil) as a major factor, stating: “a \$100M investment is not going to change large scale commodities—the program better be really carefully designed! Expectation management is required here. Donors are underestimating the political economy dimensions: Indonesia is a trillion-dollar economy. Commodities come from other sectors than environment and forestry.” Combining results-based payments with implementation of commodity supply chain commitments, as outlined in Box 3, could provide a powerful means for incentivizing results at jurisdictional level that may be able to overcome such challenges.

108. The ET reviewed recent literature on REDD+ and AFOLU jurisdictional approach-based emission reductions programs and found that lessons from international best practice on the jurisdictional approach are only partly included in the ISFL. Box 4 highlights some of the global lessons learned on the jurisdictional approach. Within some ISFL program documents (e.g., Zambia and Ethiopia PADs), there are references to lessons from international best practice; however, it is

⁷⁵ CIAT, 2018, “Compatibilidad entre el inventario de gases de efecto invernadero y el programa ISFL del Fondo BioCarbono para la región de la Orinoquía colombiana,” Draft Report shared with authors, at 4. (“More than half of the 35 MtCO₂e of gross emissions in the region (57%) come from forest land converted to pasture (3B3bi), especially in the department of Meta, where the savanna and forest biomes meet.”)

⁷⁶ <http://pamaccafrica.blogspot.com/2013/08/deforestation-charcoal-burning-and.html>;
https://www.cifor.org/publications/pdf_files/OccPapers/OP-86.pdf.

⁷⁷ <http://www.fao.org/3/a-i5134e.pdf>.

unclear the extent to which the ISFL has incorporated such lessons into its program implementation.

⁷⁸ During the evaluation interviews, many ISFL stakeholders stated that they were aware of international lessons regarding jurisdictional approaches, although they felt that it was difficult to find solutions. Many stakeholders agreed with international lessons, such as the problem of expecting results to be achieved too quickly and the over-emphasis on REDD+ payments and large multinational supply chains. Illustrative observations are highlighted below:

- **International Agency Representative, Zambia:** “Some of the ideas in there are far-fetched... You have to come up with a pretty good plan ... there must be a very innovative way of going about it. If you are not able to link forests to agriculture and just go with a narrow REDD+ approach, then you will be lost in a maze and never be able to [make it work].”
- **Government Member, Zambia:** “There is a lot of emphasis on carbon, but carbon is a monitoring tool not a goal. It is the livelihoods of local people that need to be improved on and then reduce deforestation. We designed ZIFLP as a livelihood project, not a carbon project.”
- **Civil Society Representative, Ethiopia:** “Communities don't have money... [ISFL] needs to make financial sense now, and in the medium and long-term. It must be practical, tangible, clear – for example, if we are planting trees, we must be able to use them to make money.”
- **World Bank staff member, Indonesia:** “[The complexities of the actual program on the ground] sometimes seems out of order with expectations set by ISFL. There needs to be an appreciation of complexity and a more realistic time scale.”

Box 4: Lessons on the Jurisdiction Approach

Recent global reviews of jurisdictional-level approaches have outlined a variety of common mistakes in jurisdictional and landscape approaches, such as:

- (1) expecting results to be achieved too quickly;
 - (2) assuming understanding of political economies without carefully analyzing the context;
 - (3) investing mostly into readiness activities; overly relying on REDD+ payments and corporate supply chains;
 - (4) moving too quickly without developing strong political leadership and public participation;
 - (5) not engaging private sector sufficiently or not distinguishing its actors in such engagement; and
 - (6) not clearly and consistently articulating the jurisdictional programs goals, needs and successes to build support across audiences.¹
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Finding 15: The ISFL country programs are implemented by government agencies that have varying levels of prior experience with ER programs, different sectoral backgrounds, and mandates to operate at different jurisdictional scales. Overcoming these various starting points for ISFL implementation poses challenges for initial implementation and capacity mobilization; however, the ISFL process has been seen by many to be overall an enriching process for mainstreaming landscape and ER thinking.

109. The ISFL country programs generally include governmental agencies of various sectors (see Finding 6) at both jurisdictional and national levels. While the overall approaches were new to all agencies (see Findings 13 and 14), there are agencies with more experience in ER projects and climate change planning in general, while others have no previous experience or in-house expertise. The ET reviewed ISFL implementation arrangements and interviewed staff from different agencies to analyze if the involved agencies had enough baseline capacities to effectively implement the program.

⁷⁸ Ethiopia and Zambia PADs reference findings from Fishbein, G., and Lee, D. “Early Lessons from Jurisdictional REDD+ and Low Emissions Development Programs.” Rep. Arlington: n.p., 2015.

110. **At a global level, ISFL staff and Contributors noted that the evolution of land-based ER programs from individual REDD+ projects to broader landscape- and jurisdictional-scale approaches was a new paradigm that requires different ways of thinking and is still not fully understood by all ISFL stakeholders.** Adopting landscape- and jurisdictional-scale approaches increases technical and administrative complexities as more sectors and funding mechanisms are integrated into the ISFL compared with more traditional, project-based approaches. Many ISFL stakeholders found it difficult to change their ways of thinking to truly understand what a holistic, landscape approach means. According to some, the lack of understanding of landscape and jurisdictional approach dynamics is not limited to country programs but also applies to program staff and Contributors as well. Six interviewees (three global-level, two in Zambia and one in Ethiopia) emphasized that both the global and the country programs required a strong champion to convince everyone in the jurisdiction how to think in this new paradigm.
111. **The WB and country program agency respondents in Zambia and Colombia noted that collaboration with colleagues from other sectors was enriching.** Participating agencies with little experience in climate change and ER projects learned from others with more experience. For example, environment and forestry Departments learned about both technical and administrative aspects of donor programming from agriculture and planning departments. Many stakeholders in Colombia and Zambia, where the ET could interview a larger number of people, praised the project's design for including jurisdictional and landscape approaches. Many interviewees stressed that such approaches required greater capacity at jurisdictional level with planning and process improvements. Mobilizing the different capacities and starting effective collaboration among agencies that had not been working together in the past posed challenges to early implementation. Examples of the different levels of capacity and ways in which participating agencies are collaborating through the ISFL are highlighted below:
- **In Colombia**, the lead implementing agency is the Ministry of Agriculture that has little previous expertise with climate change projects and no expertise with ER. The Ministry of Agriculture does have significant expertise managing WB loans but not grants, according to WB staff. ISFL implementation in Colombia is done in cooperation with the National Planning Department that does have in-house expertise in climate change planning but not in ER projects. A third agency, the Ministry of Environment's Institute of Hydrology, Meteorology and Environmental Studies, houses most of Colombia's national expertise. In contrast to the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Environment and NPD have rarely managed loans but do have extensive experience with grants. Similarly, at the jurisdictional level, the project will be implemented in collaboration with Colombia's Provincial-level governments that have little previous climate change expertise as well as the Regional Environmental Corporations (CARs) who have had a decade of climate change planning expertise, including the development of subnational climate change strategies.
 - **In Zambia**, a similar situation to Colombia exists: The Planning Department hosts the program both at the national and jurisdictional levels, but the National Parks and Wildlife Agency and the Agriculture and Forest Agencies participate with each agency bringing different levels of relevant expertise.

Finding 16: In most ISFL program countries, there is sufficient technical, managerial and financial capacities to deliver the program in the jurisdictions. However, the data systems and information for multiple land uses and ecosystems is not yet adequate, and in some countries, knowledge capacity is under-utilized.

112. **A considerable level of in-country capacity is required at technical, administrative and operational levels to implement the ISFL given its innovative character and the broad demands it places on countries and jurisdictions in terms of the various sectors involved, size of jurisdictions, and data requirements.** The findings of the evaluation survey show that the ISFL

benefits from staff with high technical capacity: 73 out of a total of 87 respondents agreed that the ISFL is managed by well-trained and capable people. Overall, countries have built up their capacity through earlier interventions, such as developing national forest inventories. However, it is not clear if the technical capacity on other AFOLU land uses (e.g., agriculture, livestock) or land types (e.g., savannahs, Miombo forest in Zambia) is sufficient to achieve ISFL objectives. The ET relied on stakeholder interviews and country documents to understand the capacity of executing agencies. The ET also reviewed documents such as National Climate Change Communications and Nationally Determined Contributions to better assess the technical needs and abilities as self-reported.

113. **National-level stakeholders from ISFL countries recognized their share of technical gaps.** In Colombia, for example, IDEAM has high technical capacity to establish baselines and is well-financed by the ISFL and other donors. This allows IDEAM to combine their work on GHG inventories and reference levels from different programs in an ongoing effort to use best available data and knowledge to provide adequate support to the ISFL. They also recognize their capacity limitations. For instance, IDEAM is aware that the GHG data for savannahs, a major landscape of the Orinoquía region, has not been studied in terms of emissions and important technical uncertainties remain (see Finding 13). Similarly, Indonesian interviewees acknowledged requiring training and additional consultant support on issues such as emissions measurement and data management.
114. **Zambian and Ethiopian stakeholders believe their programs generally face the biggest hurdles in technical capacity among ISFL countries.** In Zambia, no applicable base line or GHG emission model existed for forests in the Eastern Province due to difficulties in estimating degradation in its miombo forests. The country program was in the process of developing their own emissions model and baselines at the time of the evaluation. An additional complication for the Zambia program is that the lead agency that prepares UNFCCC forest reference emissions levels (FREL) follows UNFCCC requirements whereas the Zambia ISFL country program follows those of the BioCarbon Fund. Additionally, Zambia's FREL is from 2014 and out of date, which is delaying finalization of the country's technical framework. Ethiopia also must overcome some technical challenges related to baseline assessments. Ethiopia's program has developed its overall MRV framework and GHG inventory at the time of this report's writing, and the inventory will help to elaborate the country's emissions categories and key sectoral baselines.
115. **Given the high level of data requirements to implement the ISFL, the country programs should leverage the full range of in-country expertise.** There are a few instances where not all the available scientific data or available expertise is being used by ISFL programs. For example, in Colombia, the Alexander von Humboldt Institute completed a mapping of the ecosystems in Orinoquía which would be useful for the ISFL. Similarly, Conservation International has been working on payment for ecosystem services with communities in the region for the past twenty-five years although both Alexander von Humboldt Institute and Conservation International have not been fully involved in the ISFL program development. Likewise, in Zambia, the UK-supported climate-smart agriculture project has important intellectual capital and practical experience on the issue it is addressing that has not been fully leveraged for ISFL programming (see Finding 17). In both examples, the resources of these organizations have been identified and accounted for in ISFL stakeholder mapping, and the information of these organizations is being used for ISFL country program design. But their representatives mentioned that they have not been approached to share their knowledge and experience. The amount of effort required to foster collaboration between various organizations can be high so the ISFL does need to consider trade-offs between efficiency and effectiveness. To cite one Zambian stakeholder: "including all available capacity might be more effective but it comes with a transaction cost."

Finding 17: The ISFL country programs are coordinating implementation with other sustainable landscapes projects, particularly where implementing agencies can align ISFL programming with existing projects within their own portfolios. However, ISFL implementing agencies have not coordinated ISFL programming with relevant programs being implemented by other governmental agencies or civil society organizations – even when these programs are supported bilaterally by ISFL Contributors. Beyond coordination meetings, ISFL country programs could do more to update their programming elements to reflect complementarities with other active programs.

- 116. The ISFL alone cannot develop the missing capacity needed to create the enabling environment for a jurisdictional-scale emission reduction program.** One of the most efficient ways to fill such capacity gaps is to build on and collaborate with past and present initiatives in the same area. The ISFL country programs have mapped relevant projects and made efforts to align with many of them. The ET has examined the effectiveness of linkages to other initiatives and agreements to leverage complementary activities and funding by reviewing program documents, and aide memoires of meetings and field missions, as well as by conducting interviews with ISFL staff and representatives of other initiatives.
- 117. In all countries, there is strong coordination with other government-implemented forest-carbon programs such as FCPF, UN-REDD and FIP.** These key programs are well-referenced in program design documents (see Finding 4). Additionally, many government agency staff leading ISFL country programs were previously involved in forest carbon programs so they can apply the learning and tools to the ISFL, such as safeguard information systems, forest baselines, and experiences from stakeholder consultation.
- 118. Outside of these core partner programs (e.g., FCPF, UN-REDD, and FIP), there is considerable variation in the degree of alignment with other initiatives and donor programs.** Some examples of this are the following:
- **In Zambia,** several project partners and civil-society stakeholders found that the ISFL country program coordinated partially with other, relevant initiatives. For instance, the Conservation Farming Unit (CFU) implements a GBP 25M, DFID- supported program on climate-smart agriculture. The CFU program has been invited to general ISFL presentations, but no further efforts have been made to align activities and there has been no open communication channel between the two programs. The ISFL country program could benefit from CFU’s extensive experience in setting up its own agriculture extension mechanism, parallel to the Ministry of Agriculture’s system. This is relevant to ISFL programming as it also includes strengthening the Ministry of Agriculture extension system. The ET cannot judge the quality or performance of the CFU system, but the lessons can inform ISFL implementation.
 - **In Colombia,** stakeholders voiced similar concerns about the program’s incomplete coordination with other programs. While several ISFL information and coordination meetings have occurred, Contributor representatives in country found a general lack of coordination, alignment and communication between other relevant programs, even those funded by their countries, and the ISFL. For instance, a new German (BMU) Project, *Transformando la Orinoquía con la Integración de los beneficios de la Naturaleza en Agendas Sostenibles* (TONINA), is just beginning implementation through GIZ, but the ET found no evidence of active coordination between the ISFL country program and TONINA. According to respondents, a bilateral meeting between the TONINA and ISFL programs to seek alignment has not occurred, even though it would be useful. The reasons mentioned for the lack of coordination efforts was the pace of ISFL implementation: “we have to move fast with the implementation and ISFL is going too slow; we cannot wait for them”. In addition, the two programs work with different national partners in the Orinoquía for specific technical expertise; (e.g., GIZ works with the Humboldt Institute while ISFL involves WWF, and this has not contributed to coordination). The ongoing REM program in Colombia, *Visión Amazonía*, is funded by two Contributors to ISFL, Norway and Germany,

and it shares goals and partly overlaps geographically with the ISFL. Although WB country staff have demonstrated efforts to communicate with *Visión Amazonía*, according to the Contributors and the implementers of that program, there has been no established coordination between the two initiatives and direct conversations between the two teams have been sporadic. In part, this is attributed to the fact that *Visión Amazonía* implementation is led by the Ministry of Environment while ISFL is implemented by the Ministry of Agriculture.

- **Interviewees in Ethiopia, Mexico and Indonesia** confirmed that coordination was proceeding generally well with other programs in their country. Some coordination could improve in Mexico as the program is designed for CONAFOR to align with other institutes and initiatives, but ISFL Contributor representatives in country feel that they are simply informed of what the program is doing and no coordination is underway yet.

119. **At a global level, WB staff acknowledge that there are coordination challenges. They have felt pressure to coordinate constantly with other programs but from a practical standpoint cannot do so with every donor and initiative.** Some ISFL program staff also noted that donors often fail to coordinate with the WB. Donors and WB programs have their own agendas, timetables, and risk-mitigation strategies that have the effect of complicating attempts to coordinate. According to some WB staff, the participating countries meet at the global level and convey relevant messages to all the donors, some of which have similar initiatives. Donor roundtables also present an opportunity to share information. However, ISFL Contributors and other donor-agency representatives interviewed in Colombia and Zambia noted that the WB had not communicated with them on the ISFL and had not joined monthly calls and meetings. The issue of poor communication and coordination between the ISFL and Contributors at country level was identified at the last Contributors Meeting (Paris, October 2018). Subsequently, an ISFL program-wide decision was made to improve coordination (see Finding 20).

Finding 18: The available funding from the BioCF*plus* grants for ISFL country programs has no direct relationship with the actual amount of resources required for addressing identified gaps in country capacity.

120. **During the first phase of the ISFL, BioCF*plus* funds have been used to fill capacity gaps to create an enabling environment for future RBP.** To assess if the available funding is sufficient to fill these gaps, the ISFL country program PADs were reviewed to obtain general information on the amounts and uses of ISFL funding at country level. However, the ET did not see detailed budgets for the ISFL or its country programs. The analysis and findings here are therefore based on the limited information contained in the PADs and public financial documents. It should be noted though that the budgets of complementary programs, such as of the GEF or of future private-sector partnerships, were considered as additional sources of finance for the ISFL programs. The ET reviewed country program documents, such as annual reports, PADs, and meeting minutes. KIIs were also conducted with Contributors to better understand the relationship between financial resources and existing capacity gaps.

121. **In general, there are no detailed budgets available for country programs.** Country PADs break the funding down by component, but to varying degrees of detail. For example, Zambia's and Ethiopia's PADs include a component/subcomponent cost breakdown (by funding source, in the case of Zambia). The PADs also include an annex with an economic and financial analysis of the investment and return projections for the loan portion of the funding. But these budgets do not specify the costs of supporting the enabling environment in the country. Colombia's and Mexico's PADs only present a breakdown of the budgets by main program component. In all cases, the PADs contain information on the enabling environment constraints that exist (i.e. the gaps or needs) and outline some activities to address these, but do not provide budgets for them.

122. **The size of the required budget for each country program and its distribution by component do not appear to be based on an accounting of all the activities needed to achieve the outputs and outcomes of the program, but rather on more opportunistic considerations.** The design of the ISFL allows for Contributors to choose which country, and which ISFL funding window, to support (see Finding 26). Therefore, ISFL funding allocations across countries and activities have primarily been defined by the resources that Contributors have made available with generalized estimates of what might be needed to address the identified gaps. For instance:

- The implementing partners in Colombia noted that the agencies, going beyond the general budget in the PAD, have jointly defined a budget for each activity. This distribution of the available ISFL funds was done on the basis of what was seen as fair, using a rough estimate of the cost of urgent activities rather than an overall needs assessment. Also, in Colombia, Germany has added additional resources to the program when the GEF and ISFL project proposals separated their operations (see Finding 2).
- In Mexico, the ISFL adjusted BioCF*plus* support by adding \$5M when Mexican counterparts said that the originally proposed \$5M would be inadequate to achieve the stated goals. In this case, the added funds respond to an immediate need and were possible due to the availability of additional resources.

123. **Approximately half of all ISFL stakeholders that were interviewed believe that funding levels were sufficient to meet the program goals during the first phase.** Notably, the interviewees that focus on the ISFL's technical elements, such as IDEAM in Colombia and United States Forest Service (USFS) in Zambia, suggested that much more funding was needed to establish adequate baselines and MRV systems. As one IDEAM staff member said, *"we don't know what the future ERPA looks like, [so we have] no idea the level of information needs to go into this or how much it will cost."* A Contributor interviewee noted that the perceived funding insufficiency was the crux of why crowding in of other funding sources was so crucial and why he wanted to see more ambition by the WB to find the resources required to implement at scale.

EVALUATION QUESTION EFFECTIVENESS 3

Have capacity-building activities managed to bring different stakeholders' capacities up to the required level of implementation of ISFL?

- EQEf3.1. Have ISFL training activities managed to effectively increase the capacity of different (public and private) stakeholders?

Finding 19: While some limited capacity-building activities have taken place, it is too early to analyze the effect of such trainings on the implementation of ISFL.

124. **A primary objective of this early phase of the ISFL is to fill capacity gaps based on local needs, particularly in relation to the enabling environment for a jurisdictional approach to emission reduction.** Several capacity-building activities are included in the PADs, such as training courses for staff of implementing agencies, direct technical support related to MRV, and building up agricultural extension to promote best practices at the field level.

125. **The ET has identified that only a few formal capacity-building activities have been implemented.** At the global level, for example, WB staff and country partners have been trained on the methodological aspects of ISFL in a series of four workshops that took place in 2016 and 2017. Furthermore, the "International Workshop on Jurisdictional Integrated Landscape Management Programs" was organized in cooperation with FCPF. In Ethiopia, where the program was the earliest to be implemented, some capacity-building activities were conducted for beneficiaries. Capacity-building events that were mentioned by stakeholders in Zambia included administrative project

management to IU staff and support to technical staff to assist a specific training in South Africa. However, WB staff have also noted that capacity is also built through regular and ongoing interactions, for example between task teams and countries in developing project documentation. While this is a valid approach, the ET is not aware of a plan, strategy or monitoring for this kind of ongoing, non-formal capacity building. While ISFL stakeholders have found overall training opportunities useful, it is too early to analyze whether their capacities have significantly increased. The survey data shows that only 33 out of 89 respondents reported to have been involved in any kind of training. Moreover, the surveyed population is too small to draw any broad conclusions.

EVALUATION QUESTION EFFECTIVENESS 4

Is the ISFL's communications and knowledge management approach effective (including its MEL Framework) to inform stakeholders, disseminate its approach, and guide its adaptive management?

- EQEf4.1. In what manners does the ISFL communicate and share knowledge with various stakeholders (e.g., World Bank Group, ISFL Contributors, ISFL program countries, civil society, private sector, stakeholders in ISFL program countries)?
- EQEf4.2. Is the adopted ISFL MEL Framework adequate for monitoring and evaluating results of the ISFL portfolio against its objectives and for guiding adaptive management?
- EQEf4.3. Is there any evidence of other programs adopting ISFL approaches in their practices?

Finding 20: ISFL country programs have begun to disseminate information more effectively; however, the lack of a clear communications strategy has hindered engagement from the full range of relevant stakeholders. In several countries, ISFL programs have targeted stakeholders on an inconsistent basis or via one-way streams of information, resulting in confusion and reduced stakeholder involvement.

126. In a complex program such as the ISFL, where there are many stakeholders and on different levels in several countries, a communication strategy should be an important element. The implementation of a communications strategy can help achieve several goals, including: (i) ensure effective dissemination of tools and approaches to technical level stakeholders; (ii) improve collaboration with program partners in implementation, including government agencies at different levels and sectors; (iii) increase trust and sharing of lessons learned through consultation and engagement with local beneficiaries, CSO, private sector; and (iv) enhance transparency and accountability. A complete communication strategy will identify goals, target audiences, means, activities and budget. Global and country program-level design documents only provide a high-level, general understanding of ISFL communications without sufficient level of detail needed across jurisdictions and sectors. The ET relied on the review of communication materials and interview results to assess the development and implementation of communications in each country.

127. The ISFL is still developing a global communications strategy, and this at least partly explains why country programs face communications-related challenges. The only global-level ISFL communications strategy made available to the ET was a two-page Stakeholder Engagement Approach, which emphasizes general outreach to a wide variety of stakeholders through in-person meetings and online communications.⁷⁹ The need for a global strategy for country-program communications are twofold:

- A guiding communications strategy is required for country programs to develop strategies for communication at national and jurisdictional levels (see Finding 11). The ET observed that in countries where the ISFL program is close to or under implementation, communication efforts

⁷⁹ BioCarbon Fund, Undated, "BioCarbon Fund ISFL Stakeholder Engagement Approach," URL: <https://www.biocarbonfund-isfl.org/sites/biocf/files/FINAL%20ISFL%20Stakeholder%20Engagement%20Approach.pdf> (noting "stakeholders may include, for example, relevant government agencies, formal and informal stakeholder groups, private sector entities, IPs, communities dependent on landscapes, research and academic institutions, local experts, CSOs and local entrepreneurs.")

have been undertaken to disseminate its approach and the planned activities among local stakeholders (e.g., governments, communities and CSOs), mostly through direct dissemination activities (e.g., workshops, events), the production of printed materials and web-based information, but not following a specific strategy.

- A guiding communications strategy from the FMT at a global level helps to clarify the program to national and local stakeholders and avoid misconceptions. A representative of the Zambian NIU, as well as two WB staff, noted that a higher-level communications strategy would enable the IU to carry out its communications better and facilitate understanding of the ISFL among a global audience. In addition, the WB needs to help differentiate ISFL country programs from other WB (e.g., infrastructure or agriculture loan) programs. The lack of clarity about the purpose of the ISFL created many false expectations, and often a local reluctance to work with the ISFL country program. During the evaluation, it became clear that some local informants clearly had a misconception of the program ranging from “*this will pay farmers directly for forest conservation*” to “*this initiative channels all funding to multinationals*”. Gaps in the ISFL’s approach to communications are also reflected in the PADs for Zambia and Ethiopia, where communications activities are hardly mentioned.

128. Incomplete, inconsistent and unclear national communications have affected stakeholder consultation and engagement because communication activities and products did not provide stakeholders with an avenue to engage in program design or implementation (see Finding 1). Illustrative examples of this include the following:

- In **Colombia**, insufficient communication was mentioned as a main reason for coordination challenges at the national level and with Contributors (see Findings 17 and 21). Also, local stakeholders in Orinoquía said that they felt well-informed and involved in project development, but mentioned that communications slowed down after the PAD approval and as they awaited the grant agreement between Colombia and the WB. Local private-sector representatives found that the engagement workshops *ExpoGestión Orinoquía* in 2015 and 2016 were well-attended and considered informative (see Finding 5). However, the ET found that despite having attended several communication events, stakeholders were unable to provide an explanation of how the fund operates.
- **The Zambia program’s** initial outreach generated such high expectations of the ISFL country program among local organizations that when implementation did not immediately follow stakeholders began to wonder about the progress of the program and when their future engagement with it would occur. Zambian interviewees said the general public was not sufficiently informed about the ISFL country program, as only CSOs and chiefs (traditional leaders) were invited to the program launch. In Zambia, a jurisdiction-level government director suggested that “there is work to do in stakeholder consultation – until now it has been information [dissemination], not consultation.”
- **Ethiopian** interviewees explained that the Oromia project coordinated successfully with project partners to conduct two-way communications with stakeholders across the jurisdiction. Although the strategic communications document is still pending, the program’s initial communications have been informed by an analysis conducted by a consulting firm which focuses on behavioral change through community consultation. Nevertheless, a CSO representative commented that even though local communities and farmers were invited to meetings, it often only meant that they could observe but not be given a meaningful role in them. Some stakeholders noted that after the initial project announcement or launch, the only stakeholders receiving further communications were local-community ones that are directly involved with the project in target areas.

129. The ISFL country programs have a low profile and are not well known among most audiences.

According to the evaluation survey, only 34 out of 94 respondents agree with the statement that the ISFL is a well-known initiative. Only one out of five consultants and six out of 18 NGO/CSO respondents agree with this statement. In terms of national government respondents, who in other survey questions tended to be generally positive about ISFL performance, only 44 percent agree with the statement indicating that they too view the ISFL as not well-known among most audiences. A slightly greater effectiveness on communications at the subnational, jurisdictional level is indicated by the responses of local-government staff, none of whom disagreed with the statement. Colombia and Zambia survey respondents were more likely to say that the ISFL country program is not well-known in their countries. In those countries, 79 percent of Colombian respondents and 58 percent of Zambian respondents either disagreed with the statement or were neutral on it.

130. At the global level, information on the ISFL is disseminated through the comprehensive website www.biocarbonfund-isfl.org. While informative, this website has limited content and does not function as a platform for engagement. This site describes the program in general, its approach and methodology and includes all publicly available design documents and descriptions of country programs in general. It also has some news and stories of activities of the ISFL and other programs⁸⁰. However, the website is not frequently updated⁸¹, it contains no information for potential partners or investors on the types of collaboration or investment opportunities available, and there are no direct links to country programs or information on how to contact country programs.⁸² Also, there is no information on the program's management, responsible units and teams, implementing-partner agencies or overall governance system.

131. The ISFL could improve its visibility in the global climate change area. To illustrate this, a country program staff member who made a presentation at the UNFCCC COP24 in 2018 was surprised to find that the ISFL had not arranged a side event or booth. An internet search by the ET on ISFL global presentations found no ISFL side events or other communications efforts conducted other than the high-level closed-door programmatic meetings (e.g., the UNFCCC Standing Committee on Finance and Meeting of National REDD+ Focal Points). The ISFL was also not represented in other relevant global platforms and dialogues such as the Green Climate Fund (GCF) Private Investment for Climate or Partnership of Action on Green Economy. This lack of global communications is especially noteworthy given the critical need for the ISFL to catalyze global investments in its program countries, attract innovative partners from the private sector, assist with communications across its country programs and perhaps most importantly, share lessons learned with other countries engaged in jurisdictional and landscape approaches.

132. A review of country programs' dissemination activities revealed scant information dissemination for most country programs.

- Zambia's country program is the only one with its own website. The website has a comprehensive structure including links to social media accounts, but lacks basic information and working links on many of its pages.⁸³ Ethiopia has a webpage housed within an Ethiopian

⁸⁰ The general World Bank website has also published some ISFL stories. See, e.g., World Bank Feature Story, 2 March 2018. "Zambia Takes the Keys Away from 'Drivers' of Deforestation" URL: <https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2018/03/02/zambia-takes-the-keys-away-from-drivers-of-deforestation>.

⁸¹ ET's most recent consultation (April 7, 2019) of the "about" page, (<https://www.biocarbonfund-isfl.org/about-us>) showed no mention of the Mexico program or Switzerland as a new Contributors although both were achieved in 2018. The "news" page' latest blogs and videos are from October 2018.

⁸² Each country page on the ISFL global website includes a link for "Program Contact Information," but the link takes the reader to an internal messaging service without providing country program contact information.

⁸³ See <http://ziflp.org.zm/>. ZIFLP also has Twitter, Facebook and Instagram feeds. Last visited: February 4, 2019.

Government REDD+ website that provides basic information on the OFLP program albeit with many blank pages.⁸⁴

- An online review of press coverage in Colombia reveals nearly identical new stories from press releases around key project dates such as the initial announcement of Contributors to support the fund in 2013,⁸⁵ January 2016 and 2017 visits of Contributors,⁸⁶ and the March 2018 president's signature event.⁸⁷ All reviewed articles gave general information on project goals, main partners and Contributors. The articles have very little specific information on targeted value-chain or forestry/agroforestry activities; ways that potential partners such as private-sector actors such as banks, lenders or farmers could get involved; or how to find more information on the program.

Finding 21: The complex and large institutional structures of ISFL's main partners, the WB and the Contributors, has hindered communication flows between them at all levels. The insufficient level of communication has affected the coordination for ISFL's design and implementation, and this is a specific reason for concern as it is affecting the program's overall performance.

133. Coordination and communication among the different entities comprising the ISFL are critical elements for its success. The ISFL is supported by four Contributors and implemented by the World Bank. These entities are organizations with a complex structure and numerous programs in place in each country. The programs are also implemented by broad groups of staff through various mechanisms, at different paces and following different strategies. The ISFL's formal governance structures are relatively simple, with a small FMT and a limited number of representatives from each contributing country participating in Contributors' meetings to steer implementation. Beyond the ISFL's straightforward, formal governance structure, the operational mechanisms become much more complex. For example, the WB's implementation modality for ISFL involves TTLs situated in two different Global Practices, and support from country offices and various thematic experts based in different offices around the globe. With regard to the Contributors, the UK contributes to the ISFL through two agencies, DEFRA and BEIS, but its bilateral channel to the countries is managed by a third agency, DFID, or directly by Embassy staff. Germany interacts directly with the ISFL through BMU at the global level, while in the countries it tends to be represented by the German agencies, GIZ and KfW.⁸⁸ Norway has a small staff interacting with the ISFL through NICFI, and at the country level it channels its funds directly through NORAD. Norway also collaborates with Germany by channeling its funds through KfW (e.g., in Colombia's *Visión Amazonía*). Finally, the US's contributing agency is the State Department, which coordinates directly with the ISFL, while at country level the bilateral agency, USAID, works through delivery partners. While this level of complexity is not unusual for multi-donor programs, the sheer number of participating institutions, mechanisms and people in ISFL does mean that coordination and strong communication will facilitate ISFL success.

⁸⁴ See Ethiopia REDD+, "Oromia Forested Landscape Program," <https://ethiopiareddplus.gov.et/redd-implementation/oflp/> Last visited: February 4, 2019. (providing information on Scope, Program Milestones, Design Process, and Strategic Framework, but blank pages on Capacity Building, Safeguards, Steering Committee and Technical Working Group).

⁸⁵ Colombia.com, 30 October 2014, "The United Kingdom donates 300 million dollars to Colombia for the environment", URL: <https://www.colombia.com/actualidad/nacionales/sdi/102243/el-reino-unido-dona-300-millones-de-dolares-a-colombia-para-medioambiente>.

⁸⁶ See, e.g. Vanguardia.com, 25 January 2017, "Colombia promoverá un Fondo de Biocarbono," URL: <https://www.vanguardia.com/economia/nacional/colombia-promovera-un-fondo-de-biocarbono-ARVL387025>.

⁸⁷ Minagricultura, 9 March 2018. "US\$20 millones para el agro sostenible en la Orinoquía Colombiana." URL: [https://www.minagricultura.gov.co/noticias/Paginas/US\\$20-millones-para-el-agro-sostenible-en-la-Orinoqu%C3%ADa-Colombiana.aspx](https://www.minagricultura.gov.co/noticias/Paginas/US$20-millones-para-el-agro-sostenible-en-la-Orinoqu%C3%ADa-Colombiana.aspx).

⁸⁸ Given that in many countries, Germany engages at country level through GIZ and/or KfW, representatives of these agencies are considered as "Contributors" for the sake of categorizing stakeholders in this evaluation.

134. The issues related to inter-institutional communication within the ISFL are different in each country:

- **In Colombia**, there are communication challenges between the key ISFL partners. Although the ET found WB staff to have communicated bilaterally with Contributor agencies and organized multi-lateral stakeholder meetings during the entire design phase, the perception of Contributor agencies on the WB's communication efforts is different. Five interviewed persons from four agencies of the Contributing countries in Colombia explained that they have poor communication with the WB on the ISFL. To cite only a few expressions from this group of respondents, *"I cannot tell you if ISFL is on track because I do not know what they want or what they do", "It has been difficult to get continuous info from the World Bank; we asked them numerous times, but it doesn't happen. You only get something if you specifically ask for it", "There is frequent coordination between donors supporting ER projects in Colombia (GNU coordination) but World Bank is not part of that, while they should"*. These Contributor-level interviewees suggested the World Bank could take more initiative updating its funding partners and development of coordination or outreach mechanisms.
- **In Mexico**, the responses varied. One interviewed Contributor-agency staff member felt and demonstrated that there has been good communication: the person has a fair knowledge of the ISFL, was engaged in one field mission, and organized a meeting with CONAFOR and the WB to explore collaboration because there were still many open questions related to the feasibility of the project in Mexico (see Finding 13). This person did not know about the larger initiative in the country, which includes the IBRD loan. Another Contributor, while working with a suite of forest conservation projects in several regions and preparing a major Forest Carbon initiative with CONAFOR, had not heard of the ISFL or the IBRD loan, and had had no contact with the WB team. Both Contributors stressed the general lack of donor agencies in Mexico.
- **In Zambia, Ethiopia and Indonesia**, interviewees found the communication and coordination between their country program and other ER programs in the jurisdictions to be running smoothly despite there being many ongoing projects. For instance, Zambian national-level stakeholders noted that a donor roundtable and portfolio review platforms have been coordinating environment and climate change activities. However, these mechanisms could use improvements. Several interviewees thought the FIP is useful to learn from as it is better coordinated, despite having more donors, than the ISFL country program. At the jurisdiction level, interviewees noted a competition among project partners engaged in ER programs and some frustration that ISFL was only selecting areas lacking interventions, in order to claim value was being added, rather than building on existing programs.

135. Interviews with other Contributor representatives at global level suggest that the lack of streamlined coordination is not unique to Colombia nor is it a result of only the WB's actions. For example, the DoS mentioned that they struggle to coordinate with in-country USAID missions. In Zambia, USAID funds a land-titling and tenure and wildlife management program that neither DoS nor the WB was aware of. Respondents also mentioned that it is challenging to easily 'slot in' to USAID and other development-agency implementation strategies. Stakeholders from the German government at headquarters informed the ET that they have only a small share of time to dedicate to the ISFL and tracking in-country developments, including the coordination between the ISFL and bilateral projects they fund through communicating with Embassy or GIZ staff in the countries. While this was confirmed by German in-country staff, they all mentioned a low frequency of communication with "Berlin" on the ISFL.

136. The communication challenges affect how Contributors make decisions. For example, one Contributor mentioned that they can pool additional resources but tend to receive news on what is happening on the ground late, and therefore do not have the opportunity to move quickly. Communication challenges between Contributors and the WB at the Initiative level were recognized

at the last Contributors' meeting (Paris, October 2018) and corrective actions have been agreed upon. These actions include: (1) developing a Communications Strategy and Annual Communications Plan, (2) monthly portfolio updates to include a cover note with details on changes, issues, achievements and risks; and (3) quarterly call.⁸⁹ Though this is a positive step, as one attendee noted, the biggest communication challenges are at country level.

Finding 22: The reporting system defined by the MEL Framework is adequate for monitoring and reporting progress at the operational level and most targets will be reported on starting in 2019. The ISFL has some examples where it has applied adaptive management to its approach and strategies at the central level, based on insights obtained through other mechanisms.

137. **The ISFL uses a detailed MEL framework to establish indicators with partially defined target values.** While the MEL Framework explains that each program sets indicators and targets to monitor and allows for adaptive management,⁹⁰ at the Initiative level it builds on the monitoring and evaluation functions of the different country programs. Some target values will therefore be defined once the different country programs are fully developed and implemented with ERPAs. However, the MEL Framework does not reflect how monitoring and evaluation will guide adaptive management. The program has utilized the MEL Framework to report on some targets, though most are required to report in 2019. The MEL Framework, approved in February 2017, lists several indicators for which it is stated 'indicator targets indicatively developed by December 2017'. This has provided flexibility for country programs to select the most relevant indicators. The ET reviewed the MEL Framework (the version of February 2017), which comprises the key building blocks for the ISFL to effectively monitor, evaluate and report implementation. The ET reviewed annual reports which provide early results against indicators and narratives of lessons learned. In Zambia, MEL staff from national and provincial implementation units were also interviewed. The ET only reviewed annual reporting at the Initiative level and did not see targets set by country programs.
138. **The MEL Framework also provides the framework to guide the learning agenda.** Institutional learning has happened as a result of implementing the MEL Framework, through producing and sharing knowledge products, and in-person fora, such as annual ISFL meetings. The ISFL 'Learning Agenda' is intended to complement the evaluation approach and ensure that results from M&E are captured, fed back into implementation and shared with ISFL stakeholders and the broader land-use climate change community. The MEL Framework provides a timeline for 'learning modules' to capture lessons from the program. The first thematic learning module for 2017 was the identification of potential opportunities for private sector engagement in each ISFL program country. This will be completed by mid-2019.
139. **The need for adaptive management is large.** In the countries where the ISFL is being implemented, social, political or economic developments can occur dramatically during just a couple of years, and the ISFL country programs will need to adapt at the same speed. To name just two significant changes that have occurred in the countries:
 - In **Ethiopia**, public order deteriorated and large parts of the country, including Oromia state, were put under emergency rule from October 2016 until August 2017, and from March to August

⁸⁹ Information taken from meeting minutes.

⁹⁰ The ISFL MEL Framework notes on page 4 that "[e]ach program has its own set of country specific results that it monitors as agreed to by the recipient country and the World Bank to allow for proper adaptive management and lesson learning." Monitoring and evaluating for adaptive management in the context of international development has been defined as "developing enabling structures and processes to regularly reassess desired outcomes and learn what strategies work and do not work." Loveridge, D. 2007 "Adaptive management for international development programs," Australasian Evaluation Society Conference 2007. URL: https://www.academia.edu/38246895/Adaptive_management_for_international_development_programs.

2018. This critical period of political and social instability impacted the project's ability to operate. These developments drastically influenced local governability, community participation and private sector appetite to collaborate with the program.

- In **Colombia** a peace treaty was signed with the FARC, which implied large areas of the Orinoquía becoming, in theory, free of armed conflict. For example, the mayor of the town of Uribe in eastern Meta department (Orinoquía) said: *"In the past, the FARC would limit logging to two hectares a year in the municipality. But in one week [last year], 100 hectares were cleared and there is little we can do about it."*⁹¹ Some areas have experienced increased state presence and investment while also seeing significant increases in land grabbing, illegal deforestation and encroachment by inefficient animal husbandry.⁹² Positive developments are well-recognized. Studies have shown that business investments in post-conflict areas could have a return of 25 percent on investments,⁹³ a figure recognized by the agro-industrial private sector and supported by the EU. The ISFL program development process could adapt to these fast changes while activities are under development, but once the PAD has been submitted, the relatively slow procedures for PAD approval and implementation of grant agreements (see Finding 12) mean few changes are possible until implementation starts. This period can, based on other countries' experience, take a year or more.

140. There have been two clear examples of adaptive management at initiative level. The first is the phased approach for ERs in countries and the second is a country-specific approach for private-sector engagement. The adaptive management followed an informal rather than a structured process; decisions taken at Contributors' meetings were a response to direct information provided by country implementation teams and perceptions from people involved in the initiative. The decisions to adapt management were not directly based on MEL or technical reports emerging from a structured knowledge management system. The ET has found no examples of other structured monitoring activities to guide adaptive management such as "pause and reflect" workshops or revisiting the assumptions of the Theory of Change.

Finding 23: Based on the ISFL's most recent annual financial reports, ISFL administrative and program costs are standard but the program has a slow pace of spending in implementation and grant disbursements.

141. The current ratio of administrative to implementation costs reflects the fact that ISFL country programs have been in the design phase. The ET was provided with the most recent annual financial reports, but these did not include detailed budget figures. However, the ET had an opportunity to question the FMT on the types of costs that went into the larger line items, such as Country Implementation Support, Country Advisory Support, IFC Advisory Services, etc. Based on the 2018 Annual Report, the ISFL spent \$5.3M on the Initiative at the global level and \$9.24M on country program activities through June 30, 2018. Global-level costs include methodology support, communications, knowledge management, private sector engagement and evaluations. While the administration costs appear high in relation to total costs, this is due to the design phase in each country; at the time of this evaluation, the pace of spending in implementation and grant disbursements is slow. When Colombia, Mexico and Zambia are fully procuring for and implementing their programs, it is expected that there will be much higher spending, while administration costs will stay relatively the same. This will strongly improve the balance between administrative and program costs.

⁹¹ <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jul/11/colombia-deforestation-farc>.

⁹² <https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-018-05397-2>; <https://www.usnews.com/news/best-countries/articles/2018-07-19/in-colombia-a-hard-won-peace-increases-deforestation-cocaine-production>.

⁹³ <https://www.larepublica.co/responsabilidad-social/cuatro-proyectos-del-agro-buscan-capital-privado-2748930>.

142. **In comparison to the global REDD+ initiatives, the administrative costs of the ISFL are reasonably low.** The ET reviewed the annual reports of the FCPF and the UN-REDD+ external evaluation to compare. While the FCPF is a bigger fund with more countries under implementation, it averaged \$7.87M per a year from 2009-2018 in administrative costs. Up to 60 percent of UN-REDD+ program funds are spent at the level of its global secretariat as opposed to on its national programs.⁹⁴ The ISFL spent \$1.33M in 2018 on initiative costs of which \$.86M was on administration. Note that it is difficult to know what types of costs are coded to administration in the different funds.
143. **The ET noted that FY18 saw an underspending in implementation in every country except for Ethiopia.** This was reflected in the shortfall in grant disbursements. The budget for grants was \$3.45M while the amount actual disbursed was \$2.6M.

FINDINGS FOR EFFICIENCY

EVALUATION QUESTION EFFICIENCY 1

Is the ISFL's financial structure and implementation practice, including current and identified funding levels, adequate to achieve the ISFL's objectives, taking into consideration World Bank and Contributors' policies, procedures, and commitments?

- EQEc1.1. How do the ISFL's administrative costs compare to activity costs and are there any opportunities for improving economies of scale?
- EQEc1.2. Does the ISFL have sufficient flexibility to pursue co-financing arrangements for its programs, including with the private sector?
- EQEc1.3. Are the ISFL's funding structures (BioCF*plus* and BioCF T3) and mechanisms enabling the ISFL to meet its objectives and long-term goals?

Finding 24: ISFL funding structures and mechanisms provide a flexible instrument to support a wide array of activities that can be adjusted to local context and demand. However, its slow pace, high volumes of administrative and procedural requirements, and international standards generated challenges for efficient delivery.

144. **The ISFL provides a flexible mechanism that allows countries programs to determine where to direct funds to achieve emission reductions.** That said, the WB is a large organization with procedural checks in place and one that works with the large bureaucracies of country governments and multilateral institutions such as the GEF. While the delivery mechanism is designed to be optimal for both building country capacity and ownership and crowding in additional resources, the operational procedures are often cumbersome. The ET conducted interviews with the FMT and program teams to understand how the funding structures were designed to function.
145. **In all five countries where the ET interviewed national government stakeholders involved in country program development, there was a positive perception of the BioCF/ISFL funding structure.** Stakeholders noted that positive characteristics included: 1) combined funding mechanisms (see Finding 2), (2) adjustment of funds to local demand (see Finding 6), (3) the creation of the BioCF*plus* window to build the enabling environment before results based payments, and (4) the flexibility of funding windows for Contributors (see Finding 25). At the same time, stakeholders recognized that the size of the WB and its multilateral character implies many, sometimes complex procedures that are not always implemented efficiently.
- In **Zambia**, people from the IU noted that the procurement process takes up to one year. According to them, this is holding up all the key milestones (e.g. baselines, ERPD, benefit-

⁹⁴ http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/user_upload/oed/docs/UN-REDD%20Global%20Evaluation%20Final%20Report.pdf

sharing). Interviewees mentioned that there was a lack of experience with World Bank procurement procedures. While it is not surprising that procurement processes are slow in Zambia, it should be considered in project planning and design to manage expectations.

- A contributing factor of delay in **Colombia** was the legal complexity regarding which government entity has the authority to sign World Bank grant agreements. The confusion over this issue resulted in months of delay. According to interviewees, this held up the program during most of 2018.

Finding 25: How BioCF T3 funding will be used is still unclear and capacity needs have yet to be defined, therefore it cannot be judged if ISFL funding levels are sufficient to achieve its overall objectives and therefore, if ER payments provide enough benefits to land users to generate low carbon development.

146. **Results-based payments in the future will be covered by BioCF T3 funding.** It constitutes an important step in the program's TOC, considering that delivering benefits to land users, from ER payments, will contribute to low-carbon development. The specific use of BioCF T3 is still being debated, and may include: payments to communities through projects, co-investments in sustainable land use alongside the private sector, support to policies, or a combination of these (see Finding 10). The choice of how BioCF T3 will be used will depend not only on the program's acceptance, the level of in-country co-funding and the amount of emission reductions achieved, but also on the appetite of countries to use this funding for addressing policy constraints. Lessons from the development of the jurisdictional approach show that when aiming for a zero-deforestation jurisdiction, there must be agreement from the public and private sectors as well as the community. In this role, the public sector is key to developing and promoting disincentive and incentive structures. Calculating the sufficiency of BioCF T3 funding will require an accounting of the requirements/demand for such funding as well as the full amount of the available finance from public and private investments within the relevant sector and jurisdiction. Also, the ISFL global program should determine whether T3 funding will be used to cover the implementation costs of transitioning to sustainable land use mechanisms, and/or the costs to address policy constraints. The ET analyzed program design documents and PADs related to this issue in addition to interviews with national and global stakeholders.
147. **Based on interviews with governmental agency staff responsible for ISFL implementation, in all the countries it is unclear whether the projected T3 funds (e.g. \$30 M in Zambia and \$50 M in Colombia) are enough to incentivize significant land-use change activities.** The major reason for this lack of understanding is the unclear use of the future funds. One government representative said: *"It depends on what will be done with the money, but we do not know yet."* While some stakeholders mentioned the use of T3 funds to further incentivize the private sector, the ISFL country programs must also establish sufficient incentives for government actors at national- and jurisdiction-level across often-competing various agencies and ministries.
148. **The common denominator among government agencies is that T3 funding will be used to defray implementation costs. The ET found little evidence of using future RBP funding for incentivizing change and therefore cannot judge if the TOC of the program holds** (ER payments providing enough benefits to land users to generate low carbon development). For instance, while in Colombia and Zambia there is an emerging conversation with individual public-sector representatives (see Finding 5), there is not yet an assessment of the question: *will the benefits of sustainable land use models adequately offset investment risk for the private sector?* Nor is there an assessment of whether potential incentives (individually or "stacked") can change appetites to

invest.⁹⁵ One global-level participant noted the program likely needed to focus more on involving national and subnational financial experts who can advise on fiscal options to incentivize green growth. Another global participant with financial expertise thought that it would have helped to pay something between the preparatory grants and the carbon payments, and that the carbon payments could be more flexibly used to leverage greater resources.

149. **Simple total cost estimates provided to the ET by country planning departments show that there is a need to leverage major additional funding alongside T3 to cover perceived needs.** For instance, two figures that provide a fair indication of the perceived need include: (i) the total costs for developing sustainable land use in Zambia estimated at \$200 M by the National Planning Department, and (ii) the implementation plan of NORECCO's Climate Change Strategy for Orinoquía, which is estimated at \$800 M. Consulted experts also warned that some drivers of deforestation and barriers for emission reductions do not follow economic logic; they are related to illegality, territorial occupation and land rights issues that require strategies beyond economic incentives.

Finding 26: The flexibility that ISFL provides to Contributors to access specific country program windows enhances the relevance of the program to donor policies and increases funding levels. However, this comes with less control by the ISFL FMT at the global level, even though they have a broader view of different country needs and would benefit from the ability to steer funds based on those needs.

150. **The ISFL funding structure allows Contributors to fund the countries they choose and to provide financing to both BioCEplus and T3 windows.** This structure provides Contributors with an opportunity to be politically pragmatic. It also allows Contributors to focus resources on countries that have complementary bilateral programs. By and large, Contributors appreciate the potential for this funding structure to improve alignment both financially and technically in the countries they prefer, at least in theory.⁹⁶ Examples include German funding in Colombia through GIZ that aligns well with REDD Early Movers, REDD+, NDC Policy Support Program and the TONINA program. Norway is focusing resources in Indonesia and Ethiopia where they have substantial REDD+, forestry and sustainable landscape funding/investment in programs.
151. **The tradeoff of this approach is that it does not allow the FMT to allocate resources, despite its global view of where resources may be best allocated to maximize impact.** Stakeholders that have been involved with both the ISFL and FCPF suggested that the inability of the FMT to move funds at the global level between programs provided a strict structure and affected its decision-making. For example, one World Bank staff in Indonesia noted that the FCPF model is more effective as decisions are made from a multilateral perspective and not subject to bilateral preferences. A global stakeholder from Ethiopia also noted the difference from FCPF, saying that the Ethiopia program was 'donor driven' and therefore did not begin with strong government buy-in.

⁹⁵ Seymour, F. 2017. "Corporate commitments: Necessary but not sufficient to end tropical deforestation" <https://medium.com/trase/corporate-commitments-necessary-but-not-sufficient-to-end-tropical-deforestation-45da39f49a4c>

⁹⁶ This alignment in practice had several challenges (see Findings 4 and 17).

FINDINGS FOR GOVERNANCE AND MANAGEMENT

EVALUATION QUESTION GOVERNANCE AND MANAGEMENT 1

Have the Initiative's governance arrangements facilitated efficient and effective decision-making, and could they be improved?

- EQG1.1. Have the ISFL FMT and ISFL Contributors been effective in fulfilling the ISFL's objectives according to their roles described in the ISFL's governance arrangements and could they be improved?
- EQG1.2. Could decision processes be improved to increase the efficiency of the ISFL?
- EQG1.3. Are relevant (national, subnational) stakeholders effectively and fairly involved in decision-making

Finding 27: The ISFL FMT and Contributors continue to effectively fulfill their roles as described in the ISFL's governance arrangements at the Initiative level, but there is much room for improvement at the Program Activity level.

152. The ISFL Governance arrangements, including the by roles and responsibilities of the WB and Contributors in the Initiative and for the Program Activities are defined in 'Annex 3: Governance'. The ET has reviewed these arrangements, and cross-checked the roles with its observations, confirmed them using meeting minutes and interviews with WB and Contributor stakeholders. In some areas, particularly engagement and communication, there is scope for improved roles and responsibilities for Contributors (Table 6).

TABLE 6: OPPORTUNITIES TO IMPROVE PROGRAM ACTIVITY ROLES OF CONTRIBUTOR AND WORLD BANK

Contributor and World Bank Engagement Opportunities	Illustration
Engaging with the relevant local embassy, in coordination with the WB, to build local support and alignment on relevant issues.	Findings 4 and 17 showed that there is scope for better alignment and coordination between ISFL country programs and bilateral programs by Contributors. These are normally well connected to staff in local embassies or development agencies (USAID, GIZ). Also, embassies have a role in trade promotion and international private-sector involvement. Contributors can have a welcome role in engagement with this local expertise to improve engagement with bilateral programs and private sector.
Direct government-to-government contact, in coordination with the WB, at official levels or, potentially ministerial levels, to facilitate progression of the ISFL program (if aligned with the agreed program of the Participating WBG).	Findings 18 and 25 illustrate that while the adequacy of ISFL funding is difficult to assess, additional funding is probably required to meet program goals. Also, Finding 20 shows that the ISFL could benefit from better global visibility. Contacts with a broader set of agencies at the Contributor' country level gives wider visibility and can increase access to other funds than the strictly climate and development related bilateral and multilateral windows.
Direct engagement with private sector and non-government organizations in the ISFL Program jurisdiction with whom ISFL Program Contributors have existing working relationships, with the prior notification and agreement of the Bank- and Facilitating linkages with relevant bilateral programs through the Bank;	Finding 21 indicates that while the ISFL country programs can do more to fully align and coordinate with Contributor' supported bilateral projects and their associated NGO and private sector partner there is clearly a role for Contributors to proactively seek these opportunities.
Coordinating all communication and external engagement related to the BioCFplus-ISFL Program Activities, in cooperation with local teams, including coordinating the ad-hoc local Advisory Committee (where applicable) and	Finding 20 shows that there are several communication challenges - not only external but also internal. It is evident that without a guiding global communication strategy and national communication strategies, the World Bank cannot deliver its responsibilities in this area

Contributor and World Bank Engagement Opportunities	Illustration
facilitating the engagement with other key stakeholders, as necessary; Collecting and disseminating the knowledge obtained through BioCFplus-ISFL Program Activities. ;	
Preparing and organizing meetings for ISFL Program Contributors;	Related to the point mentioned above on the engagement with Contributors initiatives and partners, it is primary responsibility of the ISFL county program, supervised by the WB, to convene an active platform for dialogue and coordination with Contributors

153. **Many global stakeholders noted that the challenges relating to roles and responsibilities stem from unclear expectations regarding the various roles of the WB.** One Contributor noted that the WB prioritizes transparency and therefore involves the Contributors at every step of decision-making at the global level. While this is good practice, it often leads to incomplete drafts and cycles of comments in documents, which limits efficiency. Furthermore, the Contributor noted that contributing countries speak with different voices and some prefer to be heavily engaged while others want the WB Bank to make the decisions, saying “*if I buy a car, I don’t need to see how the engine works, I just need to drive it.*” Another Contributor felt that decisions were being taken ad-hoc and by unsuitable channels such as email when they should be discussed in the annual meetings. The interviewee mentioned an example regarding waving a rule on investment levels by a potential additional Contributor which was presented to the Contributors by email. Several global stakeholders in the WB (at the initiative and program levels) noted that the Contributors to the ISFL have greater demands than those they have worked with in other programs, and this may be a result of unclear roles and responsibilities. On the other hand, during the last annual meeting (October 2018) there was an understanding among participants that the FMT alone does not have the responsibility to communicate and coordinate: Contributors also need to play an active role in championing the ISFL via their bilateral and embassy channels.

Finding 28: Overall, governance arrangements have not facilitated efficient and effective decision making by the FMT, Contributors and country program lead agencies, implying that several aspects need adjustment.

154. **Notwithstanding the complex institutional structure and reporting lines of the WB and the Contributors (see Finding 21), the core governance arrangement of the ISFL is relatively simple and should allow for efficient and effective delivery of the program.** In response to earlier experiences, particularly UN-REDD, there is no large multilateral oversight committee with representation from beneficiary countries or external experts but only a small operative group comprised of the WB and Contributors. The ET has interviewed all stakeholders involved in the governance structure at WB, Contributor and country levels, reviewed meeting minutes from key meetings, and analyzed decision-making processes *vis-a-vis* the effectiveness of decisions taken.

155. **Findings related to effectiveness and efficiency point to slow performance and challenges in the delivery of the ISFL, which implicitly indicates opportunities for improvement in the governance structure.** Interviewees from different governance bodies have provided several suggestions for improvement, such as:

- More frequent and proactive (as opposed to reactive) communication lines.
- Improved communication structures among Contributors at all levels (country and global).
- More technical expertise embedded in the FMT instead of ad hoc support from different areas.

- Smaller number of WB staff involved in country programs but each of them with more time availability WB staff.
- Country representation in the decision-making process.
- TTLs should be in the country of implementation to improve direct follow up and implementation.
- Strengthened response lines within WB.

The WB TTLs perceive that that they could be empowered in decision-making, which would benefit the effectiveness of the program. They informed the ET that a decision was made (after they left the BioCarbon Fund team and joined the Global Practices) to exclude them from attending decision-making meetings between the FMT and Contributors, whether in person or virtually. This, in their view, presented significant risks to the Initiative's success. Several TTLs stated that they have not participated in key meetings such as the private-sector strategy design presentation at the fall 2018 Annual Meeting and needed to send a claim in order to receive a copy of the presentations. Almost all Contributors noted in interviews that they do not have a good sense of what is taking place in the field. Therefore, having TTLs present in annual meetings, or providing input on policies that will impact their role would be important. According to the interviewed TTLs and government focal points to FCPF, task teams in that program meet with donors four times a year. Furthermore, TTLs with the ISFL often juggle more than two projects or programs at a time, each of which include myriad technical and managerial responsibilities (see Finding 12). Strengthening the technical expertise of the FMT, which primarily responds to the Contributors, could partly ease the burden of the TTLs and provide a more direct line to address technical challenges in the programs). According to FMT staff, TTLs are invited to specific agenda points and in different Annual Meetings, several TTL participated in person or through videoconferencing means. However, the meeting minutes consulted by ET do not provide information on attendance or on the specific participation of TTL in the debates during these meetings.

156. Normally, TTLs are stationed in-country. In Zambia, country teams (both WB, IU and government agency staff) noted the challenge of having the TTL stationed in Washington DC, including inefficient communication and delayed decision-making given the time difference.

157. **One country program team noted that Contributors often make substantial requests to the FMT for information on the country programs, which the country team are subsequently requested to respond to without having had the opportunity to participate in the decision-making behind the request.** Two examples were provided:

- Contributors wanted to see historical averages of second reference levels in country programs but the TTLs believed that trends are most appropriate since the data is insufficient for historical averages;
- The private sector strategy was developed without TTL involvement. At least two WB interviewees noted their concern that the recipient countries are not involved in the decision-making structure of the BioCF—a significant difference from the FCPF. This may also contribute to the perceived top-down view of the ISFL (versus bottom up with country buy-in with the FCPF; see Finding 30).

158. **Strengthened communication lines between the country programs, FMT and Contributors will allow improved decision-making on all aspects of program development, which will strengthen program performance and ensure that BioCFplus activities will prepare countries for T3 payments.** At the global level of the initiative, Contributors are responsible for reviewing and approving annual business plans and budgets and providing guidance, advice and feedback on program activities. All Contributors mentioned the delays of the program and felt uninformed as to the activities “on the ground.” Other findings address the communication challenges of ISFL (see Finding 3, 20); some of which are related to the decision-making and governance structures.

Finding 29: Although the ISFL targets the subnational jurisdictional level, national government agencies have taken a major role in country program implementation, which can disempower jurisdictional agencies.

159. The flexibility of the ISFL allowed country programs to apply different governance structures.

The agreed-upon structure in each country depends on the size of the program, the sectors and jurisdictions involved, and the funding mechanisms. In general, the governance model of country programs consists of one lead agency with overall responsibility for fund management, along with a committee that includes representation from the different sectors that are involved and/or the governmental agencies that partner in implementation. Representatives from civil society, communities and local government are included (or will be included) in the national steering committees in Zambia and Indonesia. Different mechanisms exist in other countries in which consultation processes exist to allow for their input.

- **Indonesia** is the only ISFL participating country where program preparation and implementation is entirely led by jurisdictional agencies. A Provincial Steering Committee, to be legalized through a Governor's Decree, will be responsible for guidance and decision-making on provincial-level policy and program issues. It will be composed of representatives of key agencies, including the Governor's office, traditional leader's offices, different government sectors, private sector, civil society, and academia. A Provincial Management Unit will be established to provide day-to-day project management. At the national level, a national steering committee will be established consisting of representatives from central government agencies, with a responsibility limited to providing overall policy guidance.
- In **Zambia**, there is also a steering committee and a management unit at both the national and the jurisdictional level. A national steering committee is chaired by the Ministry of Development Planning and includes other relevant ministries, representatives from the Local Government, and representatives of the private sector, CSOs, and NGOs. A National Project Unit, seated in Lusaka, is responsible for preparation of annual work plans, coordination of work executed at national level, and reporting. Several activities are implemented directly by government agencies at national level. This structure is mirrored at the jurisdictional level in the Eastern Province, with a provincial committee and a Provincial Implementation Unit. In Ethiopia, subnational level agencies are involved in program budgeting and implementation, but additional activities and primary oversight occurs at the national level. Civil society participates through the advisory function of the REDD+ steering committee.
- The implementation in **Colombia and Mexico** is led by national-level agencies who sign grant agreements, manage funds, supervise execution and partially delegate tasks to subnational agencies. In Colombia, the design process was developed by national level governmental agencies, principally the Ministries of Agriculture and Environment and the National Planning Department. It is foreseen that during the implementation there will be an important role for these local authorities and that a regional implementation unit will be established, but the decision-making level and oversight lies with national government agencies. The national steering committee is made up of four national governmental agencies plus one representative of jurisdictional agencies through NORECCO. In Mexico, the country program is under implementation steered by one federal agency, CONAFOR. It is expected that other Federal and State agencies in Mexico will become involved in the future. However, the IBRD/BioCF ISFL PAD does not explain how future agencies will be incorporated, only it is that it will be outlined later, in an ER Program PAD or the ERPD.

160. Under the jurisdictional approach, the ISFL concentrates its efforts and activities at that level, adding value to existing platforms and not duplicating current processes. This implies supporting the enabling environment at the jurisdiction and includes strengthening capacities, coordinating stakeholders and decision-making at the jurisdiction level. However, the ET found that in most countries agencies at the national government level are leading the program.

- In **Mexico**, the federal agency in charge of project development (CONAFOR) is expected to coordinate with state-level agencies and involve them during project implementation. The mechanisms for this interaction are not designed yet and two interviewed stakeholders, external to the government, have informed the ET that there are many practical challenges for such a collaboration related to roles, funds and capacities of CONAFOR vs. State agencies.
- In **Zambia**, all-but-one governmental agency at the jurisdiction-level expressed concern as to why a jurisdiction-level project is led by a national agency.
- In **Colombia**, this complaint was heard less during the evaluation, possibly because the WB has actively supported the collaboration among local agencies of the four departments and consulted them during design so that Colombian subnational agencies feel more empowered. Local agencies in Orinoquía, particularly the two departmental governments (*gobernaciones*) and the two autonomous environmental corporations (*CAR*) were consulted and, according to interviewed representatives, their priorities and suggestions were included in the project design.

Finding 30: There is no defined link between jurisdiction or country-level decision making and management of the larger Initiative. National and subnational stakeholders are not involved in decision-making at the Initiative level, even though those decisions affect the country program.

161. The design of the ISFL governance structure, which does not include country representation, is a response to an important lesson from the FCPF and UN-REDD: significant country representation in high-level governance bodies is very expensive and it slows down processes and makes them inflexible. As a response, WB and Contributors chose to simplify Initiative-level decision-making to a committee of Contributors and WB without any beneficiary country representation. This even changed Contributors' own strategies, evidenced by the 2012 "Funding Avoided Deforestation" US Government program concept documents. These envisioned including beneficiary-country representatives in decision-making,⁹⁷ but were changed after the program joined the BioCF to just include Contributors in the 2015 ISFL Draft Operating Framework.⁹⁸ Beneficiary countries make decisions with country task teams on country-level ISFL implementation but neither are involved in ISFL global-level decision making. Local views on key decisions are assumed to be reflected at the global level through frequent reporting from country programs, consultation missions to countries, specific invitations to representatives of country governments to Contributors' meetings, and independent reports. The ET analyzed initiative design documents and asked both country-level partners and partners at the overall initiative governance on their opinion on the country involvement in ISFL governance.

162. The ET confirmed that at the Initiative level, countries or jurisdictions are only slightly involved in the decision-making processes. This includes key decisions that affect the kind of support to countries and therefore the work of beneficiary agencies, such as budget allocations, country selection and decisions on overall technical approach. For instance, the decision to apply a staged approach to ER might have been based on discussions with country level institutions and experts, but the decision was taken at Initiative level without their participation. Also, country governments informed the ET that the price that the BioCF will pay for emission reductions under ISFL has been established outside of the control of the beneficiary countries, is lower than other ER

⁹⁷ The September 2012 *Funding Avoided Deforestation Concept Note for Discussion* foresaw "a group of committed experts from potential donor governments and companies, potential recipient governments, NGOs, and the institution that housed the instrument" (at 5).

⁹⁸ *BioCarbon Fund Draft Operating Framework*, January 2015 (v.4.1), at 10 ("A joint forum for Contributors to BioCF_{plus} and BioCF T3 for all ISFL Programs will be established at the Initiative level with the responsibility for making global decisions, including the selection of new ISFL Programs, and the overarching design and direction of the ISFL, but not for decisions on specific ISFL Programs.")

payments in the voluntary market and will barely cover transaction costs. This was a concern expressed at FCPF Participant Committee meeting in October 2018. The participation of countries in program design was limited to their contribution to the development of some program level tools and concepts, such as ISFL ER Program Requirements.

163. **While the small governance structure reduced transaction costs and helped in taking some adequate adaptive management decisions, there are several voices within the Initiative expressing that country representation should be included in decision-making.** Three out of five Task Teams mentioned that countries should have greater control over the overall ISFL design because in the end, decisions taken at the global initiative level influence the country programs directly. The TTLs interpreted the flexible funding windows (see Finding 24) that the ISFL grant funding are supply-driven, with Contributors deciding what to spend funds on in countries. According to three TTL members interviewed, some decisions made in Contributors' meetings result in requests to country programs to implement activities that are impossible to implement or otherwise could have been better informed. For example, two TTLs noted the additional requirement of second reference levels (RLs) in country programs, which Contributors wanted to be historical averages and FMT agreed. However, the TTLs think the new RLs should use trends, since not enough data exists to calculate historical averages. As a second example, TTLs were not invited to participate in the development of the global private sector strategy. Their understanding of relevant issues in each ISFL country could have helped inform this strategy.

Conclusions and Recommendations

CONCLUSIONS OF THE EVALUATION

164. **The findings of this evaluation provide an overall image of a highly relevant project, welcomed and adopted by national and jurisdictional agencies participating in the ISFL program.** The ISFL's innovative approach provides additional value to participating countries' existing strategies for reducing land-based emissions and promoting green growth. The ISFL successfully involves multiple government agencies and line ministries across different sectors at the local, subnational and national levels. This level of engagement and cross-sectoral collaboration is necessary because the ISFL adopts a landscape-scale approach to address multiple drivers of deforestation. The implementation of the ISFL is achieved through several WBG funding mechanisms (both loans and grants) which has had the beneficial effect of increasing the size of total funding and flexibility of implementation.
165. **The ISFL is an ambitious program because it operationalizes relatively complex concepts - such as the landscape and jurisdictional approaches for reduced carbon emissions - across subnational regions in five countries.** In addition to conceptual complexity, the landscape-scale and jurisdictional approaches have rarely been applied in practice. Because of this, there are relatively few pre-existing case studies and lesson-learned to draw upon, making the ISFL particularly ground-breaking. Furthermore, while results-based financing for reducing carbon emissions has been implemented over the past few years, particularly at the individual project level, the ISFL is one of the first programs to apply this at the landscape scale with the intention of achieving results and issuing payments within a relatively short time-frame.
166. **Given the complexity of its approach, the ISFL has faced technical and administrative challenges in its foundational years.** From a technical perspective, the ISFL program has benefited from having access to relatively high levels of expertise in participating countries; however, there is still a need for additional expertise, data and knowledge systems to support successful implementation. From an administrative perspective, the complex organizational structures of the agencies responsible for implementation, which is overseen by a relatively small central management staff, has slowed down the pace of development and implementation. While collaboration of governmental agencies at different levels is evident, there remains a gap in engaging with the full spectrum of ISFL stakeholders, such as local communities, civil society and private sector. Meaningful engagement with non-governmental stakeholders is still in the early stages. The collaboration between ongoing similar initiatives in each country is variable. Many of the challenges faced by the ISFL pertain to issues related to improving information flows, engagement and collaboration among agencies and initiatives. Based on the findings, the ET detailed the following conclusions organized according to OECD-DAC criteria and responding to the main evaluation questions:

CONCLUSIONS FOR RELEVANCE

- i. The ISFL program has been successful in building partnerships with national and subnational government agencies of different sectors, and these agencies are leading the implementation of the country programs. (Based on Finding F1, F6)
- ii. The national and sub-national governmental agencies involved in ISFL implementation feel some level of ownership of the program because it aligns to their climate change, landscape management and overall sustainable development policies and strategies. (F6, F8)

- iii. Local communities, civil society and the private sector are starting to effectively engage in program implementation as a result of ISFL information and consultation efforts; however, many stakeholders do not know the mechanisms by which to engage with the ISFL. (F3, F5) The late development of global and country-level private sector engagement strategies until the time of this report's finalization has hampered clarity around engagement mechanisms.
- iv. The program integrates lessons and tools from ongoing and previous forest-based ER programs, particularly FCPF, UN REDD+ and earlier BioCF projects. By focusing on emission reductions in the full range of agriculture, forestry and land use (AFOLU), ISFL country programs expand to other government sectors beyond environment and forestry through involving agriculture and planning departments. (F4, F6)
- v. The implementation of ISFL jointly with different other WBG funding mechanisms, enhances the relevance, scale and scope of the program in the countries where this co-funding is being applied. The use of loan mechanisms (e.g., IDA and IBRD) has been particularly catalytic in the countries where they have been used. (F2)
- vi. The program adds value to existing country programs that address sustainable land use and emission reductions because it takes a landscape-scale approach. It therefore addresses issues beyond the scope of individual projects and covers many different drivers of deforestation in the AFOLU sector. While this integrated approach is seen as positive, the program's complexity and varying levels of understanding among ISFL stakeholders has caused challenges for implementation and a slower-than-expected pace of the ISFL in almost all program countries. (F7)
- vii. The design of the global ISFL initiative, and its country programs, appropriately includes social and economic benefits for local stakeholders in each jurisdiction, at the level of objectives and outcomes. Environmental benefits, such as biodiversity and freshwater, are also considered in program design, particularly when GEF projects are combined with ISFL. Economic co-benefits are reported through the MEL framework. Social and environmental co-benefits, including gender indicators, are also implemented and monitored through safeguard systems. (F8)
- viii. The ISFL program has mainstreamed gender dimensions and social inclusion in its programming and management practice. Especially at the level of country programs and by application of social safeguards, the ISFL is well designed to positively contribute to empowerment of women and disadvantaged groups. While there is no specific gender strategy or single gender specialist, gender-related indicators are included and reported upon in the MEL Framework. (F9)
- ix. Fair benefit-sharing will be a key element of ISFL's forthcoming ERPAs with country programs; however, there is uncertainty in how this will be designed, decided and monitored. Across country programs and the global initiative, stakeholders' expectations diverged widely on what ISFL benefit-sharing will consist of. (F10)

CONCLUSIONS FOR EFFECTIVENESS

- x. The ISFL program is not on track to meet its outcomes and objectives within the planned timeframe, neither at the global initiative level nor at the country program level. The slow pace of early development at the global initiative level led to delays at the country program level, and *vice versa*. (F11, F12)
- xi. The main barriers to timely delivery of program results at the global initiative level are a lack of conceptual clarity, incomplete understanding of the concept, underdeveloped strategies and operational challenges related to a small management team, and complex coordination and communication lines within the WB and Contributor agencies. (F11, F21) A key shortcoming in this regard is the lack of a well-developed theory of change – for the program as a whole and for

individual country programs – with logical causal steps included in results chains and/or impact pathways, as well as assumptions and monitoring tools.

- xii. The ISFL partner countries have adequate capacity to manage the program, but the theoretical concepts and the associated information and technical tools of the jurisdictional and landscape approaches are still under-developed. This uncertainty forms the main barrier for the country programs to meet established goals in the planned time. (F12, F16)
- xiii. The need to collaborate and create ownership between various governmental agencies from different sectors and levels, as well as variations in country-level experience and capacity to manage complex programs such as ISFL has further slowed down the program development and implementation. Overall, however, the intersectoral collaboration has been enriching for participating agencies and will likely lead to higher effectiveness for ISFL and similar programs in the future. (F6, F12, F15)
- xiv. The ISFL country programs have faced unique challenges in operationalizing the landscape and jurisdictional approaches for emission reductions, which are relatively new concepts. The program also faced challenges that are more common for large, multilateral environment and sustainable development programs, such as governmental changes, intersectoral coordination, and intra- and inter-agency coordination and communication lines. Global lessons have not been adequately included to date. (F12, F13, F14)
- xv. The ISFL country programs have effectively streamlined efforts to coordinate planning and implementation with other government-managed ER programs but there is scope to coordinate and communicate better with other initiatives, especially those supported by ISFL Contributors. (F17)
- xvi. There are constraints and gaps in ISFL program country technical and administrative capacity to create an enabling environment for future results-based financing. The amount of resources required to fully address these gaps has not been identified or budgeted; therefore, it is not clear if the current amount of funds allocated to BioCF*plus* grants will be sufficient to fill these gaps. (F18)
- xvii. The ISFL program's communication strategy and tools are not yet sufficient to optimally inform and engage the full range of ISFL stakeholders and partners or to ensure collaboration between the WB and Contributor agencies. (F20, F21) At a global level, ISFL work has been relatively isolated from REDD+, sustainable landscapes and jurisdictional approach communities of practice, which limits its abilities both to learn from the latest research and best practices as well as to share its own findings with other initiatives.
- xviii. The MEL Framework is well-developed and adequate for tracking output/outcome indicators and for guiding institutional learning. The program has used adaptive management in several instances; however, this was not guided by the MEL Framework or other structured monitoring processes. (F22)

CONCLUSIONS FOR EFFICIENCY

- xix. Given the lack of quantifiable detail regarding capacity gaps in counterpart countries and the current undefined detail of BioCF T3 funding recipients, it is unclear if the ISFL funding structure will enable the program to meet its objectives and goals and if ISFL TOC holds. (F18, F25)
- xx. ISFL's funding structure provides sufficient flexibility to pursue co-financing from other WBG funding windows, Contributors and partner countries. To date, there is little co-funding from private sector partners. (F2, F5, F24, F26)

- xxi. The ISFL Initiative-level spending has been in line with expectations and changing circumstances. Due to the slower-than-planned pace, there is significant underspending in three countries, particularly in country implementation support and advisory services. (F23)

CONCLUSIONS FOR GOVERNANCE AND MANAGEMENT

- xxii. The ISFL governance arrangements have facilitated efficient, but not effective, decision making. Governance arrangements are not representative of partner countries and jurisdictions, and do not effectively respond to evolving demands (F28, F29, F30).
- xxiii. The ISFL FMT and Contributors effectively fulfill their defined roles at the initiative management level, but there is room for improvement at the Program Activity level. Both Contributors and the WB can take a more proactive role in improving overall communications and engagement with relevant stakeholders, such as similar initiatives and the private sector. (F27)

COMPARISON WITH EARLIER EVALUATIONS OF SIMILAR GLOBAL PROGRAMS: UN-REDD AND FCPF

167. To develop recommendations that can improve effectiveness and efficiency of ISFL, the ET assessed which results of this evaluation are unique to the ISFL, and which findings and conclusions are similar to evaluations of other land-based climate mitigation programs. Comparing the results to other programs allows the evaluation team to validate the appropriateness of recommendations that have been made in previous evaluations. The ET has reviewed the FCPF⁹⁹ and UN-REDD¹⁰⁰ external evaluations to identify similarities and differences with the findings and conclusions of the ISFL first program evaluation.

168. The ET observed that several of the findings and conclusions of this evaluation seem unique to the ISFL. These include:

- Successes and challenges related to the landscape and jurisdictional approach (Conclusions vi, xi and xiv-first part);
- Program implementation involving multiple sectors (planning, agriculture, environment/forestry) and levels (national/jurisdictional) through various funding mechanisms (grants and loans) (Conclusions v and xiii);
- Private sector involvement as a key element of value proposition (Conclusions v and xx); and
- The ISFL institutional structure with the WB as the managing organization for ISFL and four bilateral donor agencies, each of whom also have other in-country activities (Conclusions xxii and xxiii).

169. Several emerging themes are also shared with either FCPF and UN-REDD. These include:

- Issues related to the slower than planned pace of program development and implementation (Conclusion x);
- Challenges for interinstitutional collaboration and communication (Conclusions xiv-second part and xvii);
- Inclusion of non-carbon co-benefits and distribution of benefits (Conclusions vii and viii);

⁹⁹ Baastel and Norecco (2011) First Program Evaluation for the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) Evaluation Report; Indufor (2016) Second evaluation of the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility. Final Report.

¹⁰⁰ Frechette et al. (2014) External Evaluation of the United Nations Collaborative Programme on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries (the UN-REDD Programme). Volume 1. Final Report.

- Capacity to manage innovative complex programs (Conclusion xii); and
- Adequacy of program funding (Conclusions xvi and xix).

170. When comparing the evaluations of UN-REDD and FCPF with the ISFL, the ET found several areas where the ISFL seemed to have applied lessons from other initiatives. For instance, where UN-REDD noted low country ownership and limited involvement of governmental agencies, both the FCPF and ISFL scored well on these elements, most likely due to the fact that the ISFL has direct involvement of government agencies in the design and implementation of country programs (Conclusion i). This is similar to the first FCPF evaluation which found “direct support to national government agencies responsible for the forest sector” as an important factor for program success.
171. Both FCPF and the UN REDD evaluations recommend that greater emphasis should be placed on integrated cross-sectoral approaches to REDD+ with higher-level political support and capacity-building obtained beyond environmental sectors. This challenge has been overcome by the ISFL through its strong emphasis on cross-sectoral collaboration. Finally, the UN-REDD evaluation emphasized the high transaction costs of their large, participatory governance bodies and recommended simplifying their governance structure. This lesson has been applied in the ISFL to such a degree that the main governance body consists only of the WB and the Contributors, and with no other stakeholder involvement. The ET concluded, however, that eliminating participatory governance bodies may have been too drastic and led to the perception by country stakeholders of there being too little of their representation in ISFL decision-making (Conclusion xii).
172. While the ISFL has challenges with communication across ISFL stakeholders, and internally within the program (Conclusion xvii), the UN-REDD program was credited with effective awareness-raising and stakeholder engagement through a strong outreach and communication strategy, knowledge management systems and platforms for REDD+ governance systems. Here, there are important lessons that the ISFL could apply. The FCPF’s first program evaluation also noted a lack of formal knowledge-sharing and communications strategy. By the time of the second FCPF evaluation, awareness-raising and stakeholder engagement had improved; however, the lack of a formal communications strategy was considered a weakness; therefore, the evaluation recommended the design and implementation of a final knowledge-sharing and communications strategy. The FCPF recommended that the communication strategy include coordination (e.g., shared platforms and messaging) with similar initiatives from the WB and others to strengthen synergies and harmonize messages.
173. The main factor that affected performance of UN-REDD program in 2014, was its ambitious nature and absence of a clear and explicit theory of change. This placed limitations on the ability of UN-REDD to, among others, efficiently allocate resources and adaptively manage implementation. The ambitious nature of UN-REDD is similar to the ISFL (Conclusions vi and xii), and the programs share similar challenges as a result. The UN-REDD evaluation recommended the development of an explicit and robust theory of change that explains what the Program aims to accomplish and how it will achieve such ends. While the ISFL does have an overall theory of change (TOC), and some additional examples for the country programs or strategic plans such as the Private Sector strategy, the analysis done during the inception phase of this evaluation showed that this TOC can be more explicit and robust to identify inherent assumptions to be used in evaluation and monitoring to assess program performance and guide adaptive management.
174. The slower-than-planned pace of ISFL implementation (Conclusion x) has been encountered by both UN-REDD and FCPF. For instance, the countries participating in UN-REDD National Programs were not progressing as planned “because the time, effort, and resources needed were greatly underestimated.” Like the ISFL, “the slow pace of implementation was in part attributed to the inherently complex nature of the REDD+ agenda”. Similarly, the FCPF program evaluation identified “slow disbursements at the country level, [...] and coming to terms with technical complexities have led to

delays in the FCPF programs”. The UN-REDD program evaluation also noted that distribution of resources across the Program is not linked to a clearly articulated strategy; like in ISFL, there are no clear strategic guidelines for the development of these budgets. To overcome these operative challenges, the UN-REDD evaluation recommended to implement results-based planning [including budgets], monitoring, and reporting tools across the breadth of the Program, to support adaptive management needs. The FCPF evaluation recommended to improve disbursements at the country level by facilitating the provision of technical assistance for the procurement of goods and services, among others buy bundling technical assistance services into single contracts. The difficulties related to complex concepts translates to capacity gaps in ISFL (Conclusion xii and xvi) are identified by FCPF as well, which notes “the carbon funds methodological framework is viewed as technically challenging among REDD countries, whom expect adequate technical support.”

175. Although the implementation arrangements of the UN-REDD and FCPF are different than those of the ISFL, they share similar challenges for inter-institutional collaboration and coordination (Conclusions xiii and xiv). The FCPF evaluation recommended strengthening alignment of the Delivery Partner (i.e., IADB, UNDP) engagement strategies by reporting alignments and misalignments. Recommendations in the UN-REDD evaluation focused specifically on collaboration with FCPF. In particular, alignment between UN-REDD and FCPF was focused on more fully harmonizing standards and approaches, eliminating duplication of effort, and strengthening joint delivery on the basis of core agency competencies. This is similar to the ISFL evaluation finding that there are opportunities for better collaboration with similar initiatives, particularly bilateral programs funded by Contributors. The first FCPF evaluation furthermore recommends greater coordination with bilateral and multilateral partners at the country level to increase efficiency and reduce the risks associated with funding aps. This would imply direct involvement of WB staffing in national-level donor coordination mechanisms and support to joint review and monitoring missions with other donors.
176. Another conclusion of this evaluation (Conclusions vii and viii) that is shared by UN-REDD and FCPF evaluations is the benefit of applying social and environmental safeguards to ensure non-carbon benefits to create more local support, but also the unresolved challenge of Benefit Sharing. The second FCPF evaluation mentioned the existence of multiple global safeguard policies (FCPF, FIP, UNFCCC; UN-REDD) that created concerns about additional work burdens and overlapping efforts. The UN REDD evaluation recommended continue efforts to streamline social and environmental safeguards for REDD+, especially with regards to benefit sharing mechanisms, and support reporting.
177. The challenges related to Private Sector engagement in the current evaluation have been even stronger highlighted in the FCPF evaluation. For example, the FCPF includes the statement: “FCPF has not manage to attract private sector interest and engage effectively across the portfolio.” The second FCPF evaluation recommends designing a private sector program to improve engagement and commitment under Green Climate Fund’s Private Sector Facility or other organizations that are better equipped to engage effectively with private sector. The second FCPF evaluation also suggests establishing direct partnerships with multinational companies, going beyond consultation for implementation of ERPA by providing clear business cases to attract private sector interest.

RECOMMENDATIONS

178. Based on the findings and conclusions of this evaluation, and by comparing these with previous evaluations of similar global initiatives, the ET developed a series of forward-looking recommendations to improve the program’s approach and structure, including management efficiency and effectiveness. These recommendations aim to be action-oriented and target specific actors that implement the ISFL: Contributors, the WB, FMT, and the country programs. Within

country programs, some recommendations are directed towards the host-country government Implementing Units that are responsible for the delivery of the country programs. Recommendations are organized around thematic areas. Specific references to the relevant findings have also been provided to show linkages to the evidence.

EXTERNAL COMMUNICATIONS AND ENGAGEMENT

(Based on Conclusions i, iii, xiii, xviii; Findings 1, 3, 11, 12, 17, 20, 21)

179. Although the ISFL is generally well-engaged with relevant governmental agencies in the countries and jurisdictions where it works, the findings from this evaluation suggest that the ISFL program has challenges engaging with broader stakeholder groups and collaborating with a wider group of potential partners, including similar programs and non-governmental agencies. To improve external outreach, ownership and engagement with the ISFL program and to improve information flows needed to leverage national and global expertise, the ET recommends:

1. FMT:

- Develop and implement an initiative-wide country engagement and communications strategy targeting jurisdiction, national and international levels. The strategy should include the goals and expected outcomes (e.g. dissemination, engagement, accountability, collaboration, etc.), and for each of these purposes: a definition of target audiences and their roles in the ISFL, key messages that need to be communicated, communication channels and an identification of barriers to and opportunities for each goal in relation to the target audience. The strategy should include requirements for additional human resources and budget allocations, as needed.
- Review the ISFL’s existing and future communications materials at the initiative level, and ensure that they clearly define pathways for engagement by relevant stakeholder groups. Communication materials should include follow-up contact information for relevant global coordinators and country programs.
- Set up a virtual roundtable of global land-based ER initiatives like FCPF, UN-REDD+, REM, and others active in project countries, to ensure ISFL is integrated and coordinated with their strategies and operations.
- Promote wider general visibility and knowledge of the ISFL among national and international climate change agencies and initiatives, and communities of practice on jurisdictional approaches (such as are emerging at a global level under TFA2020, the Governor’s Climate and Forest Task Force, for example, and nationally like the Roundtable for Sustainable Districts in Indonesia). Such promotion would include more active outreach through, for instance, a more complete, informative and interactive program website; increased dissemination of ISFL issues via social media accounts at the global and country levels (such as in Zambia) in different languages; and ISFL representation at meetings and conferences on climate change, landscape management, and private sector climate financing, such as the UNFCCC COP, Carbon Expo, Global Landscape Forum, or GCF Private Investment for Climate.
- Manage global-level expectations, among Contributors and program countries to increase understanding of the reality of the ISFL timeframe (e.g., by greater interaction of country TTLs and programs visits).

2. ISFL Contributors:

- Improve internal communication to Embassies, country representatives and managers of non-ISFL programs/projects about the goals and opportunities of the ISFL program, to enhance alignment, coordination and joint activities.

- Actively support ISFL’s communication strategy by disseminating results, products and news through Contributor’s communication outlets.
3. ISFL Country Programs:
- Guided by the global communications strategy, host country governments and implementation units (IU, where these are established) need to develop a communications strategy for the country program, with the same elements as the global strategy.
 - As part of country-level communications strategy development, the participating country counterparts, with support from TTLs, should update stakeholder maps over a year old, with special attention to civil society, private sector, traditional authorities.
 - Host country government/IU, supported by TTLs could consider organizing a series of communication events focusing on the pathways for engagement for key stakeholder groups. These events should create two-way communication to increase awareness and understanding of ISFL as well as provide opportunities for feedback and accountability. Possible communication events to be sponsored by the host country government could include “ISFL townhalls,” thematic technical events, and field visits.
 - To improve alignment with related programming and share lessons learned, TTLs should seek to actively participate in existing donor roundtables where these exist. Also, together with host country governments/IU, they should support joint review and monitoring missions together with other donors and participate in fora on relevant issues, such as ER, climate-smart agriculture, sustainable landscapes and climate finance programs at national or jurisdictional level in order.
 - Host country government/IU, supported by TTLs, should formalize a schedule of informational meetings with actual and potential partners at the country and jurisdiction levels to strengthen and widen engagement, including regular and frequent check-ins across related agencies, initiatives and planning processes at local, regional and national levels to ensure the ISFL is well-coordinated with other ongoing programs.

INTERNAL ISFL COMMUNICATIONS

(Conclusions xiii, xiv, xv, xxii, xiii, Findings 1, 4, 17, 21, 27)

180. The ISFL is being implemented by different agencies, working at various levels. While the FMT is at the heart of coordination, there are several other bodies that have complementary roles and responsibilities in program design, execution, decision making and oversight. Knowing that both the WB and Contributor agencies are large, complex and decentralized organizations, internal communication is a challenge. The ET found that there is suboptimal alignment and coordination between the different agencies involved in program implementation. To enhance internal communications that can improve efficiency and effectiveness, the ET recommends:

- FMT:
 - Apply the commitments for improved communication taken at the 2018 Annual Contributor’s meeting and report back in next Annual meeting.
- Contributors:
 - Ensure continuous information flows from Contributor agency representatives (including key project staff) to ISFL country programs and report back to ISFL Focal Points at the global level of Contributor agencies on progress, opportunities or challenges for alignment and coordination.
- Country Programs:

- The TTLs and host country government agencies/IU should ensure continuous information flows from ISFL country program to representatives from Contributor agencies (including key project staff) and consider facilitating regular in-country Contributor meetings aimed at sharing information, lessons and coordination of activities (or participate where existing, such as GNU coordination in Colombia).
- TTLs and WB in-country staff join IU on calls and meetings with Contributor agencies and assist in the development of coordination or outreach mechanisms.

PRIVATE SECTOR ENGAGEMENT

(Conclusion iii, Findings 5, 11)

181. Active and effective private sector engagement is a cornerstone of ISFL's value proposition. This evaluation found that there have been different efforts to engage with private-sector actors. There is real and genuine interest among companies, producer groups, private-sector platforms and individual entrepreneurs to partner with ISFL. To date, however, there have been relatively few formalized private-sector partnerships that have generated financial contributions or other firm commitments. There is also little evidence of development of collective corporate engagement at jurisdictional level, nor of combining RBP finance with sustainable supply chain commitments in jurisdictions. To increase the effectiveness of private sector engagement to yield additional partnerships, the ET recommends:

- FMT:
 - Expedite the implementation of an actionable private-sector engagement strategy that identifies the full range of potential partners, options and approaches, and can be used as a model for the development of country-level private-sector engagement strategies. The private sector strategy could include specific targets for each country in terms of developing a pipeline of private-sector opportunities that is used to encourage routine follow-up and engagement.
 - (Re-)engage with global initiatives beyond those involved on a regular basis that promote private-sector investment in sustainable landscapes or value chains (e.g., IDH, Bonn Challenge, Commonland, TFA2020, the UK's P4F Program) with a focus on partnering and learning.
 - Consider expanding the private-sector strategy to include a broader range of financial institutions, including other multilateral banks, private banks, and insurance companies that can be engaged at the global level. Given the positive responses received about the use of IDA/IBRD loans, for example, the FMT should consider ways to further leverage reimbursable financial mechanisms to increase coverage of the full private sector landscape that can reach from multinational companies to the farmer level.
 - In close connection, ISFL should align its RBP funding with private sector sustainable supply chain commitments in the targeted jurisdictions to overcome political economy and competing sector challenges and better incentivize change.
- ISFL Contributors:
 - Actively support ISFL private-sector engagement by promoting options for engagement with companies from Contributor countries seeking investment opportunities, for instance at trade missions, trade fairs or through engagement with trade commissioners at Embassies. Contributors may also use bilateral relationships with private-sector engagement platforms such as &Green Fund, Partnerships for Forests and PPPs in the program countries to further promote the ISFL's efforts to incorporate the private sector.
- ISFL Country Programs:

- The host country government/IU, with support of the TTL and the ISFL private sector specialist of the WB at the global level, should adapt the Initiative-level private-sector strategy to the local and national context, in close collaboration with private-sector stakeholders. In the jurisdiction, this strategy should target a collective vision of different private-sector representatives on corporative engagement within the jurisdiction. The strategy should include increasing the amount of targeted outreach to the private-sector firms, present business cases, and inform companies of potential entry points for working with the ISFL.
- The host country government agencies should ensure that the ISFL private-sector specialist in WB headquarters has a key counterpart in each country, such as a member of the IU or a contractor, with the time and capacity to cultivate necessary relationships and build partnerships;
- Once in place, the private-sector specialist with the IU should develop strategies to upscale ISFL private-sector engagement by increasing the number of beneficiaries through private sector partnership and by targeting producer-group associations, cooperatives and other aggregators that offer credit and favorable terms based on volume. For example, public-private partnerships in which commodity buyers offer preferential pricing to “green jurisdictions” could have a transformative impact.
- The host country government/IU, with support of the global-level ISFL private-sector specialist, could ensure that the public sector provides an adequate set of incentives and disincentives, which could eventually be bundled with private-sector incentives, to provide a sufficient value proposition for change. They could develop innovative approaches for sustainable value chains, such as support for “green branding” and marketing of goods that are sustainably produced within ISFL landscapes. To do this however, ISFL jurisdictions would need to link to various jurisdictional scale indicator initiatives underway¹⁰¹.

OPERATIONS AND ADMINISTRATION

(Conclusions x, xi, xiv, xxii)

182. This evaluation found that some operational and administrative arrangements within the WB are barriers to timely development implementation of the program, both at global initiative level and in the countries. To improve effectiveness and efficiency, the ET recommends:

- WB:
 - Currently the TTLs of the ISFL projects report to their respective Global Practices, have other project management responsibilities that prevent them from devoting more time to the ISFL, and there is a need to accelerate the pace of program implementation. Consequently, the FMT, Global Practices and TTLs should explore ways to either be able to dedicate more time from WB staff or acquire additional human resources, to support ISFL project management at country level. Increased staffing commitments are also necessary to enable ISFL to keep up with and contribute to evolving policy and practice related to the jurisdictional approach, REDD+ and related initiatives globally. Ideally, each country program should have one TTL overseeing the different complementary funds, stationed in the country and with exclusive time dedicated to ISFL to allow for more focus on moving ISFL activities forward.
 - Increase the amount of human resources available to the FMT, such as additional expertise on relevant technical approaches, tools and financing/private-sector engagement, rather than rely on infrequent support from consultants or staff from other divisions.

¹⁰¹ e.g., Verra Landscape Standard, IDH Verified Sourcing Areas, and the EU initiative foreseen by its 2019 Communication on Deforestation and Forest Degradation; “EU Communication (2019) on Stepping up EU Action against Deforestation and Forest Degradation.” URL: http://ec.europa.eu/environment/forests/eu_comm_2019.htm

- FMT:
 - Increase TTL presence in ISFL meetings between Contributors and FMT to ensure relevant knowledge on ISFL country-levels is included in decisions at the FMT-level affecting those programs.
 - To improve proactive internal and external collaboration that is needed to advance ISFL programming, the FMT should find ways to incentivize behaviors that advance the program to meet or exceed project timelines. For example, the WB FMT may consider offering opportunities for team members, or participating country counterparts, to receive special recognition awards (e.g., “ISFL Mover of the Quarter”) award published in the newsletter, recognize countries who achieve key milestones, provide professional development opportunities for ISFL performers to present at relevant conferences, bonuses, or other forms of incentives.
- Country Programs:
 - TTLs together with their respective implementation units should review their procurement pipelines to identify the specific roadblocks that are hindering the pace of spending in implementation and grant disbursements. Where possible, they should explore ways to expedite processes, such as through conducting multiple reviews and approvals simultaneously or by bundling technical assistance services into single contracts. Where capacity gaps exist in understanding of administrative procedures, TTLs should ensure that relevant trainings are provided to IU administrative staff with sufficient follow-up to maintain forward progress. Given the high level of data requirements to implement ISFL, country programs should leverage the full range of in-country expertise.
 - Where possible, the FMT, TTL and host-country implementing agencies should fully align and coordinate different funding flows (BioCF*plus*, GEF, loans) in terms of management teams, executing agencies and time frames.

ISFL RESOURCE ALLOCATION

(Conclusions xvi, xix, Findings 18, 25)

183. The evaluation found that available funding from the BioCF*plus* grants for ISFL country programs has no direct relationship with the actual amount of resources required for addressing identified gaps in country capacity. To improve effective resource allocation, the ET recommends:

- FMT:
 - Consider conducting a financial needs assessment, particularly related to MRV and baselines for RBP enabling environment and ensure that the BioCF*plus* grants are sufficient to meet these needs or else, develop criteria to decide what capacity areas to prioritize. A broader financial needs assessment related to the T3 funding would likely be of less value since the true scale of investment needed to create measurable changes in emission reduction across an entire jurisdiction would likely go beyond the resources available in the ISFL although such a financial needs assessment is worth considering.
 - Consider options for revising the funding structure to increase FMT control of funding from different Contributors to better enable the ISFL as a whole to succeed.
 - Since many stakeholders identified the low-level of funding from the ISFL grant as a major weakness, and in countries where the ISFL grant is accompanied with an investment loan brought greater government ownership of the program, the FMT, the relevant WB Global Practices and the participating ISFL countries should explore the other countries’ potential interest in larger-scale investments that address key country priorities but also meet ISFL

aims, as this could furnish the countries (and TTLs) with greater incentive to support sustainable landscapes.

KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT, MONITORING, LEARNING AND CAPACITY-BUILDING

(Conclusion xii, Findings 7, 16, 19)

184. The ISFL program can still be considered in its early stages, with two country programs just beginning implementation and the others under development or negotiation. However, once all country programs are under implementation, a wealth of data, information, experiences and publications will be generated and different projects from agencies at various levels can benefit from all emerging knowledge. While the ISFL is based on previous global ER programs and on knowledge available at the time of its design, there are data gaps and few information management systems in place. Also, while the ISFL tapped into best national capacities, there are important capacity gaps related to the innovative approaches. To date, few capacity building activities have taken place. To be prepared for optimal future knowledge management and strengthen capacities accordingly, the ET recommends:

- FMT:
 - Ensure lessons are transferred between programs and countries through learning exchanges (e.g., South-South exchanges). Consider developing an ISFL online knowledge platform, building on or integrated with pre-existing knowledge-sharing platforms (e.g., FCPF¹⁰² or UNREDD¹⁰³) to collectively develop technical and administrative capacity relevant for landscape and jurisdictional approaches.
 - As a basis for country level capacity-building plans, develop a global capacity building strategy, targeting overall capacity gaps, key stakeholders, and global activities to fill the gaps and budget.
 - Further develop an explicit and robust theory of change of the overall initiative: include logical causal steps included in results chains and/or impact pathways, including assumptions and tools to monitor these. This can be a model for TOCs that guide country programs and program strategies.
 - Organize yearly “Pause and Reflect” workshops to review the MEL indicators, discuss lessons learned, ensure to capitalize on these lessons and experiences for future program implementation and adapt workplans to adjust for changes in the political and operational environments.
- Country Programs:
 - The host country government/IU should develop a detailed capacity-building plan for the country program, targeting specific capacity gaps, key stakeholders, activities to fill the gaps and budget.
 - The host country government agencies should ensure that in each country there is a primary point of contact, such as the staff responsible for project M&E, for collecting and disseminating the knowledge obtained through BioCFplus ISFL Program Activities (F27).
 - The country counterpart together with the TTL and external facilitators, when appropriate, should host “Pause and Reflect” workshops, possibly as part of annual work planning, that allows ISFL country teams to meet with international experts to ensure that the state-of-the-art has been considered and incorporated into ongoing or future ISFL programming.

¹⁰² <https://www.forestcarbonpartnership.org/knowledge-and-resources>.

¹⁰³ <https://www.unredd.net/>.

UNDERSTANDING, COMMUNICATING, AND ADAPTING TO THE COMPLEXITY OF ISFL TECHNICAL APPROACHES

(Conclusions vi, xi; Findings 6, 13, 14)

185. The landscape and jurisdictional approaches are developing concepts, it is understood differently by different stakeholders in varying contexts and there is little experience with actual application. This complexity has challenged the design, application and pace of implementation of the ISFL at global and country level. To improve the understanding and adapt to this complexity, it is recommended:

- FMT:
 - Provide targeted international-level trainings to in-country staff related to technical matters on ER, jurisdictional approaches, and operations, as needed, where significant short-comings in technical capacity or conceptual misunderstandings exist.
 - To stimulate understanding and uptake of the landscape and jurisdictional approaches, promote a champion-role for particularly well-informed and well-connected persons as ambassadors for the ISFL approach at international, national and local levels.
 - Consider developing an ongoing Political Economy Analysis (PEA) tool for the global program, and particularly for each country program, that maps out key ISFL champions across the initiative. The PEA could also identify political roadblocks, obstacles, spoilers, risks, and opportunities in each ISFL country so that these issues and political dynamics can be addressed directly in the remaining period of the ISFL, particularly as work transitions from project preparation to implementation.
 - Consider setting up a scientific advisory group for the initiative, or alternatively, ensuring that representatives from existing scientific advisory groups (e.g. CCAFS, IUCN or national research consortia) are engaged in ISFL planning, programming, and oversight to capture lessons learned and increase both global and in-country capacity on landscape and jurisdictional approaches.

ACCOUNTING FOR ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL BENEFITS

(Conclusion vii, viii; Findings 8, 9, 10)

186. ISFL considers economic, social and environmental co-benefits along with carbon benefits.

Especially the country program design has clearly included a gender positive approach to activities and results. The way these benefits are included in program design and how they are reported upon, vary from country to country. Because many of these co-benefits are seen as important as the carbon benefits, the ET recommends to further enhance accounting for these benefits through:

- FMT:
 - Ensure that relevant social, economic and environmental indicators beyond ER are included as mandatory outcome-level indicators in the MEL framework, and are reported upon. Particularly, the MEL framework should consider including a gender outcome and associated indicators beyond merely sex-differentiated data.
 - Continue efforts to streamline social and environmental safeguards for land-based emission reduction, especially with regards to benefit sharing mechanisms.
 - Consider reducing the burden to countries of adopting multiple safeguards requirements and explore ways to simplify the requirements by adopting one set of safeguards that provides an acceptable level of environmental and social risk reduction.
 - Ensure that biodiversity has targets and is monitored and reported upon through MEL.
- Country Programs:

- The host country government/IU, assisted by the TTL, should define relevant social, economic and environmental indicators beyond ER, in consultation with relevant national and jurisdictional government and civil society stakeholders and in line with program framework, to be included in MEL.
- IU should include gender expertise (single expert or supporting organization) in charge with ensuring continued mainstreaming and reporting of the gender positive approach.
- Government agencies/IU with support of TTLs, consider employing independent analyses to assess potential trade-offs and conflict between sectoral interests as well as relevant political economy issues at national and jurisdiction level.
- In country programs without an associated GEF programs, explore developing program to target biodiversity conservation beyond mere deforestation targets.

T3 FUNDING AND BENEFIT-SHARING MECHANISMS

(Conclusions ix, xix; Findings 10, 25)

187. The evaluation found that there is a lack of common understanding of the future mechanisms and use of ER (BioCF T3) funding and how benefits will be distributed. The ET considered this a major weakness of the ISFL, as it has led to stakeholder confusion and heightened expectations. Therefore, to increase clarity on the use of future funding and how different groups of society could benefit, the ET recommends:

- FMT:
 - Expedite the finalization of the global ISFL benefits-sharing paper under development, drawing on international best practice and lessons learned, especially from UN-REDD and FCPF, in order to frame the discussion on the use of T3 funding and benefit sharing in each country.
- Country Programs:
 - The host country government agencies, assisted by the TTLs, should facilitate a series of informed, multi-stakeholder workshops to decide on the range of potential benefit-sharing mechanisms that will be undertaken with ISFL programming to reach an agreement on the use of T3 funding. Ideally, this should be done as early as possible in the project implementation to ensure stakeholder engagement and manage expectations.

GOVERNANCE

(Conclusion xxii; Findings 6, 28, 29, 30)

188. Decisions at ISFL's global initiative level are made by FMT and Contributors, mostly at the Annual Contributors' meeting. Country programs are generally overseen by a national Steering committee with participation of WB, government agencies and civil society representatives. This evaluation found that the ISFL decision-making processes while generally efficient, can gain in transparency and representativeness to be able to effectively respond to evolving demands. In addition, a fundamental premise of the ISFL is to build up and empower subnational agencies to reduce emissions at the jurisdictional level. However, the evaluation found that the governance model in all the ISFL countries, maintains a strong role for national-level agencies. To make decision-making overall more transparent, representative and effective, and to strengthen the role of jurisdiction-level government agencies in ISFL decision making and implementation and to increase jurisdictional ownership and capacity, the ET recommends:

- The WB and Contributors:

- Make communications on governance system openly and widely accessible on ISFL website, including the structure, participants, dates, agenda and minutes of Annual meetings
- Consider options for increasing country program inputs directly into global-level decision-making that would not significantly affect efficiency of decisions. Options include:
 - Including at least one of the beneficiary countries (on rotational basis) as a voting member of the Annual Contributors' meeting.
 - Include a delegation of local government agencies in Annual Contributors' meetings and consider giving them voting rights over global plans and budgets
 - Invite civil society beneficiary groups (farmers, NGO, private sector) as observers during the entire agenda of the entire Annual Contributors' meeting
 - Back-to-back with Contributors' meetings, organize work planning meetings that also key issues emerging across country programs, such as the price of ER payments. Annual meetings should be preceded by a survey to national and local ISFL stakeholders to identify issues that should be covered with the goal of reaching resolution on key issues.
- To Country Programs:
 - The host country government agency in each country should actively consider ways to provide jurisdictional government agencies the leading role in implementation of country programs.
 - The host country government agency should stimulate fair representation (in numbers) and active participation of local government agencies in the national steering committee, including in all its decision making.
 - National steering committees (where present) should consider effective incorporation of civil society and local community input in ISFL-related programmatic decision-making. National level entities should consider adding voting or non-voting community representatives as part of program approvals, integrating public consultation processes, or requiring broad statements of local level support as part of program decision-making.

Annex 1: Evaluation Questions and Data Sources

EVALUATION QUESTIONS AND DATA SOURCES USED TO RESPOND TO EACH QUESTION

Link of Evaluation Question to Theory of Change is Provided by References to Annex 6

Evaluation Question	Expected Data Sources
Relevance	
<p>EQR1: Has the ISFL been successful in building partnerships, coordinating efforts and leveraging complementary activities and finance by relevant stakeholders, including national and subnational ISFL program country governments, rural communities, vulnerable populations, indigenous peoples, donor countries, civil society, the private sector, and others toward its objectives? (refers to items 3.2, 3.4, and 3.5 of Annex 5)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ EQR1.1. How does the ISFL engage these stakeholders and are they aware of opportunities for engagement? How can engagement processes be scaled-up, replicated, or improved, including throughout the various stages of program development (e.g., scoping, design, implementation)? * ▪ EQR1.2. What is the degree to which ISFL programs have worked with other programs and/or initiatives, including in ISFL program countries and with the private sector, that complement the ISFL's objectives in order to avoid duplication of efforts and leverage finance or activities? ▪ EQR1.3. Do ISFL programs align with national and local, public and private policies and plans? Is the ISFL central to climate change strategies for relevant stakeholders? * ▪ EQR1.4. Is the ISFL on track to add unique value to existing programs and/or initiatives in addressing sustainable land use and emission reductions? 	<p>Qualitative:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Interviews (country stakeholders, subnational stakeholders, CSO, Private Sector, Similar initiatives) external), FGDs, private sector strategy ▪ Program Documents (e.g., Vision, Operating Framework, Program Requirements), MEL, PPPs, PS strategy (country level), country reports, ▪ External documentation (press coverage, reports from govt agencies) ▪ National and local public and private policies ▪ Observations during field visits <p>Quantitative:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Partnership agreements ▪ Funding commitments ▪ Number and characteristics of involved stakeholders ▪ Participants in partnership development events
<p>EQR2. To what extent are non-carbon benefits – including improving local livelihoods to address poverty, building transparent and effective governance structures, promoting improvements on clarifying land tenure, and enhancing or maintaining biodiversity and/or other ecosystem services – considered in the early design of ISFL programs and captured and reported on? (refers to item 2.6 of Annex 5) *</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ EQR2.1. Do ISFL design documents and grant agreements and ERPAs align with jurisdiction priorities, and do they support local livelihoods, fair benefit sharing, biodiversity conservation and other ecosystem services? 	<p>Qualitative:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Interviews (country stakeholders, subnational stakeholders, CSO, local stakeholders) ▪ Program documentation (grant agreements, benefit sharing agreements, activity reports, aide memoires, biodiversity and ES assessment reports and strategies, MEL plans and grant reporting) <p>Quantitative:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Number of design documents, grant agreements and ERPAs that address non-carbon benefits ▪ Number of people receiving non-carbon benefits
Effectiveness	
<p>EQEf1. Is the ISFL on track to meet its outcomes and objectives at the Initiative level, as outlined in the ISFL Log frame? (refers to item 1.6 of Annex 5)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ EQf1.1. What are the main risks and barriers to meeting Initiative-level milestones in the current ISFL Log frame? 	<p>Qualitative:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Interviews (FMT, Contributors, Country stakeholders, other initiatives), ▪ Program Documents (e.g., Vision, Operating Framework, Program Requirements), MEL, meeting notes ▪ Other documentation (academic and grey literature on SL), describing context, that can

Evaluation Question	Expected Data Sources
	<p>be validated against ISFL design and progress)</p> <p>Quantitative:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Assessment of progress indicators against milestones (as defined under MEL framework)
<p>EQEf2. Are ISFL programs on track to meet their outcomes and objectives as outlined in the ISFL Log frame? (refers to items 1.6, 2.1, 2.2, 2.4 of Annex 5) Are the current objectives of the ISFL realistic in relation to the capacity of ISFL program countries and the World Bank?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> EQEf2.1. What are the unique challenges and opportunities in scoping, preparing, and implementing ISFL programs, taking into consideration each country's context and the World Bank project cycle, and how can these processes be improved? ^{*)} EQEf2.2. Is the ISFL jurisdictional and landscape technical approach – as outlined in its ER technical framework and related documents – on track to meet program goals, and balance ambition with feasibility? EQEf2.3. Given the scope of the ISFL programs' designs, the innovative nature of the programs, and the baseline capacities of program countries (including technical capacities), are the expected delivery timeframes realistic? EQEf2.4. Are the implementing governmental agencies in ISFL program countries also implementing other ER programs similar to the ISFL or complementary programs? Are efforts to manage these programs being streamlined? EQEf2.5. Is available support and funding, including from BioCF<i>plus</i> grants, sufficient for addressing any identified constraints or gaps in ISFL program country capacity to meet their objectives? ^{*)} 	<p>Qualitative:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Interviews (FMT, Contributors, Country stakeholders, subnational stakeholders, CSO, local community-based organizations), Program Documents (e.g., Vision, Operating Framework, country strategies, Aide Memoires, Country reports, ISR reports, annual reports, MEL, country PAD, grant agreements) Other documentation at country level, (reports, papers) Field visits/observations <p>Quantitative:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Assessment of progress indicators against milestones (as defined under MEL framework), Satisfaction level of national/subnational stakeholders (count of respondents with positive assessment of progress) Level of budget allocation in relation to desired results
<p>EQEf3. Have capacity building activities managed to bring different stakeholders' capacities up to the required level of implementation of ISFL (refers to 3.2 of Annex 5) *)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> EQEf3.1. Have ISFL training activities managed to effectively increase the capacity of different (public and private) stakeholders? ^{*)} 	<p>Qualitative:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Interviews (stakeholders in capacity building, trainees) Program documentation (capacity building strategies, reports, materials) <p>Quantitative:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Number of events Number of participants Success rate of capacity building Level of satisfaction (survey)
<p>EQEf4. Is the ISFL's communications and knowledge management approach effective (including its MEL Framework) to inform stakeholders, disseminate its approach, and guide its adaptive management? (refers to items 2.1, 2.3, 2.4 of Annex 5) *)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> EQEf4.1. In what manners does the ISFL communicate and share knowledge with various stakeholders (i.e., World Bank Group, ISFL Contributors, ISFL program countries, civil society, private sector, stakeholders in ISFL program countries)? ^{*)} EQEf4.2. Is the adopted ISFL MEL Framework adequate for monitoring and evaluating results of the ISFL portfolio 	<p>Qualitative:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Interviews (FMT, country stakeholders, communication specialists at Contributors and in country programs, external stakeholders) Communication materials (hard and soft) and dissemination networks Program documentation (MEL, communications strategy, annual reports, lessons learned (country docs), meeting notes, country reports)

Evaluation Question	Expected Data Sources
<p>against its objectives and for guiding adaptive management?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> EQEf4.3. Is there any evidence of other programs adopting ISFL approaches in their practices? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> AFOLU sector documents and external agencies/events documentation (including reference to ISFL) <p>Quantitative:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Number of communication materials, Impact data (where available: dissemination statistics).
Efficiency	
<p>EQEc1. Is the ISFL's financial structure and implementation practice, including current and identified funding levels, adequate to achieve the ISFL's objectives, taking into consideration World Bank and Contributors' policies, procedures, and commitments? (refers to items 2.5 and 2.6 of Annex 5)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> EQEc1.1. How do the ISFL's administrative costs compare to activity costs and are there any opportunities for improving economies of scale? EQEc1.2. Does the ISFL have sufficient flexibility to pursue co-financing arrangements for its programs, including with the private sector? EQEc1.3. Are the ISFL's funding structures (BioCF <i>plus</i> and BioCF T3) and mechanisms enabling the ISFL to meet its objectives and long-term goals? ^{*)} 	<p>Qualitative:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Interviews (FMT, country stakeholders, Contributors, financial managers, private sector) Program documentation (World Bank project cycle documents, Contributor's commitments, cofounding commitments, annual reports, country reports) Grant agreements, Financial information from other initiatives, allowing comparison of cost-benefit <p>Quantitative:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Financing documents, budget, agreement Financial reports, flows
Governance and Management	
<p>EQG1. Have the Initiative's governance arrangements facilitated efficient and effective decision-making, and could they be improved? (refers to items 2.1, 2.6. 3.3 of Annex 5)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> EQG1.1. Have the ISFL FMT and ISFL Contributors been effective in fulfilling the ISFL's objectives according to their roles described in the ISFL's governance arrangements and could they be improved? EQG1.2. Could decision processes be improved to increase the efficiency of the ISFL? ^{*)} EQG1.3. Are relevant (national, subnational) stakeholders effectively and fairly involved in decision-making? ^{*)} 	<p>Qualitative:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Interviews (members of decision-making bodies at international, national and subnational level, other initiatives, CSO, local community organizations) Program documentation (Governance structure, scopes of work, meeting agenda and minutes, participants) Representativeness analysis (participation in decision making bodies vs stakeholder mapping) <p>Quantitative:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Number of meetings vs planned Level of participation in decision making bodies (% attendance, % delegation)

Annex 2: Document Review List

Doc. No.	Category	Evaluation Question*
1	1. Program Design	
1.01	Guidance Note on the Preparation of Financing Plan of REDD+ and Landscape Emission Reduction Programs (Aug 2017)	BD, EQEc1.2
1.02	ISFL Buffer Requirements (Feb 2018)	EQR2, EQEf4
1.03	ISFL Emission Reductions (ER) Program Requirements (Sep 2017)	EQR2, EQEf4
1.04	ISFL Emission Reductions Program Requirements Booklet	EQEf1, EQEf2, EQEf3.2
1.05	ISFL MEL Framework	EQEf1
1.06	ISFL Emission Reductions (ER) Program Document (PD) Template	BD, EQEf2
1.07	ISFL ER Program Requirements for Program Design - Public Consultation Period, May 2017	EQEc1
1.08	ISFL Methodology Workshop Summary, January 26-27, 2016	EQR2, EQEf4
1.09	ISFL Private Sector Engagement Approach	EQR1, EQR1.1
1.10	ISFL Vision	BD
1.11	Public-Private Partnerships for Agribusiness Development	BD
1.12	BioCF ISFL FPE TOR	BD
1.13	Note on the Ability to Transfer Title to Emission Reductions (Mar 2018)	EQR2, EQEf4
1.14	Funding for Deforestation: Brief Note for Discussion	BD
1.15	BioCarbon Fund Draft Operating Framework	EQG1
2	2. ISFL Background	E
2.01	Funding for Avoided Deforestation: Priority geography study (full title not disclosed, not public document)	BD
2.02	Introduction to ISFL	BD
2.03	Instrument Establishing BioCF	BD, EQG1, EQG1.1
2.04	Presentations to CSOs (Mar 2015, Oct 2015, Jun 2016)	BD
2.05	ISFL FAQ Updated	BD
2.06	ISFL CSO Briefing and Dialogue, Washington June 2016	BD
2.07	Development of a Comprehensive Landscape Methodological Approach for ISFL by LTS International	EQG1.2
2.08	ISFL Methodological Approach for GHG accounting	EQEf4
2.09	ISFL Methodological Approach Workshop Summary, January 2016	EQEf3.1
2.10	TOR for Background Paper and Analysis of Country Data to Support Development of a Comprehensive Landscape Methodological Approach for the BIOCF ISFL	BD
2.11	2015 Annual Report	EQEf2, EQR1, EQR1.3
2.12	2016 Annual Report	EQR1, EQR1.3
2.13	2017 Annual Report	EQEf2, EQEf2, EQR1.3
2.14	FPE for the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (June 2011)	BD
2.15	Second Evaluation of the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (Nov 2016)	BD
2.16	Engaging the Private Sector in Results-Based Landscape Programs: Early Lessons from the WB's Forests and Landscapes Climate Finance Funds	EQG1, EQR1, BD
2.17	An International Climate Fund business case for DECC investment in the BioCF and the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility – Carbon Fund	BD
2.18	ISFL Annual Meeting Notes 2018	BD, EQG1.2, EQEf4.1, EQR1.2
2.19	ISFL Annual Meeting Notes 2017	BD, EQEf4
2.20	ISFL Annual Meeting Notes 2016	BD, EQEf4,
2.21	FY17 Financial Report and FY18 Business Plan*	EQEc1
2.22	FY18 Financial Report and FY19 Business Plan*	EQEc1

Doc. No.	Category	Evaluation Question*
2.23	World Bank Safeguard Policies and the UNFCCC REDD+ Safeguards	EQR2, EQR2.1
2.24	FCPF Guidance Note on the Preparation of Financing Plan of REDD+ and Landscape Emission Reduction Programs	EQEf1
2.25	LEVERAGING CO-BENEFITS BETWEEN GENDER EQUALITY AND CLIMATE ACTION FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT Mainstreaming Gender Considerations in Climate Change Projects	EQR1
2.26	UNFCCC Introduction to Gender and Climate Change	EQR1
2.27	World Bank Group Gender Strategy	EQR1
2.28	External Evaluation of the United Nations Collaborative Programme on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries (the UN-REDD Programme)	Background, EQEc1
2.29	Funding Avoided Deforestation Concept Note for Discussion	EQG1
3	3. Governance	
3.01	Annex 3 - ISFL Governance	EQG1
3.02	BioCF ISFL Stakeholder Engagement Approach	EQEf3, EQEf3.1, EQR1
4	4. Carbon Accounting	
4.01	ISFL ER Program Requirements for GHG Accounting Workshop Summary	EQEf4
4.02	ISFL ER Program Requirements for GHG Reporting and Accounting Public Consultation Period	EQEf4
4.03	ISFL Emission Reductions Program Requirements Landscape Accounting Approach	EQEf4
4.04	Forest Carbon Accounting: Overview & Principles	EQEf4
4.05	Carbon Markets for Greenhouse Gas Emission Reduction in a Warming World: An Evaluation of the World Bank Group's Support to Carbon Finance	EQR1.1
5	5. Annexes	
5.01	Annex 1 Concepts and Scope for landscape carbon accounting	EQR1.2
5.02	Annex 2 Data availability for landscape level REL: Reflections	BD
5.03	Annex 3 Introduction to the use of carbon accounting models and how they could be used to determine a Reference Emissions Level	BD
5.04	Annex 4 From Global to Local: Modeling Low Emissions Development Strategies	BD, EQR1.2
5.05	Annex 5 Remote Sensing Approaches for Monitoring of Emissions from Land Cover Change	BD, EQR1.3
5.06	Annex 6 Introduction to Adoption of Sustainable Agricultural Land Management Methodology	BD, EQR1.3
6	6. Technical Documents	
6.01	WBG - Managing Forest Resources for Sustainable Development: An Evaluation of the WBG Experience (Feb 2013)	BD
6.02	IEG OECD-DAC Sourcebook for Evaluating Global and Regional Partnership Programs	BD
6.03	WBG - Results-Based Climate Finance in Practice: Delivering Climate Finance for Low-Carbon Environment	BD
6.04	IPCC - Agriculture, Forestry, and Other Land Use (AFOLU) GHG Inventory Guidelines	BD
6.05	Earth Innovation Institute, Jurisdictional Sustainability: A Primer for Practitioners	EQR1.4
6.06	Early Lessons from Jurisdictional REDD+ and Low Emissions Development Programs.	EQR1.4
6.07	Global Forest Observations Initiative, 1.1 IPCC greenhouse gas inventory methodologies	EQR1.4
6.08	Jurisdictional Approaches to REDD+ and Low Emissions Development: Progress and Prospects	EQR1.4

Doc. No.	Category	Evaluation Question*
6.09	WWF Tackling Deforestation through a Jurisdictional Approach: Lessons from the Field	EQEf2.2
6.10	Approaches to REDD+ Nesting: Lessons Learned from Country Experiences	EQEf2.2
7	7. Colombia	
7.01	Technical Assistance under the “REDD Early Movers “(REM) Programme – Colombia	BD, EQR1
7.02	Colombia: FCPF Readiness Grant Report	BD, EQR1
7.03	REDD+ Country Profile Colombia (January 2014)	BD, EQR1.4
7.04	The Impacts of International REDD+ Finance Colombia Case Study	BD
7.05	Misión de Identificación: Iniciativa de Paisajes Forestales Sostenibles	BD
7.06	El desarrollo económico de la Orinoquia Como aprendizaje y construcción de instituciones	BD
7.07	Expogestion Orinoquia - Generamos Prosperidad Regional 2015	BD, EQR1
7.08	Expogestion Orinoquia 2016	BD
7.09	Colombia-Dairy IFC Report	EQR1.3 EQA2.3
7.10	Plan Regional de Cambio Climático. Formulación de Estrategias de Adaptación para la Orinoquia Colombiana	EQEf2.2
7.11	Project Appraisal Document on a Proposed BioCF ^{plus} Initiative Grant in the Amount of US \$20.0 Million to the Republic of Colombia for a Sustainable Low-Carbon Development in Orinoquia Region Project	EQEf2, EQR1.4
7.12	Colombia Grant Agreement	EQR2, EQR2.1
7.13	Estrategia Integral de Control a la Deforestación y Gestión de los Bosques	EQR1.3
7.14	Mapeo de Actores Involucrados en el Desarrollo Rural Sostenible de la Orinoquia en los Niveles Nacional, Sub-Nacional y Territorial*	EQR1.1, EQEf
7.15	Compatibilidad entre el inventario de gases de efecto invernadero y el programa ISFL del Fondo BioCarbono para la región de la Orinoquia colombiana*	EQEf2.1. EQEf2.2
7.16	Draft: Mapeo de cambios en el uso de la tierra de la Orinoquia colombiana 2000-2016*	EQR1
7.17	Draft: Determinantes de cambio de uso de la tierra y predicción de cambios futuros en la Orinoquia colombiana *	Reference
7.18	Draft: Reporte del escenario tendencial para el sector AFOLU de la región Orinoquia*	Reference
7.19	Revisión de literatura sobre oportunidades de mitigación en el sector AFOLU para la Orinoquia*	Reference
7.20	Recomendaciones técnicas y políticas*	Reference
7.21	Presentación: Fondo de BioCarbono de la Orinoquia Iniciativa de Paisajes Sostenibles Bajos en Carbono*	Reference
7.22	La Institucionalidad Catastral Actual en Colombia, 2. Escenarios para Nueva Institucionalidad Catastral, 3. Propuesta de Nueva Institucionalidad*	Reference
7.23	Mapeo de Sectores y Actores: Evaluación de financiación pública y privada para un desarrollo bajo en carbono en Orinoquia*	EQR1
7.24	Identificación y análisis de incentivos financieros y económicos: Evaluación de financiación pública y privada para un desarrollo bajo en carbono en Orinoquia*	TBD
7.25	Orinoquia, la futura despensa alimentaria de Colombia y quizás, del mundo. Dinero.com	EQR1.2
7.26	Construyendo país: La destrucción de la selva natural es especialmente grave en la Amazonia y el Pacífico. El tiempo.com	EQR1.3
7.27	¿Desarrollo en la Amazonía y Orinoquia? ¿Para qué y para quién? Construcción de soberanías y autonomías territoriales	EQR2, EQR2.1

Doc. No.	Category	Evaluation Question*
7.28	Palma Africana, nueva amenaza para los boques amazonicos, sostenibilidad.semana.com	EQEf2, EQEf2.1
7.29	El Reino Unido dona 300 millones de dólares a Colombia para medioambiente Colombia.com	EQEf4
7.30	US\$20 millones para el agro sostenible en la Orinoquía Colombiana, Ministeria de Agricultura	EQEf4
7.31	Colombia promoverá un Fondo de Biocarbono Vanguardia.com	EQEf4
7.32	Deforestation soars in Colombia after FARC rebels' demobilization Guardian.com	EQEf4.2
7.33	Cuatro proyectos del agro buscan capital privado larepublica.com	EQEf4.2
8	8. Ethiopia	
8.01	Program Information Document (PID)	BD
8.02	Project Appraisal Document	EQEf1, EQR1.4
8.03	Bale Mountains Eco-Region Reduction of Emission from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+) Project- Ethiopia	EQR1.3
8.04	VCS/CCB Bale Mountains Eco- Region REDD+ Project Monitoring & Implementation Report	EQAR1.3
8.05	Ethiopia's Productive Safety Net Program (PSNP): Soil Carbon and Fertility Impact Assessment	BD, EQR1.3
8.06	Emission Reductions at the Landscape Level in the Oromia Region, Ethiopia	EQAR1.2
8.07	Forest Carbon Partnership Facility - Ethiopia: REDD+ Readiness Process	EQR1.3
8.08	The Context of REDD+ in Ethiopia	EQAR1.2, EQR1.4
8.09	Inception Report - Identification and Preparation of REDD+ Pilot Proposals in Ethiopia	EQR1.3
8.10	Project Paper on a Proposed Additional Grant in the Amount of US \$10 Million to the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia for Additional REDD+ Readiness Preparation Support from The BioCarbon Technical Assistance Trust Fund	Reference
8.11	A procedure for screening and selecting potential forest sites for REDD+ pilot development in Ethiopia	Reference
8.12	National REDD+ Strategy (2016 - 2030)	EQR1 EQR1.4
9	9. Indonesia	
9.01	Concept Note - A Proposed Carbon Finance Transaction in the Amount of US \$80 and a Proposed BioCF Grant in the Amount of US \$13.5 Million to the Republic of Indonesia for Sustainable Landscape Program in Jambi	EQEf2
9.02	Prospective Development Pathways: Private Sector Engagement in landscape approaches to reduced emissions from land use in Jambi Province	EQR1.2
9.03	Briefing Notes on Coffee, Rubber, Pulpwood, Cinnamon and Palm Oil*	EQR1.2
9.04	Asian-Power.com: Will Indonesia keep its unrelenting grip on coal	EQR1.2
9.05	Indonesia Revised Draft REDD+ Strategy for Indonesia	EQR
10	10. Mexico	
10.01	Project Appraisal Document on a Proposed Loan in the Amount of US \$56 Million And on a Proposed Grant from the BioCF ^{plus} -ISFL Trust Fund in the Amount of US \$10 Million to the United Mexican	EQEf2, EQR1.4

Doc. No.	Category	Evaluation Question*
	States for a Strengthening Entrepreneurship in Productive Forest Landscapes Project	
10.02	BioCFplus ISFL Trust Funds Grant Agreement	EQR2, EQR2.1
10.03	México se enreda con los bonos de carbono de REDD+ Proceso.com	EQEf2, EQEf2.1, EQEf2.2
11	11. Zambia	
11.01	Combined Project Information Documents / Integrated Safeguards Datasheet (PID/ISDS)	BD
11.02	AIDE MEMOIRE for the Preparation Support Mission for the Zambia Integrated Forest Landscape Program	EQEf2.2
11.03	Zambia Integrated Forest Landscape Program	BD
11.04	Project Appraisal Document on a Proposed Credit in the Amount of SDR12.6 Million (US \$17.0 Million Equivalent) and a Proposed Global Environment Facility Grant in the Amount of US\$8.05 Million to the Republic of Zambia for a Zambia Integrated Forest Landscape Project	EQEf2, EQR1.4
11.05	Aide Memoire Zambia Integrated Forest Landscape Project	EQEf2.2
11.06	Cargill: Protecting Forests, Land and Water Resources	EQR1.2
11.07	President Lungu calls for mindset change to curb rising levels of deforestation in Zambia	EQR1.3
11.08	World Bank: Zambia Takes the Keys Away from 'Drivers' of Deforestation	EQEf4
11.09	Deforestation, Charcoal Burning and Livelihood: Zambia Dilemma	Reference
11.10	Agriculture-charcoal interactions as determinants of deforestation rates: Implications for REDD+ design in Zambia	Reference
11.11	Dynamics of the charcoal and indigenous timber trade in Zambia: A Scoping Study in Eastern, Northern and Northwest Provinces	Reference

*Documents not for public disclosure.

Annex 3: Summary of Survey Results

In the first table below, the frequency of answers using a five-level Likert scale from 1 (fully disagree) to 5 (fully agree). This shows that in general, the responses were relatively positive, especially on the statements 3 (ISFL considers non-carbon benefits), 4 (ISFL addresses key drivers) and 6 (ISFL aligns with policies) that all received more than 60 responding “mostly agree” or “fully agree”. Statements where a considerable number of respondents had a more critical opinion are 2 (ISFL has a realistic timeframe), 5 (ISFL is well coordinated with ongoing activities), 8 (ISFL is well-known) and 10 (ISFL’s decision making is informed and transparent) where 20 or more respondents considered “fully disagree” or “mostly disagree”.

Survey Statement	1 (fully disagree)	2 (mostly disagree)	3 (undecided)	4 (mostly agree)	5 (fully agree)
1. The ISFL is on track to meet its objectives.	3	12	32	35	8
2. The ISFL has a realistic and feasible timeframe to complete its objectives	5	14	32	24	9
3. ISFL considers non-carbon benefits (i.e., environmental and social)"	1	2	13	36	36
4. ISFL addresses the key drivers of AFOLU emissions/removals in your landscape.	3	8	17	30	29
5. ISFL is well coordinated with ongoing activities in forestry/agriculture/land-use/climate change mitigation in the country	4	13	25	35	14
6. ISFL strategies align with existing policies and plans.	2	6	10	31	41
7. ISFL is designed based on local/national demand	3	9	16	39	21
8. ISFL is a well-known initiative.	9	20	28	26	8
9. The training/capacity building activities of ISFL have increased knowledge, skills or capacity of relevant stakeholders.	7	9	12	18	7
10. ISFL makes decisions in an informed and transparent manner	6	12	30	25	7
11. ISFL is good value for its money.	1	14	18	35	13
12. ISFL is managed by well trained and capable people.	2	3	9	47	23
13. I have participated in any capacity building/training activities through the ISFL	Yes: 33	No: 56			

In the second table below, the average response on the five-level Likert scale from 1 (fully disagree) to 5 (fully agree) is given per stakeholder group. This shows that the respondents who are directly involved in the initiative (national, subnational and local government agencies) generally have a more positive response than stakeholders not directly involved (international agencies, consultants, private sector and NGO), particularly in statements 1 (ISFL is on track) , 5 (ISFL is well coordinated), 8 (ISFL is well known), 9 (ISFL’s capacity building efforts were effective), 10 (ISFL decision making is informed and transparent) and 11 (ISFL is good value for money). On these statements, the average score of the national and subnational governmental agencies was around or above 4 (“mostly agree”) while the other stakeholders’ average response was around or below 3 (“agree nor disagree”).

Survey Statement	International Agency (n=17)	National Government (n=34)	NGO or CSO (n=20)	Consultant (n=5)	Institute (n=5)	Private Sector (n=8)	Subnational Government (n=7)
1. The ISFL is on track to meet its objectives.	3.1	3.9	3.1	2.8	3.2	2.3	4.3
2. The ISFL has a realistic and feasible timeframe to complete its objectives	3.1	3.5	3.3	2.6	3.0	2.8	3.1
3. ISFL considers non-carbon benefits (i.e., environmental and social)"	4.3	4.2	4.1	4.8	4.0	3.8	4.1
4. ISFL addresses the key drivers of AFOLU emissions/removals in your landscape.	3.8	4.1	3.6	3.2	4.2	3.9	4.1
5. ISFL is well coordinated with ongoing activities in forestry/agriculture/land-use/climate change mitigation in the country	3.3	3.8	3.1	2.8	3.2	3.5	3.9
6. ISFL strategies align with existing policies and plans.	4.1	4.2	4.1	4.8	3.0	4.0	4.9
7. ISFL is designed based on local/national demand	3.6	4.0	3.4	3.2	3.8	3.8	4.4
8. ISFL is a well-known initiative.	2.9	3.2	2.8	2.6	2.2	3.1	3.7
9. The training/capacity building activities of ISFL have increased knowledge, skills or capacity of relevant stakeholders.	3.0	3.9	2.3	3.3	2.5	2.4	4.4
10. ISFL makes decisions in an informed and transparent manner	3.1	3.8	2.8	2.2	3.0	2.3	4.0
11. ISFL is good value for its money.	3.4	4.0	3.3	2.8	3.8	2.9	4.1
12. ISFL is managed by well trained and capable people.	3.9	4.3	4.0	3.6	3.3	3.8	4.3

*n is total number of those surveyed, not each respondent answered each question.

Annex 4: Interview Questionnaire

Introduction:

- Thank interviewee for his/her time
- Present team members
- Present goal of evaluation
- Explain principles of interviews (informed, voluntary, can be stopped at any time) and information management (transparent, confidential, normally anonymous – if not specific permission will be asked)
- Explain modality of interview (open conversation around guiding questions, time, language, please ask if anything is unclear)
- Ask for consent to participate and to record interview

Background:

Name, organization and any introductory comment the person wishes to make before starting

Interview Question	Applied To ¹⁰⁴ :
1. What is your position in your organization and how long have you been in this position?	All
2. What is your knowledge of ISFL? What is your role in the ISFL and how long have you been involved with the initiative?	All
3. Are you familiar/involved with other forest or land-based emission reductions programs?	All
(EQEf1) (global stakeholders):	
4. Are you familiar with the objectives/outcomes/activities of ISFL (initiative level)? Do you consider these feasible?	PMI, Con
5. What are the factors for success and/or barriers that limit implementation of ISFL?	PMI, Con
(EQEf2) (national stakeholders)	
6. Are you familiar with the objectives/outcomes/activities of the ISFL program in your country/jurisdiction? Do you consider the project (incl. its jurisdictional approach) feasible, considering the available money, time and capacity?	PMC, Con, MIO, NGA, LGA, NGO, CEE, PS
7. Is the technical framework (establishment of base line, measurement/monitoring/verification of incremental value, cost/benefit analysis) robust enough to ensure measurable and reportable outcomes in the future? Does it include the most important AFOLU emissions sinks and sources in the target area (i.e., those under Livestock, LULUCF? Other GHG)?	PMC, Con, MIO, NGA, LGA, NGO, CEE, FGD
8. Is there anything that you believe should have been done differently in the design and preparation of the ISFL?	PMI, PMC, NGA, LGA, CEE, FGD
9. To your knowledge, have activities of ISFL been aligned/made complementary/coordinated with ongoing work of your agency/organization/community? Of other (similar) projects/initiatives?	PMC, Con, MIO, NGA, LGA, NGO, PS
10. Is Results Based Financing for emission reductions, in combination with other funding mechanisms promoted by ISFL (e.g. PPP or lending), a good enough incentive for people to apply sustainable landscape management?	PMI, Con, MIO, NGA, LGA, NGO, CEE, PS, FGD
(EQR1)	
11. ISFL is related to which existing policies and plans (from national government, jurisdiction, your organization, community; not only ER or CC, but also other environmental, sustainable development, human rights, gender-related policies and plans)? Are ISFL's goals central to your organization's strategies/policies?	PMI, PMC, Con, MIO, NGA, LGA, NGO, PS

¹⁰⁴ PMI = Program Management at Initiative level; PMC = Program Management at Country Level; Con = Contributor; MIO = Multilateral or International Organization; NGA = National Government Agency; LGA = Local Government Agency; NGO = Non-Governmental Agency/Civil Society Organization; PS = Private Sector; CEE = Consultant or External Expert, FGD = Focal Group Discussions

Interview Question	Applied To ¹⁰⁴ :
12. Has ISFL involved relevant stakeholders in its design and implementation? (national govt, local govt, NGO, CSO, Communities, Private Sector, other -similar- initiatives). Was this well done? (Were SH's consulted or only informed, how were they notified/invited, what role did they have, what communication afterwards?)	PMI, PMC, Con, NGA, LGA, NGO, CEE, FGD
13. Is ISFL significantly different than other/existing landscape level ER initiatives? What is its added value?	Con, MIO, NGA, LGA, NGO, CEE, FGD
14. Are you aware of private sector interest/collaboration/investment with ISFL programs? Why do you think this is a success/challenge? Why do you expect PS will invest or not invest? Is there any PPP?	All
(EQR2)	
15. Did/does ISFL sufficiently engage rural communities, vulnerable population, minorities, women/youth, and indigenous peoples? Has the ISFL been responsive to addressing their concerns?	PMI, PMC, MIO, NGA, LGA, NGO, CEE, FGD
16. Is the ISFL design appropriately considering/including benefits beyond GHG-ER? (check biodiversity, water, poverty, social inclusion, gender, human rights, land tenure)? Does its implementation respect/promote these issues? Has that been reported upon?	PMC, Con, MIO, NGA, LGA, CEE
17. How are benefit sharing mechanisms being considered/designed/implemented? Are these mechanisms on track to ensure fair benefit sharing among relevant stakeholders?	PMI, PMC, NGA, LGA, CEE
(EQEf3)	
18. Do you know what capacity building/training activities have been taking place in ISFL? Did they target the right audience? Did they target the adequate skills?	PMI, PMC, Con, NGA, LGA, NGO
19. Have you participated yourself in any capacity building/training activity? If so, how would you describe the quality? What specific skills/knowledge did you learn that you did not know before?	Con, MIO, NGA, LGA, NGO
20. What capacity gaps still exist and what should ISFL do to fill these?	PMC, MIO, NGA, LGA, NGO, FGD
(EQEf4)	
21. (for program managers): How is ISFL communication being designed/implemented? Is there a specific strategy? plan? dedicated staff? Are there any statistics on how many people you reached through particular means? What have been barriers or success factors to disseminating ISFL approaches and (early) results?	PMI, PMC, Con
22. (for external respondents; remotely linked to ISFL): Have you heard of ISFL activities, results or products? How have these reached you? (check: direct communication, internet, press, conferences)	MIO, NGA, NGO, CEE, PS, FGD
23. (for program managers): How is ISFL MEL strategy implemented and reported? Is there dedicated staff? How is program management informed by and adapted based on monitoring/learning? (concrete examples required)	PMI, PMC, NGA
24. Are there concrete examples of other initiatives that adopted ISFL approaches/practices/tools? How/why do you think this happened?	PMI, PMC, Con, MIO, NGA, NGO, CEE
(EQEc1)	
25. Are you familiar with ISFL funding size and structure? If so, do you think this is adequate vis-à-vis its goals and expected outcomes? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Is the program on track to developing sufficient co-funding? ▪ Are you aware of any co-funding being committed/materialized? Is it on track to do so? Are other financial institutions (WB and others) planning to implement or make available additional funding mechanisms to incentivize investments in ISFL programs? ▪ If compared to other (similar) programs you know, is the ISFL (program) budget high-similar-low? 	PMI, PMC, Con, MIO, NGA, LGA, NGO, CEE
26. (for respondents directly involved with ISFL implementation): Is ISFL funding being managed Transparently? Correctly? Swiftly? (concrete examples needed). Has financial management been a constraint for timely delivery of activities/outputs?	PMI, PMC, Con, NGA, LGA
27. Are the ISFL's funding structures (BioCF Plus and BioCF T3) and mechanisms enabling the ISFL to meet its objectives and long-term goals (incl. GHG ER and other social and environmental benefits)?	PMI, PMC, Con, MIO, NGA, LGA, NGO, CEE

Interview Question	Applied To ¹⁰⁴ :
(EQG1)	
28. Are you familiar with the ISFL governance and decision-making structure? If so, do you think this is adequate vis-à-vis its goals and expected outcomes and desired efficiency? (depending on the interviewed person, we may refer here to the World Bank's ISFL fund itself and related governance bodies and management teams, or the implementing country program).	PMI, PMC, Con, MIO, NGA, LGA
29. In case you participate in any decision-making body, do you think this is managed transparently, efficiently, effectively? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Are roles of different stakeholders clearly described and empowered? Are different stakeholder groups adequately represented and fairly involved in decision-making bodies? Should there be more/less stakeholders/representatives? 	PMI, PMC, Con, NGA
30. Is the implementation of the current management structure (Contributors-WB as implementer-country executing body) effective? Well implemented? What can be improved?	PMI, PMC, Con, NGA, LGA

Finalizing:

- Do you want to come back to anything we have discussed? Emphasize?
- Do you want to mention any issue we did not cover during this interview?
- Do you have any documentation/information that sustains your responses?
- Can you recommend reviewing specific documents or other information sources?
- Can you recommend speaking to any person in particular for follow up?

Thanks for your collaboration; exchange contact details.

Annex 5: Stakeholders Interviewed for Evaluation

Name	Gender	Organization
Zambia		
Ephraim Shitiwa	male	Ministry of Natural Resources & Climate Change
Carol Mwape	female	
Allen X	male	
John Nacareli	male	Ex-BioCF
Victor Chiba	male	Forest Service / Ministry of Lands & Natural Resources
Lawrence Matanda	male	
Isabel Mwanwe	female	
David Kaluba	male	Ministry of Lands & Natural Resources - Surveyor General Office
Emmanuel Tembo	male	
Paul Zyambo	male	Department of Natural Parks & Wildlife
Ms Misozi Kadeweale	female	MissOil - Eastern Province
Frans Kranendonk	male	
Chanda Kasolo	male	Permanent Secretary Office - Eastern Province / Chipata
Royd Tembo	male	
Noel X	male	Ministry of Planning - Eastern Province / Chipata ZIFLP PIU - Chipata
Larry Njongo	male	
Ethel Mudenda	female	
David Ngwenyama	male	
Virgil Malambo	male	
Dr. Dale Lewis	male	COMACO - Chipata
Nemiah Tembo	male	
Patrick Nyirenda	male	BioCarbon Partners - Chipata
Adam Ngoma	male	Chipata District Land Alliance - (CDLA) - Chipata
Sharon Tembo	female	Action for Positive Change - Chipata NGO - Chipata
Zula Fackson	male	
Marjorie Tisema Tembo	female	
Johnson Phiri	male	Caritas - Chipata
Chitembo Chung	male	PPCR Lusaka - Chipata
Ivonne Mulenga	female	
Mutale Mwanba	male	
Keyvan Izadi	male	ZEMA - Zambia Environmental Management Agency
Rodwell Chandipo	male	
Iretomiwa Olatunji	male	World Bank / Lusaka
Ngao Mubanga	female	
Arend Van der Goes	male	SNV - Lusaka
Godfrey Mutokoma	male	
Mindende Pande	male	Forestry Department - Lusaka
Tasila Banda	female	ZIFLP NIU - Lusaka
Charles Phiri	male	
Mulawa Mulawa	male	
Christabel Mutale	female	
Agnes Yawa	female	
Dilwel Suwake	male	
Aaron Ngo'nga	male	
Kufanga Imat	male	

Name	Gender	Organization
Catherine Tembo	female	USAID / Zambia - Lusaka
Chipampa Chola	male	Department of Energy
Deutoronomy Kasoro	male	Mitigation Specialist
Carol Mwape	female	Ministry of Lands & Natural Resources
Collins Nkatiko	male	Conservation Farming Unit (CFU)
Misael Kokwe	male	FAO
Matt Somerville	male	USAID/Integrated Land & Resource Governance
Mr Ignatius Makumba	male	Department of Forestry
Ms. Matimba Changala	male	UK High Commission
Basil Mweempwa	male	GIZ
Innocent Mulauzi	male	Ministry of Agriculture
Joyce Munkombwe	female	Provincial Department of Forestry - Chipata
Lottie Ltekatebe	female	
Joseph Cheero	male	Provincial Department of Agriculture - Chipata
Erastmus Kantcheya	male	Provincial Department of Wildlife - Chipata
Colombia		
Andrez Paez O.	male	Conservation International
Abraham Korman	male	Conservation International
Felipe X	male	Conservation International
Alejandro Olaya Velasquez	male	Fundación Palmarito
Thomas Heinrichs	male	GIZ
Sebastian Sunderhaus	male	GIZ
Jose Yunis	male	Visión Amazonia
Marnix Becking	male	Visión Amazonia
César Augusto Rey Ángel	male	MADS
Brigitte Baptiste	female	Instituto Alexander von Humboldt
Hernando Garcia	male	Instituto Alexander von Humboldt
Sofia Rincon	female	WWF
Ximena Garcia	female	USAID
Jose Felix Montoya	male	USAID/Natural Wealth
Ricardo Sanchez	male	USAID/Natural Wealth
Jerónimo Rodriguez	male	USAID/Natural Wealth
Jose Tobón	male	USAID/Natural Wealth
Erika X	female	USAID/Natural Wealth
Marianela X	female	USAID
Cesar Corredor	male	MADR
Juan Camilo Dueñas	male	MADR
Claudia Salazar	female	MADR
Javier Ignacio Perez Burgos	male	MADR
Franka Braun	female	World Bank
Luz Berania Diaz Rios	female	World Bank
Angela Betancourt	female	World Bank
David Olarte	male	MADS
Diana Maria Quimbay	female	IDEAM
Yolanda Gonzalez	female	IDEAM
Tatiana Escovar	female	MADR
Ole Reidar Bergum	male	Norwegian Embassy
Jose Luis Gomez	male	Fondo Acción
Elizabeth Valenzuela Camacho	female	Fondo Acción
Maria Teresa Palacio	female	Consultant WB
Laura Bermúdez	female	MADS

Name	Gender	Organization
Angela Ospina de Nicholson	female	Agencia Presidencial de Cooperación Internacional
Gloria Calderón	female	Agencia Presidencial de Cooperación Internacional
Jesus Antonio Vargas Orozco	male	FINAGRO
Eduardo Rueda Peña	male	FINAGRO
Monica Rangél	female	FINAGRO
Juan Pablo Bustamante Caballero	male	MADR
Nidyan Pinzon Ruíz	female	FINAGRO
Pedro Ivan Lara Forero	male	MADR
Carlos Betancur Arias	male	FINAGRO
Estafanía Ardila	female	NDC Partnership
Diana Torres	female	IDEAM
Juan Pablo Castro	male	Climate Focus
Diana Gonzalez	female	DNP
Cristina Martinez	female	DNP
Pilar Aguilar	female	DNP
Monica Pañuela	female	DNP
Astrid Cruz	female	DNP
Gustavo Galindo	male	IDEAM
Felipe Torres	male	IDEAM
Pilar Lozano	male	IDEAM
Juan David Turriago	female	IDEAM
Jeimar Tapasco	male	CIAT
Tomas Walschburger	male	The Nature Conservancy
Luz Marina Arevalo	female	UPRA
Ruben Guerrero	male	MADS
Nelson Lozano	male	MADR
Hans Thiel	male	FAO
David Ardila	male	GGGI
Beltsy Barrera	female	CORMACARENA
Diana Torres	female	CORMACARENA
Clara Leticia Serrano	female	ASORINOQUIA
Francisco Andrade	male	ANDI
Maryluz Rojas	female	COTELCO
Sandra Patricia Celis Lozano	female	CAMACOL
Carlos Montenegro	male	Universidad de los Andes
Veronica Robledo	female	United Kingdom
Augusto Castro	male	Consultor WB
Non-Visit Countries		
<i>Ethiopia</i>		
Tesfaye Gonfa	male	OFLP
Ararsa Regassa Fayisa	male	OFWE
Mahlet Shebabaw Bekele	female	IDH
Mulugeta Lemeneh	male	Farm Africa
Paul Jonathon Martin	male	World Bank
Shimeles Sima Erketa	male	World Bank
Hailu Tefera Ayele	male	World Bank
<i>Indonesia</i>		
Wayan Dharmawan	male	FCPF/BioCF Programs in Indonesia
Dr. Bambang Irawan	male	University of Jambi

Name	Gender	Organization
Alexander Lotsch	male	World Bank
Ann Jeanette Glauber	female	World Bank
Efrian Muharrom	male	World Bank
Hari Priyadi Rusanotoyo	male	World Bank
<i>Mexico:</i>		
Angela Armstrong	female	World Bank
Katharina Siegman	female	World Bank
Berenice Hernandez Toro	male	CONAFOR
Germánico Galicia García	male	CONAFOR
Jorge David Fernández Medina	male	CONAFOR
Rafael Luna	male	CONAFOR
Francisco Arrazate	male	CONAFOR
Don McCobbin	male	USAID-Mexico
Silva Llamas	female	PRONATURA
Harald Lussak	male	GIZ
World Bank, Contributors and Others		
Katie O'Gara	female	World Bank
Dan Radack	male	World Bank
Roy Parizat	male	World Bank
Kilara Suite	female	World Bank
Karin Kaechele	female	World Bank
Dinesh Aryal	male	World Bank
Ademola Braimoh	male	World Bank
Neeta Hooda	female	World Bank
Douglas J. Graham	male	World Bank
Michael Huettner	male	Germany
Mads Lie	male	Norway
Charlotte Petersen	female	Norway
Christine Dragisic	female	United States
Daniel Kandy	male	United States
Katie Caudle	female	United Kingdom
Hugh King	male	United Kingdom
David Thomas	male	United Kingdom
Jonathan Stern	male	United Kingdom
Maria Jose Sanz	female	EOC
Frances Seymour	female	EOC
Yurie Hoberg	male	Technical Expert
Marco van der Linden	male	Technical Expert
Ahmad Slaibi	male	IFC
Daan Wensing	male	IDH
Ellysar Baroudy	female	World Bank
Fabiola Zerbini	female	TFA 2020
Michael Schlup	Male	&Green Fund

Annex 6: ISFL Theory of Change Causal Logic and Assumptions

Green = Evaluation will give these issues highest priority and examined in detail. Yellow = Evaluation will examine this issue; Red = Evaluation may gain some insight, but systematic investigation is beyond its scope.

TOC Input	Core Logic	Causal Assumptions or Change Mechanisms Assumed	Preconditions for Causal Links To Hold	Preconditions Met? Or How to be Tested in Evaluation?	Corresponding Evaluation Questions
Foundations → Inputs (Pre-TOC)					
Main program design elements	Basing program on the four key design elements named will add value globally by enabling their testing and generating lessons	Testing key design elements and sharing lessons will enable low-emissions AFOLU sector to develop faster to scale globally	Lessons regarding ISFL design elements are generalizable and replicable to other countries	Initially established in program documentation, but insights to be gained in interviews	Effectiveness (EQEf) Relevance (EQR)
Trustee selection	Trustee will be selected based on relevant key criteria ensuring it can implement program	Trustee's processes and institutional arrangements will be conducive to the ISFL program delivering on its goals	Trustee systems enable efficient, effective, equitable ISFL program implementation	Initially established in program documentation, but insights to be gained in interviews	Effectiveness (EQEf)
		Trustee will build on experience implementing similar size and type of AFOLU and REDD+ programs in developing countries	Trustee is able to implement program and interface with country teams, and will sufficiently prioritize the program in global and country portfolios	Initially established in program documentation, but insights to be gained in interviews	Efficiency (EQEc)
Country selection	Countries selected based on relevant key criteria ensuring they will generate strong impacts and sustainable outcomes, and generate quality, contrasting lessons for future programs	Countries selected according to criteria will be capable to implement project and provide a positive setting to potential high impacts.	Countries selected have sufficient technical, governance and planning capacity; program experience; relevant drivers; carbon emissions abatement potential; and political will	Initially established in program documentation (external consultancy report), but will be verified in interviews	Governance and Management (EQG)
Jurisdiction selection	Jurisdictions will be selected based on relevant key criteria ensuring they will generate strong impacts and sustainable outcomes, and generate quality, contrasting	Jurisdictions selected according to criteria will be capable to implement project and provide a positive setting to potential high impacts	Jurisdictions selected have sufficient experience, governance and planning; relevant drivers; carbon emissions abatement potential; and political will	Initially established in program documentation, but insights to be gained in interviews	Governance and Management (EQG)

TOC Input	Core Logic	Causal Assumptions or Change Mechanisms Assumed	Preconditions for Causal Links To Hold	Preconditions Met? Or How to be Tested in Evaluation?	Corresponding Evaluation Questions
	lessons for future programs				
Government partner selection	Government partners will be selected based on relevant key criteria ensuring they will champion and effectively implement program	Government partners selected will be capable and interested to manage work and drive ISFL program at jurisdiction level	Partners selected have sufficient experience, technical and management capacity, adequately powerful government role; and political will	Initially established in program documentation, but insights to be gained in interviews	Governance and Management (EQG)
ISFL design, funding and management structure	ISFL's program design, governance structure, funding and staffing levels will enable it to achieve its objectives	Assigned funding and staff is sufficient to implement its activities and cover administration costs	World Bank and donor-required policies, procedures, and commitments are appropriate given the ISFL program budget, activities, objectives and timelines	Interviews and document reviews	Effectiveness (EQEf)
		The ISFL program design will balance the rigorous demands of GHG programs with implementing country realities	The ISFL program will have adequate flexibility to build on existing institutions and adapt to key political economy issues, and to implement programs practically without overly burdensome GHG emission reduction program requirements.	Interviews and document reviews	Effectiveness (EQEf) Efficiency (EQEc)
Support for Effective Delivery (Inputs → Outputs)					
Monitoring, Reporting and Verification of Emission Reductions	Initiative's governance arrangements facilitate efficient and effective decision-making, which will ensure programs implemented correctly and according to TOC	Procedures in country programs are implemented according to international standards	Technical competence and sufficient guidance/TA provided	Interviews and document reviews	Effectiveness (EQEf)
		Comprehensive and accurate data are available	Access to necessary technology, data and information systems	Interviews and document reviews	Effectiveness (EQEf)
Technical studies	Availability of background reports will help ensure correct design and implementation of activities	Results of studies are being accepted to inform design and implementation of practice and policies	Country and Bank QA/QC ensures studies are high-quality	Interviews and document reviews	Effectiveness (EQEf)
Financial & procurement management	Reliable management practices and systems will ensure efficient and effective use of funds	Rules and procedures will ensure accurate accounting and timely approvals	Rules and procedures in place for accurate accounting and timely approvals	Interviews and document reviews	Effectiveness (EQEf) Efficiency (EQEc)
		Staff and systems will implement practices effectively	Bank and government teams employ capable and well-	Interviews and document reviews	Effectiveness (EQEf)

TOC Input	Core Logic	Causal Assumptions or Change Mechanisms Assumed	Preconditions for Causal Links To Hold	Preconditions Met? Or How to be Tested in Evaluation?	Corresponding Evaluation Questions
Monitoring, evaluation and learning dissemination	Comprehensive, appropriate MEL will track activity implementation, inform process improvements and result in successful outcomes		trained staff and systems that accurately follow rules and procedures		Efficiency (EQEc)
		Gross financial mismanagement will not occur	Little/no corruption and conflict of interest	Not a major focus of evaluation	Effectiveness (EQEf)
		Indicators are relevant to each jurisdiction but also can be aggregated across ISFL	MEL plan includes both country-specific and global indicators	Interviews and document reviews	Effectiveness (EQEf)
		Impacts measured can be attributed (at least partly) to ISFL	Impacts from non-ISFL programs measured and excluded (at least partly) from ISFL-attributed impacts.	Interviews and document reviews	Effectiveness (EQEf)
Results-based payments and grants	Financial support for readiness and performance-based payments will assist ISFL countries to transform to low-emissions AFOLU sectors.	Lessons from MEL are captured and rapidly used to adapt country programming	ISFL and country-level policies in place for adaptive management responding to MEL lessons	Interviews and document reviews	Effectiveness (EQEf)
		Grant agreements and ERPAs will align with jurisdiction priorities, responding to drivers and incentives	Workable strategic planning procedures in place to guide ERPA and grant support in light of best available technical and sociopolitical evidence	Interviews and document reviews	Effectiveness (EQEf) Efficiency (EQEc)
		Processes of country programs will be timely and have low transaction costs to maximize resource impacts	Efficient processes in place	Interviews and document reviews	Efficiency (EQEc)
		Benefits will be shared equitably amongst relevant actors changing behaviors due to the program, without excessive transaction and administrative costs, and in appropriate type and quantity	Workable procedures for equitable, efficient, effective benefit sharing procedures are in place	Interviews and document reviews	Effectiveness (EQEf) Efficiency (EQEc) Relevance (EQR)
		ERPAs will facilitate parties' understanding of terms of agreement	ERPA templates clear and explained to all parties	Interviews and document reviews	Governance and Management (EQG)
		ER transactions will meet ERPA terms	ERs verified	Interviews and document reviews	Governance and Management (EQG)
		Grant performance will be timely and meet agreement terms of country programs	Grant agreements clear & monitored	Interviews and document reviews	Governance and Management (EQG)

TOC Input	Core Logic	Causal Assumptions or Change Mechanisms Assumed	Preconditions for Causal Links To Hold	Preconditions Met? Or How to be Tested in Evaluation?	Corresponding Evaluation Questions
Governance and Due Diligence Processes	Initiative's governance arrangements facilitate efficient and effective decision-making, which will ensure programs implemented correctly and according to TOC	Governance system will ensure responsible project management	Clear responsibilities assigned to manage and support project governance and activity oversight	Interviews and document reviews	Governance and Management (EQG)
		Program will embed World Bank operational policies and safeguards	Due diligence authority and decision framework established through comprehensive process	Interviews and document reviews	Governance and Management (EQG)
		Actors will communicate effectively within country and with World Bank	Functional reporting and communications protocols in place	Interviews and document reviews	Governance and Management (EQG)
Enabling Environment (Outputs → Outcomes)					
Capacity building and training	Improved capacity will enable jurisdictions to meet program goals	Local context, demand and stakeholders are known and willing to collaborate	Procedures in place to strategically identify and address capacity gaps, and target beneficiaries based on best available technical and sociopolitical evidence, including marginalized populations and women	Interviews and document reviews	Effectiveness (EQEf) Relevance (EQR)
		TA will be valuable and understandable to beneficiaries, improving their capacity	Country and Bank procedures and QA/QC ensures TA is high-quality and relevant for local context and different beneficiary groups	Interviews and document reviews	Effectiveness (EQEf) Relevance (EQR)
		TA programs avoid unnecessary duplication of efforts and make best use of available human and economic resources	TA system provides for interaction and collaboration amongst capacity builders	Not a major focus of evaluation	Efficiency (EQEc) Effectiveness (EQEf)
Effective stakeholder engagement	Working with stakeholders will inform activities and generate 'buy-in', leading to greater program uptake and success	Relevant stakeholders are willing to collaborate	Workable, clear procedures in place for identifying, including and assigning meaningful role to relevant groups, including marginalized populations and women	Interviews and document reviews	Relevance (EQR)
		At national level, stakeholders receive clear and timely communications regarding engagement	Workable, clear procedures in place for efficient stakeholder communications	Interviews and document reviews	Relevance (EQR)
Policy reforms	Policy changes will support more sustainable,	Political support exists in jurisdictions for policy reforms	Political will for reforms assessed and activities	Interviews and document reviews	Relevance (EQR)

TOC Input	Core Logic	Causal Assumptions or Change Mechanisms Assumed	Preconditions for Causal Links To Hold	Preconditions Met? Or How to be Tested in Evaluation?	Corresponding Evaluation Questions
	low-emissions AFOLU sector in target jurisdictions		designed to ensure necessary political support		Effectiveness (EQEf)
		Policy reforms address key AFOLU sector drivers and incentives in the jurisdiction	Reforms based on analysis of AFOLU sector drivers and incentives in the jurisdiction	Interviews and document reviews	Effectiveness (EQEf)
		Reforms develop public awareness on key policy issues as needed	Advocacy coalitions supported with information on policy reforms as needed, building off existing platforms where possible	Not a major focus of evaluation	Relevance (EQR)
Land management planning	Improved land use planning will result in more efficient and sustainable, lower emissions AFOLU sector management	Political support exists in jurisdictions for land management planning	Political will for land management planning assessed and activities designed to ensure necessary political support	Interviews and document reviews	Relevance (EQR) Effectiveness (EQEf)
		Land use planning integrates wide range of land uses and stakeholders, connecting actors across different scales and management hierarchies	Workable, clear procedures in place to incorporate multi-functionality and multi-stakeholder engagement in land use planning, and integrates planners across different scales and concatenated management levels.	Interviews and document reviews	Relevance (EQR) Effectiveness (EQEf)
		Land use planning will support local knowledge, livelihoods & sustainable land-use investments, social and environmental protections and are legally-binding with institutional support	Planning procedures call for links to livelihoods & sustainable investments, includes relevant social and environmental safeguards, and are legally-binding with institutional links	Interviews and document reviews	Relevance (EQR) Effectiveness (EQEf)
Partnerships with public and private sectors	Public-private sector partnerships will support the private sector to transform to more sustainable, lower emissions AFOLU sector investments	Programs will convene appropriate public and private sector financial actors	Programs identify and target appropriate actors, building off existing platforms where possible	Interviews and document reviews	Relevance (EQR)
		Programs attract private and public sector finance, which will be made available	Workable procedures in place for identifying and leveraging public-private sector opportunities for sustainable land use investments, which continue or increase	Not a major focus of evaluation	Relevance (EQR) Effectiveness (EQEf)

TOC Input	Core Logic	Causal Assumptions or Change Mechanisms Assumed	Preconditions for Causal Links To Hold	Preconditions Met? Or How to be Tested in Evaluation?	Corresponding Evaluation Questions
		Programs can be co-financed with public and private sectors	ISFL funding structure flexible to enable co-financing with public and private sectors	Interviews and document reviews	Relevance (EQR) Effectiveness (EQEf)
Achievement of ISFL Outcomes (Outcomes → Impacts)					
Improve land management and land use, including forest cover	AFOLU sector will benefit from lower emissions and improved, more sustainable forest and land use management	Improved land use planning will result in reduced emissions from AFOLU sector	Improved land use planning will not increase GHG emissions either by including unsustainable practices or by increasing land under production	Generally true but will look for signs to the contrary	Effectiveness (EQEf)
		Improved land use planning will result in a more sustainable AFOLU sector and related livelihoods	Improved land use planning will not decrease sustainability of AFOLU sector or related livelihoods	Generally true but will look for signs to the contrary	Effectiveness (EQEf)
Leverage partnerships with and between the public and private sectors to advance the ISFL vision and approach	Public-private sector partnerships in support of the ISFL vision will support a transformation to greater private sector investment in sustainable AFOLU sector	Outcomes leveraging public-private partnership outcomes will scale up private sector investment supporting lower emissions AFOLU sector	Public-private partnerships will not result in increased AFOLU sector emissions either by including unsustainable practices or by increasing land under production	Generally true but will look for signs to the contrary	Effectiveness (EQEf)
		Public-private partnership leveraging outcomes will scale up private sector investment more sustainable AFOLU sector livelihoods	Public-private partnerships will not decrease sustainability of AFOLU sector or related livelihoods	Generally true but will look for signs to the contrary	Relevance (EQR)
Deliver benefits to land users (from ER payments and income generation activities)	Benefits from ER payments and income-generating activities will incentivize a transformation to sustainable AFOLU sector	Benefits will result in reduced emissions from AFOLU sector	Benefits will not increase GHG emissions either by including unsustainable practices or by increasing land under production	Generally true but will look for signs to the contrary	Effectiveness (EQEf)
		Benefits will result in a more sustainable AFOLU sector and related livelihoods	Benefits will not decrease sustainability of AFOLU sector or related livelihoods	Generally true but will look for signs to the contrary	Effectiveness (EQEf)
ISFL Impact (Impacts → Global Goals: Improved Livelihoods, Increased Ag. Productivity, Sustainable Land Use					
GHG Emission Reductions	Local emission reductions will deliver on global goals beyond the ISFL by reducing global GHG emissions	Local emission reductions will result in global GHG emission reductions beyond ISFL program areas (no/minimal leakage), and replication will support low carbon development	Reducing AFOLU sector GHG emissions supports increased agriculture productivity, sustainable land use and improved livelihoods	Generally established global principle, but specific insights to be gained in interviews	Effectiveness (EQEf)

TOC Input	Core Logic	Causal Assumptions or Change Mechanisms Assumed	Preconditions for Causal Links To Hold	Preconditions Met? Or How to be Tested in Evaluation?	Corresponding Evaluation Questions
Reach people with benefits (assets and/or services)	People receiving benefits under ISFL program will deliver on global goals beyond the ISFL	Experience of people receiving benefits under ISFL will incentivize others to replicate lessons in other areas	ISFL program lessons will be shared with people receiving benefits, incentivizing other areas to replicate program	Initially established in program documentation, but insights to be gained in interviews	Relevance (EQR)
Replication of ISFL Approach	Increased learning and implementation of ISFL approaches will deliver on global goals beyond the ISFL	Communication of ISFL approach and results to other areas leads to changes in behavior in those areas	ISFL measures its impacts and shares knowledge and lessons outside ISFL program areas, which will be perceived as sufficiently positive to lead to those actors adopting ISFL approaches	Initially established in program documentation, but insights to be gained in interviews	Relevance (EQR)